Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

How might we have to imagine the Middle East if there were a political thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia? Could Turkey leave NATO in the near future? What would happen if security-related EU databases were successfully hacked; if South Korea were to arm itself with nuclear weapons; or if an American woman were to head the United Nations? Of course, these situations, as explored in the SWP’s latest Foresight research paper, are only hypothetical. Why address them? Because unexpected events have abounded in international politics in recent years. Brexit; the election of Donald Trump as US President; and Russia’s annexation of Crimea are only the most striking examples. Science and politics should therefore ready themselves for likely future surprises. The Foresight research paper aims to assist with this. We cannot and do not want to predict the future. However, with the help of systematic foresight we can better prepare for unplanned situations. This means improving our view of conceivable – albeit unlikely – developments that would seriously impact on German and European foreign and security policy. It also includes reviewing previous expectations – as this research paper likewise tackles. What actually happened to the battery revolution that was supposed to secure our power supply? Did the negotiation process on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU unfold as experts had anticipated? Such reviews are instructive, and can be used to gain insights for the future.

The United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development defines Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships (MSPs) as an essential tool for realising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were adopted along-side the Agenda. However, prior experience of such partnerships between state and non-state actors (from the private sector and/or civil society) has shown mixed results: significant successes have been marred by too many failures. To what extent do policymakers and other relevant actors integrate these insights into multi-stakeholder partnerships – especially as regards the relevant conditions for success – when calling for and fostering new partnerships for the SDGs? This study presents inter alia the results of a series of interviews with selected international actors – from (1) the United Nations, (2) donors and funders, (3) gov-ernments and (4) private initiatives.

Refugee movements, international migration and socio-economic development are intimately bound up together. The impacts of global migratory movements depend on their political management: circumstances conducive to development require close and dependable cooperation between the countries involved. But international cooperation on refugee and migration policy – global migration governance – has to date been weak. Important institutional and policy changes are currently under way, with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015 including at least some universally binding targets and indicators for migration. And in September 2016 the international community decided to prepare two global compacts – one for migration, one for refugees – within the space of two years. Both will have repercussions for the international institutional setup and the division of responsibilities between UN agencies, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Existing supranational consultative forums in the area of migration can also be expected to gain in political significance. What is required from the development perspective is a normative and institutional reordering of global migration policy – a process the German government should promote and contribute to.

Russia’s foreign policy has taken numerous unexpected turns since 2013. Developments such as the annexation of Crimea, the military intervention in Syria, the crisis in relations with Turkey and the instrumentalisation of obscure incidents such as the “Lisa F. case” to discredit the German government all took most Western experts and decision-makers by surprise. Moscow appears to be using unpredictability tactically to take the initiative vis-à-vis other actors. In the process, the Kremlin is deliberately taking risks with potentially unforeseeable consequences for European and inter-national security. The lack of transparency in decision-making processes and the absence of open public debate also make Russia’s foreign policy actions difficult to assess. Moreover, with decision making processes in Russia highly centralised and monopolised, the Kremlin is in a position to act rapidly and does not need to consult with international partners or take account of democratic procedures and domestic political reservations.
That does not mean, however, that there is no room for Germany and Europe to be better prepared. This study identifies conceivable surprises in Russian foreign policy that should expand our thinking about the activities of the political leadership in Moscow.

Global cyberspace is undergoing fundamental change. There are now frequent references to a “fragmentation of the Internet”, but many European and international working groups are also increasingly aware that “a free, open and at the same time secure Internet” is a global public good. However, the political rules adopted for International and European cyber policies and cybersecurity policies will always lag behind technological developments. It is the more important, therefore, to subject these rules to the over-arching norm of due diligence in cyberspace, and to do so on the national, European and international levels. This generates three requirements for Germany’s future strategic orientation in cyberspace:
- European cooperation: integrating national policies into the European framework;
- Inclusiveness: giving different interest groups broad and publicly accessible representation in formulating policies;
- Civilian response: prioritising the civilian component over the military component, particularly in times of peace.

However, Germany’s major partners are confused as to what goals precisely it is pursuing in cyberspace. It is therefore advisable for Berlin to improve its coordination and communication of responsibilities at the national and EU levels, be it on issues of Internet Governance, the fight against cybercrime, or cyberdefence.

