Politics

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (WMCES) would like to contribute to a reflection process to identify options and concrete proposals for political action on the European level for the next legislature 2024-2029 in these 7 key areas:
defence, debt, digitalisation, demography, democracy, de-carbonisation and de-globalisation. They also represent policy fields in which the European People’s Party identifies its core competencies as a political force.

This paper continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union's long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. The previous
papers were: 'An initial mapping of structural risks facing the EU' (July 2020), which set out some 66 potential structural risks confronting the European Union in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis; 'Capabilities and gaps in the EU's capacity to address structural risks' (October 2020), which looked at those risks from the mapping which were considered as more immediate and significant, and considered ways in which the EU and Member States could address them, either with existing capabilities or through filling gaps in policies and instruments; and 'Options to enhance the EU's resilience to structural risks' (Aril 2021), which examined in greater detail, in 25 of the fields presented in the previous papers, possible action by the EU and highlighted proposals from various quarters, including the European Parliament itself, and at potential or actual constraints that might hinder action in these fields. This latest paper first looks anew at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war has been launched just outside the Union's borders. It then looks in greater detail at 11 policy responses the EU could take to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union's resilience to them.

This paper offers a comprehensive strategy to manage and develop US relations with Russia over the next twenty years. This strategy seeks to thwart current Kremlin efforts to undermine the international system that the United States helped create after World War II and revise after the Cold War; to cooperate in the short and medium term on issues of mutual interest, in particular arms control; and to establish in the long term a broad cooperative relationship once Moscow recognizes that its own security and prosperity are best realized in partnership with the United States and the West.

The European Union is charting a strategic path to becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, grasping the opportunities of the digital age, building an economy that works for people, promoting the European way of life, strengthening our unique brand of responsible global leadership, and nurturing, protecting and strengthening our democracy. Openness, as well as rules-based international and multilateral cooperation, are strategic choices. They stimulate prosperity, fairness, stability, competitiveness and dynamism within the EU and beyond. The history of the European project demonstrates the benefits of well-managed interdependence and open strategic autonomy based on shared values, cohesion, strong multilateral governance and rules-based cooperation. The pandemic has only strengthened the case for international cooperation to address global challenges. This 2021 Strategic Foresight Report presents a forward-looking and multi-disciplinary perspective on the EU’s capacity and freedom to act in the coming decades. Based on an expert-led, cross-sectoral foresight process, it presents global trends, uncertainties and choices that will shape Europe’s future. The report provides the context for possible policy responses. It builds on the 2020 Strategic Foresight Report, which introduced resilience as a new compass for EU policymaking. Section II identifies important structural global trends towards 2050 that will affect the EU’s capacity and freedom to act: climate change and other environmental challenges; digital hyperconnectivity and technological transformations; pressure on democracy and values; shifts in the global order and demography. Section III sets out ten areas in which the EU could strengthen its open strategic autonomy and global leadership. The report stresses that the EU’s future capacity and freedom to act will depend on whether the EU is able to make ambitious choices today, guided by its values and interests, across the identified policy areas.

The current coronavirus crisis emphasises the need for the European Union to devote more effort to anticipatory governance, notably through analysis of medium- and long-term global trends, as well as structured contingency planning and the stress-testing of existing and future policies. In order to contribute to reflection on and discussion about the implications of the coronavirus pandemic for EU policy-making, this paper builds on an initial 'mapping' of some 66 potential structural risks which could confront Europe over the coming decade. Taking 33 risks which are assessed as being more significant or likely, it looks first at the capabilities which the EU and its Member States already have to address those risks, and then looks at the various gaps in policy and instruments at the Union's disposal, suggesting possible approaches to overcome them in the short and medium terms.

The current coronavirus crisis emphasises the need for the European Union to devote more effort to anticipatory governance, notably through analysis of medium- and long-term global trends, as well as structured contingency planning and the stress-testing of existing and future policies. In order to contribute to reflection on, and discussion about, the implications of the coronavirus pandemic for EU policy-making, this paper offers an initial ‘mapping’ of some of the potential structural risks which could confront Europe over the coming decade, with 66 such risks analysed briefly in a series of short notes. The document then goes on to take a closer look at some of the more immediate risks to be considered in the near term and outlines possible EU action to prevent or mitigate them over the remainder of the 2019-24 institutional cycle.

This Chaillot Paper seeks to provide readers with ambitious foresight analysis and insights on how to be prepared for unexpected twists and turns in Russia’s future trajectory.
The opening chapter highlights a set of key megatrends that will shape how Russia evolves in the decade ahead. Subsequent chapters focus on key sectors and analyse critical uncertainties that will influence Russia’s future course of development. They cover state-society relations in the country; its economic development and the evolution of its military posture; as well as how Russia’s relations with the EU’s eastern neighbours and China may unfold by 2030. Each of these chapters presents three alternative future scenarios. While they zoom in on specific themes and sectors, the concluding section offers a panoramic view of the various possible futures – combining elements of all of the preceding chapters to produce three holistic snapshots of Russia in 2030.

In the report’s opening chapter, “The Expansion of Geopolitics”, World Economic Forum President Børge Brende argues the number of actors exerting geopolitical influence is growing and domains for geopolitical competition or cooperation are also expanding. Within this context, Brende calls for a cooperative order: “The more powers compete and pursue strategic advantage at the expense of addressing shared technological, environmental and economic challenges, the more likely it will be that a broader sense of friction will develop across the global system. A rivalrous global system will in turn make it more unlikely that shared priorities are fulfilled,” he writes. Brende notes that global coordination in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis offer a paradigm for a more collaborative response to geopolitical challenges. Cooperation, he argues, will ultimately prove more beneficial to individual states – and to the world at large. “As the world becomes even more interconnected in terms of flows of information, capital and people, states will be more reliant on one another to realize positive outcomes for themselves and the global community,” Brende writes. “At a time when power dynamics are in flux, there is an opportunity for stakeholders to make the decision to shape geopolitics in a cooperative, rather than competitive, manner.”

In the best case, we forecast a world headed toward multipolarity with limited multilateralism. At worst, we projected a multipolarity that devolved into another Cold War bipolarity—with China, Russia, and their partners pitted against the United States, Europe, Japan, and other allies. In that scenario, war seemed inevitable. The fracturing of the post-Cold War global system would be accompanied by internal fraying caused by technological advances. No one was spared. Robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), 3D printing, and automation were already upending both skilled and unskilled occupations in the developed world. As the cost of robots came down and automation and 3D printing spread, still-struggling emerging markets could no longer rely on lower labor costs, as China did to fuel its rise. This is a far cry from the earlier notion that globalization and technological change would “lift all boats.” Under any scenario, many of the poorest of the developing countries will face stiffer, potentially existential, challenges linked to climate change, poor governance, higher incidences of civil conflict, and overpopulation. Climate change will impact everyone in the coming decades, but the poorest areas—sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—will be hit hardest by increasing temperatures and rising sea levels.