Armament Industry European Research Group - ARES

The United States’ Third Offset Strategy (TOS) is a step-change in military innovation offering the likelihood of strategic change in capability, designed to enable the US to maintain global hegemony in an era of great power competition. It represents a key opportunity of technological investment for US defence capacity, which in turn can stimulate the US defence industrial base and the broader technological ecosystem. This policy paper looks into how the TOS may impact Western defence and security decision-making and its strategic implications for the European Union.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The Preparatory Action for Common Security and Defence Policy‐related research is currently under preparation, and it will serve as a test‐bed to prove the relevance of defence‐related research at the European Union‐level. The Preparatory Action could potentially see between €75 ‐ €100 million invested in defence‐specific research over a three‐year period beginning in 2017. The Preparatory Action follows on from a pilot project on CSDP research that was launched by the European Parliament with a budget line of €1.5 million over the 2015‐2016 period. The Preparatory Action aims to serve as a basis for an eventual, fully‐fledged, European Defence Research Programme. Indeed, should the work of the Preparatory Action prove successful, the next step would be to insert a specific thematic area on defence research within the next multi‐annual financial framework (2021‐2027) potentially worth some €3.5 billion.
The idea to specifically invest EU funds in defence research is potentially a ‘gamechanger’. Traditionally, the EU has suffered from important constraints when using EU funds for defence‐related activities. Presently, projects and programmes funded under the European Structural and Investment Funds, COSME (Europe’s programme for SMEs) and Horizon 2020 are still largely geared towards civilian rather than military projects, even though defence‐related projects are not formally excluded. One of the chief objectives of the Preparatory Action and of any eventual European Defence Research Programme is to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy by investing in key defence technologies.