Centre for European Policies Studies

The massive programmes of government bond buying have led to a fundamental change in the operating procedure of the major central banks. The latter now operate in a regime of abundance of bank reserves. This makes it impossible to raise the money market rate except by increasing the rate of remuneration of bank reserves. This, in turn, leads to a massive transfer of the central banks’ profits to commercial banks that will become unsustainable. We argue that the remuneration of bank reserves is not inevitable and that there is an alternative to the current central banks’ operating procedure that avoids making profit transfers to private agents. We propose to use minimum reserve requirements as a policy tool to achieve this objective. Our favoured proposal is a two-tier system of reserve requirements that would only remunerate the reserves in excess of the minimum required. This would drastically reduce the giveaways to banks and allow the central banks to maintain their current operating procedures.

China is the EU’s second biggest agri-food exports market. It is also the second destination for the export of EU products protected by geographical indications (GI), accounting for 9% of its value, including wines, agri-food and spirits. The EU-China Agreement on the Protection of Geographical Indications, concluded in November 2019, is expected to realise higher potential for exporting EU GIs to the country since market access is now guaranteed. But the US-China Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in January 2020, has set down a couple of precautionary measures, including a consultation mechanism with China before new GIs can be recognised for protection in the Chinese market because of international trade agreements. As a result, EU GIs could be brought under tighter US scrutiny before being recognised for protection in China. Analysis reveals, however, that only a handful of EU GIs may be affected by the latter Agreement, if at all.

This paper examines the controversies surrounding the adoption of the United Nations Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and their impacts for the European Union. On the one hand, the EU lost the momentum to speak with one voice in the final conference in Marrakech and at the UN General Assembly, as three Member States voted against the GCM and five abstained (one did not attend the conference). On the other hand, 19 EU Member States did sign the GCM. It shows a positive political commitment among these Member States to develop future policies at EU level. This paper offers an overview of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM, and in particular the EU’s commitment to creating “availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration” (objective 5). It argues that while some EU legal migration policies are generally in line with the GCM, some current EU Directives on labour immigration fall short of the standards laid down in the International Labour Organisation instruments and the principle of non-discrimination among different categories of workers (Carrera et al. 2019a). Moreover, EU irregular migration policies, such as the newly proposed recast EU Return directive, are incompatible with the GCM, for example in relation to objective 13 “using detention as a last resort measure” or objective 7 that also proposes to facilitate access for “non-removable” migrants “to an individual assessment that may lead to regular status”. The Paper concludes by opening up some questions for future assessments of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM. Will EU legislators use the GCM as an opportunity to develop a long-term and comprehensive strategy in the area of migration? Or will they continue searching for consensus among all Member States and subjecting the Union’s policies to ‘intergovernmentalism’ and the lowest common denominator?

The previous Commission policy on resources management was part of the priority for jobs and growth and economic competitiveness. The circular economy will be no less important for the new political priority of climate neutrality; it will become one of the indispensable elements for meeting the EU’s ambitions. EU climate policy and the circular economy are by and large complementary and mutually reinforcing. The circular economy is more than just another ‘product standards’ policy.In order for this to happen, •there is a need for a framework that is able to systematically address trade-offs, such as between the circular and the bioeconomy, but also between material efficiency and energy use, as well as •a mechanism to steer and monitor progress, touching upon the question of whether and if so, how to increase ambition and develop tools to monitor progress, for example via targets, and •the new Commission will need to develop and then scale up successful products and processes to create opportunities for new value chains while addressing risks, such as dependency on raw materials. Circular economy products for the foreseeable future will require both technology push and market pull policies. Both the circular economy and low-carbon economy will require new and often yet unknown business models. This will also require new methods of regulation. The principal challenge will be to create ‘lead markets’ for the circular economy in combination with low-carbon products. Many ideas for this exist. They include, for example, ‘carbon contracts for difference’, carbon budgets for projects, consumption charges, taxes and tax exemptions, sustainable finance, product standards and public procurement. Ideas now need to be tested to see whether they could work in practice. Finally, the EU circular economy will need to be underpinned by a robust and transparent carbon accounting system. If effective, such as system can at the same time act as a catalyst -carbon products and processes.

