Migration

With a general election expected in the next 12-18 months, the UK’s asylum system is in crisis.
The backlog is at over 130,000 cases, the system is costing around £3.6 billion a year in asylum support costs, and the Home Office is gripped by institutional challenges. At the same time, the number of people arriving in small boats has escalated rapidly from the hundreds to the tens of thousands in the past five years.
The prime minister has pledged to ‘stop the boats’ as one of his five priorities for government. Central to the government’s plan is its flagship Illegal Migration Act – which will place a duty on the home secretary to remove irregular arrivals and not consider their asylum claims – as well as the agreement to relocate asylum seekers to Rwanda.
This briefing sets out the in-tray for the UK government in 2025 – after the next general election – across the main parts of the asylum system.

2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Almost every month, a new crisis dominated the news, contributing to a sense that this mounting tide of crises threatens to overwhelm us.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in Europe and beyond, concern about a growing loss of control is prevalent. In fact, findings from the Munich Security Index 2022 not only reflect the high level of risk perceived by respondents in the G7 and BRICS countries; they also suggest the emergence of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of crises that reinforce each other. Just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. Whether it is the seemingly endless pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or increasing geopolitical tensions, all these challenges contribute to a feeling of a loss of control. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed.
This perception is highly dangerous because it can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Societies that have concluded that they cannot solve humankind’s most challenging problems might no longer even try to turn the tide. Will our stressed and overburdened societies end up accepting what they see as their fate, although they have the tools and resources to change it?

This paper examines the controversies surrounding the adoption of the United Nations Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and their impacts for the European Union. On the one hand, the EU lost the momentum to speak with one voice in the final conference in Marrakech and at the UN General Assembly, as three Member States voted against the GCM and five abstained (one did not attend the conference). On the other hand, 19 EU Member States did sign the GCM. It shows a positive political commitment among these Member States to develop future policies at EU level. This paper offers an overview of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM, and in particular the EU’s commitment to creating “availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration” (objective 5). It argues that while some EU legal migration policies are generally in line with the GCM, some current EU Directives on labour immigration fall short of the standards laid down in the International Labour Organisation instruments and the principle of non-discrimination among different categories of workers (Carrera et al. 2019a). Moreover, EU irregular migration policies, such as the newly proposed recast EU Return directive, are incompatible with the GCM, for example in relation to objective 13 “using detention as a last resort measure” or objective 7 that also proposes to facilitate access for “non-removable” migrants “to an individual assessment that may lead to regular status”. The Paper concludes by opening up some questions for future assessments of the EU’s role in implementing the GCM. Will EU legislators use the GCM as an opportunity to develop a long-term and comprehensive strategy in the area of migration? Or will they continue searching for consensus among all Member States and subjecting the Union’s policies to ‘intergovernmentalism’ and the lowest common denominator?

In this summary, Dr Franck Debié outlines his views of the key findings of the three ESPAS reports (2012, 2015, 2019) on long-term trends to 2030 for the Ideas Network 2030.

In this short presentation, Dr Franck Debié, Director of the Library and the Knowledge services in the European Parliament, Associate Professor of Geopolitics at Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris (Paris Sciences et Lettres University), Member of the Steering Committee of the European System for Policy Analysis and Strategy (ESPAS) outlines his view of the key findings of the three ESPAS reports (2012, 2015, 2019) on long-term trends to 2030 for the Ideas Network 2030, an Oxford based network regrouping policy-makers, business actors and researchers. The discussion took place on 14 September 2019. In his conclusions he stressed that: 'the successive ESPAS reports help us to progressively narrow our focus on those issues which will force Europeans to engage in a joint conversation on policy options for the future: the rise of China, climate change, aging and migration, digital disruption, and the growth of nationalism.