Defence

In her State of the Union address on 13 September 2023, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen outlined the main priorities and flagship initiatives for the year to come, building on the European Union's successes and achievements of the past years.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 set off a chain of events that has reverberated far beyond the borders of the conflict. Across Europe, a historic effort to rethink defense posture is underway as European states grapple with the implications of the conflict for their own security. Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Vilnius summit this past July, the transatlantic alliance requires long-term defense industrial investments to sustain the collective defense of all member-states.

The 2023 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2022 that were significant for European security – in particular, inevitably, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The first section of the volume explores the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine and the far-reaching repercussions of this unprecedented event for Europe’s security and defence architecture.
The second section assesses the implementation of the Strategic Compass, the guiding framework for the Union’s security and defence up to 2030, and the EU’s evolution as a defence actor. The third section focuses on multilateralism, and contains geographical and regional thematic chapters on North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas.

The European Parliament started monitoring future shocks during the coronavirus crisis, and has continued to do so during Russia's unprecedented war on Ukraine. The annual 'Future Shocks' series reviews global risks, with a focus on specific risks and the capabilities and resilience of the EU system in the face of multiple challenges. It seeks to provide up-to-date, objective and authoritative information on these risks, based on risk literature from a broad range of sources. 'Future Shocks' includes, but is not limited to, areas where the EU has primary competence, and identifies the benefits of concerted action by the EU as well as the ability of its institutions and Member States to find new and effective solutions to deal with major shocks. The 2023 edition, the second in this annual series, highlights 15 risks related to geopolitics, climate change, health, economics and democracy that could occur in the coming decade, and 10 policy responses to address existing governance capacity and possible ways to enhance capabilities within the EU. Among the options set out are those previously included in European Parliament resolutions, positions from other EU institutions, and policy papers from think tanks and stakeholders.

Russia’s war against Ukraine exposed the dire state of European defense once and for all. European capability gaps are vast; defense industries have been scaled down; and Europeans hardly cooperate. But the war could unleash new dynamics. Carried by public support for greater defense spending and cooperation, European policymakers have committed themselves to transforming European defense. The EU is trying to seize the moment by launching several initiatives that, if properly supported and funded, could help overcome the pathological fragmentation of Europe’s defense industrial base and establish the Union as a strategic enabler for NATO. But more needs to be done.
The report highlights that Europeans need to up and keep their spending pledges both to close some of the key legacy and new capability gaps and assuage criticism that they do not pull their weight in the transatlantic relationship. But not all capability gaps can be closed. Europeans therefore need to prioritize and plan better together, both within and between the EU and NATO, including by learning the lessons from the battlefields in Ukraine. Setting joint priorities should lay the foundation for deeper cooperation on joint arms projects. However, Europeans hardly cooperate on development and procurement, which causes costly duplications, weakens Europe’s defense industrial base, and undermines the interoperability between armed forces. Europe’s responses to the war risk even exacerbating this fragmentation. Aimed at mitigating fragmentation, the EU initiatives need to be better funded and supported by the member states.
The report concludes with five policy recommendations on how Europeans can come off the fence on European defense.

As Ukraine continues to fight to liberate its occupied territories and eject Russian invaders, its Western backers debate the likely endgame for the war and its aftermath.

The international response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while impressive in many ways, remains inadequate to the task and dangerously wobbly. Russia’s wider threat to the rules-based international order is also insufficiently acknowledged.

Many proposals have been put forward for how the conflict could, or should, be brought to a close. Some, though well-intentioned, involve concessions that would effectively appease Russia, betray Ukraine and endanger Europe.

Persistent calls for a ceasefire or ‘negotiated settlement’ to end the fighting without tackling its underlying cause – Russia’s ambition to eliminate Ukraine as we know it – will do no more than reward the aggressor while punishing the victim.

This multi-author report takes nine commonly espoused ideas for quick fixes or objections to bolstering assistance to Ukraine, and weighs them against both current reality and their long-term consequences.

The unanimous conclusion of the authors is that the only outcome to the war that can safeguard the future security of Europe is a convincing Ukrainian victory – hence, Western military support to Kyiv should be redoubled before it is too late.