Munich Security Conference

Transatlantic leaders seem to have come to a common conclusion: the world’s liberal democracies are facing a new systemic competition. While they support a joint strategy for dealing with their autocratic challengers by strengthening cooperation with each other, they are only at the beginning of thinking about the best way to compete where they must – and to cooperate with competitors where they can. At last year’s Munich Security Conference, world leaders discussed a world shaped by “Westlessness” – as diagnosed by the Munich Security Report 2020. Unfortunately, various developments have vindicated last year’s dire analysis. Not only did Western countries continue to exhibit a lack of joint action on crucial global issues, the past year also saw continued attacks on liberal-democratic norms in key Western countries, with the storming of the US Capitol as the most emblematic symbol of the threat to democracy. But there is hope. In the midst of a global pandemic, almost exactly one year after a divisive Munich Security Conference 2020, the speakers at the virtual MSC Special Edition on February 19, 2021, including US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and other world leaders all voiced their support for a new beginning in the transatlantic relationship and for revamping cooperation among liberal democracies to prevail in a new age of systemic competition. After what can be called an “autocratic decade,” liberal democracies are now willing to push back to turn the “illiberal tide.” President Biden, having declared that “America is back” and ready to lead, is stressing at every opportunity that democracies find themselves at an inflection point and need to prove that democracy is not a phase-out model but can deliver tangible benefits to the people.

The Horn of Africa is adrift. Turmoil in Ethiopia and Sudan is sending shock-waves through the broader region – with knock-on effects for European and American interests. While the African Union is in the lead to address these issues, transatlantic partners must coordinate and do their part to tackle the crises in Europe’s extended neighborhood. In the Horn of Africa, hope and havoc are next-door neighbors. It is a place where a new, young generation is fighting for democracy. It is an arena where regional and global powers compete for influence. And it is also a region where conflicts are threatening the very essence of statehood. In Ethiopia and Sudan, after 30 years of authoritarian rule, two democratic transitions have first blossomed and then faced backlash within a matter of just three years. War in Ethiopia, a derailed democratic transition in Sudan, an escalating border dispute between these two neighbors, and a conflict over the Nile waters between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan represent only a shortlist of the Horn’s complex conflict network. Europe and the United States must develop a deeper understanding of the Horn of Africa’s conflict landscape and come to terms with the region’s intricate dilemmas. To start with, Europe and the US need to face two realities: first, conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa impact their very own interests not least with regard to freedom of navigation, peace, security, good governance, and migration – although not to the same extent: Europe’s exposure to turmoil in the region is much more direct. Second, transatlantic partners are not the only external actors who take an interest in the Horn of Africa. Instead, the region is at the center of an intense geopolitical competition. To prevent further deterioration of the region’s conflicts, a coordinated transatlantic agenda is required.

2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Almost every month, a new crisis dominated the news, contributing to a sense that this mounting tide of crises threatens to overwhelm us.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in Europe and beyond, concern about a growing loss of control is prevalent. In fact, findings from the Munich Security Index 2022 not only reflect the high level of risk perceived by respondents in the G7 and BRICS countries; they also suggest the emergence of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of crises that reinforce each other. Just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. Whether it is the seemingly endless pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or increasing geopolitical tensions, all these challenges contribute to a feeling of a loss of control. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed.
This perception is highly dangerous because it can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Societies that have concluded that they cannot solve humankind’s most challenging problems might no longer even try to turn the tide. Will our stressed and overburdened societies end up accepting what they see as their fate, although they have the tools and resources to change it?

Part of the Munich Security Conference’s Transnational Security Series, this report aims to shine a light on selected examples of transnational illicit flows which, in their manifold manifestations, have implications for global, regional, and national security. Given the illicit nature of these flows, available data is often fragmented. In light of this challenge and in order to illustrate key insights, this report – which includes contents compiled in close cooperation with many institutions and experts in this field – will put the spotlight on transnational challenges across several dimensions of illicit flows. In MSC tradition, this report does not aim to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as a discussion starter for our key audience and to highlight questions that need to be asked.

This year's report analyses the reshuffling of core pieces of the international order. Besides looking at major powers like the United States, China and Russia, the report also highlights actors of the "second row": liberal democracies such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. In addition, the report assesses current security policy developments in selected regions such as in the Western Balkans, in the Sahel region and in the Middle East. It examines the global challenge to arms control against the background of the recently suspended INF Treaty and emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons. Other global issues covered are the security policy implications of current developments in the areas of international trade, transnational organized crime and artificial intelligence.

Europe’s security environment has deteriorated in the last few years. New threats include a more aggressive Russia, instability in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and cyberthreats from hostile governments and nonstate actors.
The United States is sending mixed signals about continuing the high level of military support it has provided for Europe in the past decades.
Adding to the challenge, Europe’s defense capabilities have declined. Equipment inventories have been reduced to critical levels across most weapons categories, and many systems are outdated. Austerity and an increase in missions abroad have reduced the readiness of Europe’s forces; in many countries, up to half of military equipment, from infantry vehicles to helicopters, is not available at any one time.
Europe’s fragmented approach to defense exacerbates the situation: Europe has six times more types of major weapon systems than the US. In many European defense projects, countries put the interests of their national industries ahead of European capability building, military cooperation, and interoperability.