Atlantic Council

This report assesses the conditions under which a global Water Grand Strategy (WGS) might be created and implemented by stakeholders in the United States within the next one to two years. While numerous American organizations are addressing water challenges the world over, no explicit policy or vision coordinates their multiple endeavors. As a result, the United States does not maximize its influence in finding solutions to the world’s most pressing water challenges.
This report evaluates the need for a WGS and explores the possible ends of such a strategy. It summarizes what the United States is already doing in the water space,1 and identifies the current model’s strengths and weaknesses. It outlines a process for forging a “Whole of America” water strategy—a stakeholder-driven process—and addresses key implementation challenges.

There are growing risks and threats to US satellites, civilian and military alike, and challenges to stated US goals in space. The question for the new administration, however, is whether hegemonic means to address those challenges are likely to achieve US goals. It is this paper’s assertion that they are not. Instead, a rebalancing of means used to address US goals in space is now necessary, based on a comprehensive assessment of the strategic space environment through the next ten to twenty years, toward ensuring that the ways and means being pursued to address those goals are in alignment. This assessment must extend beyond the Pentagon as well, to include the rapidly expanding cast of governmental and nongovernmental space actors. In particular, industry representatives should be brought into a process of dialogue with the national space security community to discuss priorities and concerns.

The Pacific Alliance–an innovative pact among Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru–has unprecedented opportunity to capitalize on political changes in Brazil and Argentina and move the region into a new era of regional integration. A new publication by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Bertelsmann Foundation, released just weeks ahead of the Alliance’s Sixth Presidential Summit in Chile, says that now is the moment for the Alliance to deepen engagement with Mercosur and build on efforts to strengthen financial market, energy, trade, and foreign policy coordination.

Ten years ago, most observers predicted a period of smooth sailing for the world economy. Today, the world looks very different. The global economy experienced a major crisis in 2008, from which many countries have not fully recovered. Europe faces a series of major economic, financial, social, and political stresses, from outside its borders and from within. Many of the fastest-growing economies from that time, especially commodity exporters, are now experiencing serious difficulties. China is still growing at a reasonable rate, but more slowly than a few years ago. Much of the Middle East is in turmoil and its economies, with rare exceptions, are suffering. The Doha Round has proved highly disappointing, failing to meet lofty expectations. Global debt rose significantly, and job creation has stalled in many parts of the world.

The United States and the European Union (EU) have a historic opportunity—perhaps their last—to be leaders in building the digital market of the future. To do so, they must seize the opportunity to create a transatlantic digital single market stretching from Silicon Valley to Tallinn, Estonia. Together, they can give a new burst of energy to a global Internet economy centered on thriving digital commerce, innovation, creativity, online security, and citizens’ rights. The newest report of the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative, “Building a Transatlantic Digital Marketplace: Twenty Steps Toward 2020,” evaluates the state of play on the most pressing digital policy issues across five interlocking areas, and identifies twenty steps that the United States and the EU can begin to take between now and 2020 to build a transatlantic marketplace, encourage trust, and preserve the Internet as a global commercial commons and a public good.

Despite Russian aggression in Ukraine and growing threats along NATO’s southern flank, many European allies find it difficult to increase their defense capabilities and meet the commitments they made at the Wales Summit. To address this important challenge, the Atlantic Council produced its Alliance at Risk report, which draws together noted experts and former senior officials to examine the vulnerabilities in European defense and provide recommendations on the way forward. The project highlights six leading nations from NATO’s north, south, east, and west, which also serves to illuminate the many perspectives and diverse defense priorities that exists within the Alliance today.

The national energy system of the United States is aging and has to be renewed in a dynamic fashion to adapt to the transformative changes in the world of energy. Failure to do so will result in substantial economic disadvantage and national security vulnerabilities, and risk the United States’ position as the leading global power in the twenty-first century. The need for modernization represents a unique opportunity to upgrade the United States to a cutting edge system of energy hardware and software. Moreover, climate change is a severe threat to the United States and an existential one to much of the rest of humanity. Climate change represents an ever growing, direct risk to the American people as extreme weather events wreak havoc, rising sea levels engulf coastal cities, and natural beauties and wildlife habitats degrade.

The security situation facing the Middle East is grave and appears to be trending toward greater violence and instability. The Middle East Strategy Task Force's Security and Public Order report, published in cooperation with the Brookings Institution, demonstrates that states of the region have tended to focus on traditional, external threats but the internal threats they face—from domestic unrest, state failure, and civil war—have become both more common and dangerous.

It is highly unlikely that these security problems will solve themselves or that regional states will be able to resolve them on their own. Given the ongoing importance of Middle Eastern energy resources to the international economy, the region’s central geographic location, its multiplicity of terrorist groups, and the extent of regional anger at numerous other countries for their predicament, it would be a mistake to assume that these security problems will not affect the wider world. Already the problems of terrorism and refugees generated by Middle Eastern upheaval have made many Americans, Europeans, Russians, and Middle Easterners want to take action themselves.

A surge in new supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is about to hit the global market over the next several years. LNG export projects already under construction worldwide will add up to 175 billion cubic meters (bcm) of LNG capacity by 2020, mainly from Australia and the United States, and additional projects will move ahead as developers line up more customers.
The rise in LNG supplies will encounter substantially lower gas prices than in recent years and a slowdown in global gas demand, raising questions about the economics of LNG projects. For US exporters, liquefaction and tanker transport will add about $5.30 per million British thermal units (mbtu) in costs for LNG sent to Japan. The cost is similar to liquefy, transport, and regasify LNG sent to Europe, where the cost of regasifying LNG needs to be included to compare its price with pipeline gas.1 With average prices for LNG falling below $8 per mbtu in Japan and even lower in Europe, there is little margin for profit even with Henry Hub prices currently at about $2.40 per mbtu.2 However, LNG exporters are likely to continue selling as long as their variable costs can be covered.
For US exporters, the outlook is more favorable for companies who have concluded a final investment decision to go ahead with an LNG export project. Most of these projects are under construction and have much of their planned output already contracted to sell over twenty years. Most of the US sales will not begin until after the next two years, when demand may be stronger.
The majority of Australia’s projects will already be up and running by 2018 and therefore pose less competition for US exporters seeking to acquire new LNG customers. US projects are also ahead of proposed projects offshore East Africa and in the Eastern Mediterranean, which may not come online until after 2020.

Although African trade flows are accelerating at a healthy rate, most African governments have struggled to diversify their economies and to achieve inclusive, sustainable growth. “As Africans, we should be proud of our recent economic growth performance,” noted African Union (AU) Commissioner for Trade and Industry Fatima Haram Acyl in 2014, “but there should be no room for complacency.”
Increased trade could transform the African continent, which is home to thirty-three of the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) and accounted for only 3 percent of global trade in 2014. African nations that have implemented reforms supporting the free movement of goods, capital, and people have reaped a substantial development dividend and are ranked among the fastest growing economies in the world.
This report examines the current state of trade in Africa, identifies obstacles hindering economic diversification and growth, and offers policy recommendations based on these findings. It addresses the economic and geopolitical implications of the global collapse of commodity demand and China’s recent slowdown, as well as how regional trade agreements and regional economic communities (RECs) offer better opportunities for African economies to unlock growth.