Foreign affairs

Germany has never been as prosperous, secure, and free as it is today. But power and influence entail responsibility. This also means that it has to take on new responsibilities.

These guidelines correspond to a significant degree to policy priorities established by the Members of the European Parliament during the seventh parliamentary term through a large number of reports and resolutions which received broad support in the plenary. President Juncker's ten points are also broadly in line with several of the objectives set out in the 'Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change', adopted in the European Council in June 2014 when it proposed Mr Juncker to the Parliament as its candidate for President of the Commission.
The potential economic benefits of new European-level action may be measured in terms of additional gross domestic product (GDP) generated or in savings in (current or potential) public expenditure or other expenditure, through a more efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a whole.
The analysis set out in this document suggests that there could be very significant economic gains of these kinds, amounting in time to a maximum achievable potential gain of approximately €1.7 trillion per year, on the basis that Mr Juncker's ten priorities were to be fully implemented in a form consistent with various policy requests made to date by the Parliament.

This study brings together work in progress on a long-term project to identify and analyse the 'cost of non-Europe' in a number of policy fields. This concept, first pioneered by the European Parliament in the 1980s, is used here to quantify the potential efficiency gains in today's European economy from pursuing a series of policy initiatives recently advocated by Parliament - from a wider and deeper digital single market to better coordinated national and European policies for defence and development. The benefits may be measured principally in additional GDP generated or a more rational use of public resources. The latest analysis suggests that the European economy could be boosted by almost 1.6 trillion euro per year - or 12 per cent of EU-28 GDP (2014) - by such measures over time. The study is intended as a contribution to the on-going discussion about the European Union’s policy priorities over the current five-year institutional cycle, from 2014 to 2019.

"The World in 2025" group was composed of experts with a profound understanding of global challenges and developments, as well as a solid knowledge of foresight in specific countries or regions.The objectives of this group were first to assess and measure global trends over recent decades, distinguishing the different major economies and regions, including the European Union, and the main economic, geopolitical, environmental and societal relationships and inter-connections, to serve as a basis for forward projections. Secondly, the group was asked to generate and analyse alternative (even disruptive) scenarios of world trends up to 2025, based on specified assumptions about economic, political, social, environmental and technological developments, in order to assess their consequences for the EU and to examine which policy responses could be appropriate.

Offered as a companion to the US National Intelligence Council (NIC)'s Global Trends 2030 quadrennial assessment released today, the Council's Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World surveys the emerging economic and geopolitical landscape; it describes the unprecedented policy challenges that landscape presents; and it outlines a US strategy to avoid a zero-sum, conflictual future and move toward a more cooperative and prosperous 2030.

The Chinese empire prospered during the middle ages, albeit largely isolated from the rest of the World. This isolation had a side effect though, as China completely missed the opportunity of the Industrial Revolution. At its peak, near the beginning of the 19th century, China accounted for almost one third of the global economy. However, after the defeat from the British, during the two Opium Wars, the Chinese Empire and its economy collapsed to a mere 5% contribution to global GDP, by the mid 20th century. It remained near this level until Deng Xiaoping assumed power in 1977 and began growing ever since. Now this contribution exceeds 17%, a level similar to the one it had in 1870, indicating an economic cycle closing after more than a century.

Hu Angang presented global trends and the rise of China by 2030 during the 2012 "Oxford China and World Economy Forum".


Common prosperous country:

–Economically powerful country with billions population
–Innovative country with billions population
–Common-rich country with billion population
–Beautiful country built up by all Chinese

Common prosperous world:

–Big development
–Big convergence
–Big reversion
–Big transformation

China will be:

–The most powerful engine for global economic development
–The new donor of international development assistance
–The leading country of global big transformation

The paper argues that United States (US) participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS)—regional integration architecture led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—was motivated by four changes in the regional economic landscape: (i) the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and emergence of the ASEAN+3 grouping; (ii) the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the leading regional growth engine and an active player in regional integration arrangements; (iii) the failure of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) arrangement to foster trade liberalization in the region; and (iv) the inability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round to lower global trade barriers significantly.
In joining the EAS, the Obama Administration espoused an approach known as divided functionality, one that would give priority to APEC, and its trade-focused Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement economic engagement with East Asia, and the EAS for addressing political and security issues. Currently, two architectures for regional economic integration are contesting. The first embodies the US vision of a deeply institutionalized Asia-Pacific economic community, as articulated by the ongoing TPP trade negotiations. The second is represented by the Asia-only ASEAN+3 framework, a shallowly institutionalized grouping with weak enforcement compliance mechanisms. However, despite differences in the two approaches, prospects for a healthy complementarity between them—through overlapping memberships, the application of open regionalism, and the benefits of competitive liberalization among specific trade agreements—seem promising.

