European Union

The current COVID-19 pandemic will change the world, like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terror attacks. For the foreseeable future, EU governments will be preoccupied with dealing with the pandemic’ immediate socio-economic consequences. However, other policy areas will be affected as well. With regard to the EU’s security and defence policy, COVID-19 is likely to extinguish the unprecedented dynamism that has characterised its development since 2016. Its most immediate impact is likely to be decreased funding for several new initiatives such as the European Defence Fund. The pandemic is also likely to reduce the EU’s readiness to address crises in its neighbourhood and may hasten the Union’s relative decline as a global power if its recovery is slow and wrought by prolonged disputes between the member states over the appropriate economic response to the crisis. Yet, the EU should not completely abandon its pre-COVID-19 security and defence agenda. Both during and after the pandemic, the Union will continue to face familiar challenges such as cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and instability in its neighbourhood.

The pandemic has created an unprecedented level of uncertainty, mainly because we do not know how long it will last. This affects the economic implications. Two facts are clear: there will be a recession and budget deficits will have to soar. This note draws some implications beyond the immediate health concerns. In many ways, they challenge the architecture of the Eurozone. Either the architecture will change or the Eurozone as we know it will cease to exist. During the sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 2015, the architecture was changed just as the Eurozone was on the verge of losing one or more members, with unmeasurable consequences. Will history repeat itself?

China is the EU’s second biggest agri-food exports market. It is also the second destination for the export of EU products protected by geographical indications (GI), accounting for 9% of its value, including wines, agri-food and spirits. The EU-China Agreement on the Protection of Geographical Indications, concluded in November 2019, is expected to realise higher potential for exporting EU GIs to the country since market access is now guaranteed. But the US-China Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in January 2020, has set down a couple of precautionary measures, including a consultation mechanism with China before new GIs can be recognised for protection in the Chinese market because of international trade agreements. As a result, EU GIs could be brought under tighter US scrutiny before being recognised for protection in China. Analysis reveals, however, that only a handful of EU GIs may be affected by the latter Agreement, if at all.

This report examines digitalisation’s effects on science, technology and innovation and the associated consequences for policy. In varied and far-reaching ways, digital technologies are changing how scientists work, collaborate and publish. While examining these developments, this book also assesses the effects of digitalisation on longstanding policy themes, from access to publicly funded research data, to the diffusion of technology and its absorption by firms. New and emerging topics are also explored. These include the roles of artificial intelligence and blockchain in science and production, using digital technology to draw on the collective intelligence of the scientific community, advances in the digitalisation of biotechnology, and possible "dark sides" of digitalisation.

This paper examines the controversies surrounding the adoption of the United Nations Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and their impacts for the European Union. On the one hand, the EU lost the momentum to speak with one voice in the final conference in Marrakech and at the UN General Assembly, as three Member States voted against the GCM and five abstained (one did not attend the conference). On the other hand, 19 EU Member States did sign the GCM. It shows a positive political commitment among these Member States to develop future policies at EU level. This paper offers an overview of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM, and in particular the EU’s commitment to creating “availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration” (objective 5). It argues that while some EU legal migration policies are generally in line with the GCM, some current EU Directives on labour immigration fall short of the standards laid down in the International Labour Organisation instruments and the principle of non-discrimination among different categories of workers (Carrera et al. 2019a). Moreover, EU irregular migration policies, such as the newly proposed recast EU Return directive, are incompatible with the GCM, for example in relation to objective 13 “using detention as a last resort measure” or objective 7 that also proposes to facilitate access for “non-removable” migrants “to an individual assessment that may lead to regular status”. The Paper concludes by opening up some questions for future assessments of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM. Will EU legislators use the GCM as an opportunity to develop a long-term and comprehensive strategy in the area of migration? Or will they continue searching for consensus among all Member States and subjecting the Union’s policies to ‘intergovernmentalism’ and the lowest common denominator?