Digitalisation brings about disruptive transformations in society, ranging from access to services, interaction with others, obtaining and sharing information, to metamorphoses in the nature and organisation of work. Learning is no exception. Digitalisation of learning is the process by which education and training, and generally skills acquisition, development and recognition, are being transformed by the use of digital technologies. Digital technologies have already changed access to information and knowledge in everyday life. Online multimedia tutorials can be downloaded for any daily tasks. Nowadays, online tools and forums are the most effective means to master a statistical computer programme.To measure the current situation of digital learning in European countries and to draw attention to this very important issue, the Jobs & Skills Unit at the Centre for European Policy Studies (C EPS) has developed an Index of Readiness for Digital Lifelong Learning (IRDLL) for the European Union (EU)’s 27 countries. This Executive Summary presents the results of the research divided into four major chapters. The first deals with digital learning as a topic – what it is, and what it is good for. The second chapter presents the results of the IRDLL overall and of its individual subcomponents. It also contains the main messages that can be distilled for national governments and other stakeholders. The third part of the report looks at what the EU, at supranational level, is currently doing with regard to digitalisation of learning and draws recommendations for the next European Commission (EC). The last chapter contains 27 individual country sheets – ju st one page long – to present a reader-friendly summary of key findings for each EU member state (MS). In the past, the technological and infrastructural angle of the phenomenon dominated discussions on digital learning. More recently, it has become evident that digital learning encompasses how digital technologies are integrated in teaching and learning approaches, within an organisational and institutional context, considering also users’ ability to make the best use of such technologies and embrace change.

The ECRI Statistical Package 2019 provides data on outstanding credit granted by monetary-financial institutions (MFIs) to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) for the period from 1995 to 2018. Credit volumes and annual growth rates are broken down by sector and credit type to enable detailed insights into credit market developments over time and across countries. It comprises 45 countries including the EU Member States, EU candidate and EFTA countries as well as the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. 2018, loans to EU households and non-financial corporations(NFC) increased by 2.7%, the second consecutive year of the expansion.For the fourth year in a row, total loans in New Member States (NMS) grew faster than in old Member States (EU-15). Compared to the previous year, the total loans growth rate in 2018 accelerated from 2.2% to 2.7% in EU-15, while it slowed from 5.9% to 3.5% in NMS. Between 2017 and 2018, household loans increased by 2.8% and non-financial corporations (NFC) loans increased by2.6%. Total household loans grew most in in Slovakia (+11%), Romania (+9%) and Lithuania (+8%), while the largest contractions were registered in Cyprus (-31%), Greece (-7%) and Latvia (-5%). Finland (+19%), Hungary (+19%) and Luxembourg (+11%) were amongst the Member States with the largest growth rates in NFC loans. In turn, significant reductions were registered inalia, Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia.

ATMs constitute a critical component in today’s infrastructure for facilitating cash payments. However, ongoing digitalisation (cashless payments, e-commerce and online banking) is challenging the role of ATMs and putting pressure on the cash infrastructure in the EU. The shift from cash to cashless payments reduces the need for cash withdrawals and the rise of online banking challenges the bank branch as the traditionally most prevalent location for ATMs. Moreover, the introduction of pricing policies might also change the dynamics in EU ATM markets. Transparency and price caps on the so-called dynamic currency conversion (DCC) as well as potential reductions in interchange fees will put pressure on the revenues of certain ATMs.
Against this background, this report assesses the sensitivity of EU ATM markets to ongoing digitalisation and pricing policies. The impact of these developments is assessed across business models in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, which are representative of the ATM markets in all EU member states.

In developing its international trade strategy since 2006, the EU has placed a strong emphasis on concluding Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with dynamic East Asian economies. Until very recently, however, no explicit mention has been made of China – the region’s largest and most dynamic economy – as a possible candidate for an FTA with the EU. This oversight becomes even more glaring if one considers the magnitude of the economic intercourse that already exists today between these two trading partners. China is the logical sequel in the Union’s trade strategy for East Asia. This study attempts to provide a solid analytical basis for negotiations on an EU-China Free Trade Agreement (formally, Free Trade Area treaty). The first official suggestion for such an FTA, made by Chinese President Xi Jin Ping in the spring of 2014, has recently been considered, cautiously and under various conditions, by the EU as well.

This report is based on discussions in the CEPS Task Force on EU Reform. The group met four times between September 2016 and January 2017. Participants included members of the European Parliament, former members of the college of Commissioners, former members of the European Council and Council of Ministers, as well as leading scholars on EU politics and law. A list of members and their organisational affiliation appears in the Annex. Pieter de Gooijer, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom to the Netherlands to the EU, and Pawel Świeboda, Deputy Head of the European Political Strategy Centre of the European Commission acted as observers to the proceedings of the Task Force.
CEPS’ Task Force on EU reform has looked into constitutional issues and citizens' involvement in politics, migration and asylum, euro area economic governance, and trade policy. These are all areas where the added value of the Union's action is clear and where we still have unfinished business. We have tried to draw up a list of proposals for actions that are positive and can bring solutions where populist discourse cannot. Our recommendations are achievable, realistic, concrete, based on objective facts and figures, and part of a broader long-term approach. We do not shy away from considering possible treaty change, but focus first on what can be done quickly and easily, if there is a willingness to act.