This overview, followed by five supporting reports, identifies these challenges of tomorrow, points to key choices ahead, and recommends not just ‘what’ needs to be reformed, but ‘how’ to undertake the reforms. The overview is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter examines the characteristics of China’s development since 1978; considers future opportunities, challenges, and risks; and describes a vision of China in the year 2030. The second chapter maps a new strategy that will realize this vision, focusing on the key choices ahead for China to sustain rapid economic and social development and become a modern, harmonious, and creative high-income society before 2030. Chapters three to eight elaborate on each of the six pillars of the new strategy: consolidating China’s market foundations; enhancing innovation; promoting green development; ensuring equality of opportunity and social protection for all; strengthening public finances; and achieving mutually beneficial win-win relations between China and the rest of the world. The ninth and final chapter addresses implementation challenges, including the sequencing of reforms and overcoming obstacles that are likely to emerge.

This paper examines the balance between China and India in 2030. The assessment also incorporates the actions of other actors such as the U.S. and Pakistan, as well as regional actors, where necessary. The assessment uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures, and seeks to avoid previous assessment templates wherever possible. This is a unique competition, not previously faced by our planners, and requires a unique approach.
The paper is based on the following starting assumptions:
a. A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. With a shift in the locus of global politics from the Atlantic to the Pacific, India, the U.S. and China will define the emerging global balance of power. This triangular relationship, or tri-polarity, is likely to be the most significant aspect of the emerging 21st century global system.
b. The growth of the Chinese and Indian economies over the past decade, and in the next two decades, will lead to increasingly assertive political and military strategies from both nations.
c. The increasingly assertive nature of both nations will bring them into competition with each other, as they seek global stature and access to energy resources and raw materials to continue their economic growth. There has been, and there will continue to be, a continuing technological revolution.
This will particularly manifest in the fields of information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, hypersonics, and materials science. This ongoing revolution will impact on geopolitics and military balances, as well as the India-China competition.
e. Significant discontinuities are possible. The National Intelligence Council (2008) has noted that historically, geopolitical rivalries trigger discontinuities more than technological change. Technology is resulting in radical change and has been a major driver. However, over the past century, geopolitical rivalries and their consequences have been more significant causes of the multiple wars, collapse of empires, and rise of new powers than technology alone.

The assessment of the India-China competition is built in four parts:
The Nature of the Competition. The first element of the balance examines the nature of the competition between India and China. Description of competition describes how both sides see the different areas of competition, as well as the importance attached to each. This also includes India-China contrasts that affect the competition, including objectives, strategic culture, differences in strategic characteristics and competencies, and the application of national resources to realizing strategic goals.

Key India-China Balances. The next part of the paper is an examination of key balances. These balances are neither exhaustive nor independent of each other. Significant issues will differ depending on the context, but were possible, each balance will include a basic assessment, and consider goals, key asymmetries, trends, and implications. The key balances are: 1. Command and Control Capability; 2. Nuclear Forces; 3. Conventional Maritime capability; and, 4. Conventional Air-land Capability.

Scenarios. Through the extrapolation of long-term trends from these key balances, three India-China scenarios have been be generated to examine how the balance could manifest in 2030.11 Key drivers and critical uncertainties are incorporated into the scenarios and described in detail. These scenarios are reviewed from both the Indian and Chinese perspectives based on strategic aspirations and the investment in military capabilities likely to be deployed in 2030. This also will highlight issues that earlier parts of the paper have not identified.

Implications. The last section will be an overall assessment of the balance in the India-China competition. This section describes where there are strategic asymmetries, and environmental opportunities for both India and China – as seen from their point of view - and where they might seek to improve the situation in their favor. Finally, it describes potential impacts on the U.S. as well as issues that require further examination.