China has set new records in the ways, means and speed with which it has expanded its outposts in the South China Sea. Neighbouring states such as Vietnam have also extended their bases on small islands and reefs, but they have done so over many years and not within a few months. The total surface area created by China has been ironically dubbed “The Great Wall of Sand” by the commander of the US Pacific Fleet. Despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary, the expansions signal an emerging militarisation of the South China Sea, whose plentiful resources and energy deposits have long been viewed as potential causes of conflicts.

The South China Sea is currently one of the world’s most contentious zones. But the situation risks becoming even worse, despite the fact that all of the region’s states depend on stable and secure sea lines of communication. At its core, this is a regional conflict about sea routes, territorial claims and resources that primarily involves ASEAN states and China. Nevertheless, it also has global repercussions. First, it concerns a “superhighway of the sea”, on which almost a third of the world’s sea trade is transported. Any impediment to the shipping traffic would have a direct impact on world trade in general but also particularly on Japan and South Korea. Second, the South China Sea is closely connected to the rivalry between Bejing and Washington because important allies and partners of the US are involved in the dispute about China’s territorial claims. Third, it is a conflict about international norms and laws that calls into question a fundamental principle of the liberal world order: “freedom of the seas” versus exclusive maritime zones. This study addresses the main reasons, the development and the implications of the island dispute as well as ways of containing it both regionally and internationally.

At the Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 the heads of state and government of all the UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Several countries, including Germany, committed to move rapidly on implementation. During the UN High-level Political Forum (HLPF) in July 2016, twentytwo countries volunteered to conduct national reviews of their implementation. Moreover, UN member states plan to adopt a resolution on the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda before that meeting. What initiatives would be most helpful for maintaining the momentum and making ambitious progress on implementing and reviewing the Agenda?

On 18 March 2016, the EU member states and Turkey concluded an agreement on the return of persons having arrived in Greece irregularly – in the hope of reducing the number of irregular migrants coming into the EU. After months of member states being unable to find a common response to the rising numbers of new arrivals, the agreement is considered a breakthrough by many observers. In fact, the agreement stands for a broader shift in EU refugee policy, which now focuses on the themes of border security, camps and quotas. This goes along with a reorientation from the previously prevalent individual asylum application towards a system where groups of refugees are accepted voluntarily (resettlement). This trend carries serious risks for refugee protection globally. At the same time, however, new forms of cooperation are taking shape that could strengthen the EU asylum system.

The WTO’s 10th ministerial conference took place shortly before Christmas 2015, the first to be held in Africa. Verdicts on its outcomes range from “the death of the Doha Round” to WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo’s praise for a “historic” package. A more measured assessment reveals a mixed picture. While a number of important decisions were reached in Nairobi, most of the controversial questions were not even on the agenda. And it is less clear than ever where the talks should go from here. A consistent and ongoing shared interest in the global public good of a strong world trade system should persuade the member-states to find constructive new approaches.

There is no end of history. Francis Fukuyama’s famous claim has turned into quite the opposite. Today, liberal democracies and the Western concept of international order are being permanently challenged by an increase in political and economic crises, global and local dissent with established mechanisms of international affairs, and other political ideologies. These challenges increase the leverage of newly emerging actors such as China to push forward alternative ideas of international order.

Among all the different Chinese foreign policy initiatives announced by President Xi Jinping, China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative clearly stands out. It is by far the most comprehensive and visible Chinese initiative of the last three years. China’s OBOR initiative is regarded as a vision for building up a comprehensive cultural, economic, and political network that promotes connectivity and cooperation between countries, regions, and cities along the Silk Road. Furthermore, the OBOR initiative is flexible, inclusive, and open. OBOR has the potential to grow into an alternative idea showing how the common space of international politics could be organized in the future. Consequently, OBOR challenges the still dominating Western vision of the international system and could effectively transform the existing structure of the current international order.

For this reason, this study aims to conceptualize China’s OBOR initiative in a broader context. Instead of only focusing on specific mechanisms linked to OBOR, such as, for example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, it develops an analytical approach that also highlights the various dimensions of China’s OBOR initiative.