The previous Commission policy on resources management was part of the priority for jobs and growth and economic competitiveness. The circular economy will be no less important for the new political priority of climate neutrality; it will become one of the indispensable elements for meeting the EU’s ambitions. EU climate policy and the circular economy are by and large complementary and mutually reinforcing. The circular economy is more than just another ‘product standards’ policy.In order for this to happen, •there is a need for a framework that is able to systematically address trade-offs, such as between the circular and the bioeconomy, but also between material efficiency and energy use, as well as •a mechanism to steer and monitor progress, touching upon the question of whether and if so, how to increase ambition and develop tools to monitor progress, for example via targets, and •the new Commission will need to develop and then scale up successful products and processes to create opportunities for new value chains while addressing risks, such as dependency on raw materials. Circular economy products for the foreseeable future will require both technology push and market pull policies. Both the circular economy and low-carbon economy will require new and often yet unknown business models. This will also require new methods of regulation. The principal challenge will be to create ‘lead markets’ for the circular economy in combination with low-carbon products. Many ideas for this exist. They include, for example, ‘carbon contracts for difference’, carbon budgets for projects, consumption charges, taxes and tax exemptions, sustainable finance, product standards and public procurement. Ideas now need to be tested to see whether they could work in practice. Finally, the EU circular economy will need to be underpinned by a robust and transparent carbon accounting system. If effective, such as system can at the same time act as a catalyst -carbon products and processes.

Digitalisation brings about disruptive transformations in society, ranging from access to services, interaction with others, obtaining and sharing information, to metamorphoses in the nature and organisation of work. Learning is no exception. Digitalisation of learning is the process by which education and training, and generally skills acquisition, development and recognition, are being transformed by the use of digital technologies. Digital technologies have already changed access to information and knowledge in everyday life. Online multimedia tutorials can be downloaded for any daily tasks. Nowadays, online tools and forums are the most effective means to master a statistical computer programme.To measure the current situation of digital learning in European countries and to draw attention to this very important issue, the Jobs & Skills Unit at the Centre for European Policy Studies (C EPS) has developed an Index of Readiness for Digital Lifelong Learning (IRDLL) for the European Union (EU)’s 27 countries. This Executive Summary presents the results of the research divided into four major chapters. The first deals with digital learning as a topic – what it is, and what it is good for. The second chapter presents the results of the IRDLL overall and of its individual subcomponents. It also contains the main messages that can be distilled for national governments and other stakeholders. The third part of the report looks at what the EU, at supranational level, is currently doing with regard to digitalisation of learning and draws recommendations for the next European Commission (EC). The last chapter contains 27 individual country sheets – ju st one page long – to present a reader-friendly summary of key findings for each EU member state (MS). In the past, the technological and infrastructural angle of the phenomenon dominated discussions on digital learning. More recently, it has become evident that digital learning encompasses how digital technologies are integrated in teaching and learning approaches, within an organisational and institutional context, considering also users’ ability to make the best use of such technologies and embrace change.

The ECRI Statistical Package 2019 provides data on outstanding credit granted by monetary-financial institutions (MFIs) to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) for the period from 1995 to 2018. Credit volumes and annual growth rates are broken down by sector and credit type to enable detailed insights into credit market developments over time and across countries. It comprises 45 countries including the EU Member States, EU candidate and EFTA countries as well as the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. 2018, loans to EU households and non-financial corporations(NFC) increased by 2.7%, the second consecutive year of the expansion.For the fourth year in a row, total loans in New Member States (NMS) grew faster than in old Member States (EU-15). Compared to the previous year, the total loans growth rate in 2018 accelerated from 2.2% to 2.7% in EU-15, while it slowed from 5.9% to 3.5% in NMS. Between 2017 and 2018, household loans increased by 2.8% and non-financial corporations (NFC) loans increased by2.6%. Total household loans grew most in in Slovakia (+11%), Romania (+9%) and Lithuania (+8%), while the largest contractions were registered in Cyprus (-31%), Greece (-7%) and Latvia (-5%). Finland (+19%), Hungary (+19%) and Luxembourg (+11%) were amongst the Member States with the largest growth rates in NFC loans. In turn, significant reductions were registered inalia, Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia.