Politics

There is no end of history. Francis Fukuyama’s famous claim has turned into quite the opposite. Today, liberal democracies and the Western concept of international order are being permanently challenged by an increase in political and economic crises, global and local dissent with established mechanisms of international affairs, and other political ideologies. These challenges increase the leverage of newly emerging actors such as China to push forward alternative ideas of international order.

Among all the different Chinese foreign policy initiatives announced by President Xi Jinping, China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative clearly stands out. It is by far the most comprehensive and visible Chinese initiative of the last three years. China’s OBOR initiative is regarded as a vision for building up a comprehensive cultural, economic, and political network that promotes connectivity and cooperation between countries, regions, and cities along the Silk Road. Furthermore, the OBOR initiative is flexible, inclusive, and open. OBOR has the potential to grow into an alternative idea showing how the common space of international politics could be organized in the future. Consequently, OBOR challenges the still dominating Western vision of the international system and could effectively transform the existing structure of the current international order.

For this reason, this study aims to conceptualize China’s OBOR initiative in a broader context. Instead of only focusing on specific mechanisms linked to OBOR, such as, for example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, it develops an analytical approach that also highlights the various dimensions of China’s OBOR initiative.

This report is the third in RAND's ongoing Strategic Rethink series, in which RAND experts explore the elements of a national strategy for the conduct of U.S. foreign and security policy in this administration and the next. The report evaluates three broad strategies for dealing with U.S. partners and adversaries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in a time of diminishing defense budgets and an American public preference for a domestic focus. The three strategies are to be more assertive, to be more collaborative, or to retrench from international commitments. All three of these alternative approaches are constrained and a balance will need to be struck among them — that balance may differ from region to region. In general, however, the United States may need to follow a more collaborative approach in which it seeks greater collaboration and burden sharing from strong partners who have until now not been pulling their weight. To further reduce risk, the United States should seek to prevent deeper security ties from developing between China and Russia. It should work closely with its most vulnerable partners not only to reassure them, but to coordinate crisis management with them to limit the risk of unwanted escalation of incidents. And it should sponsor new trilateral efforts to draw together partners in both Europe and Asia that face similar security, political, economic, societal, and environmental problems. Only by working together across regions can many of these challenges be effectively managed. Trilateralism might serve as a useful follow-on strategy to the pivot to Asia.

This report highlights selected inputs the researchers made to the government team to summarize the essential mechanics and roles for bringing a strategic perspective to the consideration of policy. In doing so, it provides the example of problems associated with an aging population as an illustration of how one can use a strategic perspective in an analysis of policy choices.

Israel will benefit from bringing a systemic strategic perspective into its policy process. The concept is integral to formal strategic planning but distinct; although the latter places emphasis on an output (a strategic plan), a strategic perspective is a process for bringing an analytical element into policy decisionmaking. A strategic perspective helps to bridge not only the gap between a short-term focus and longer-term outcomes but also that across ministerial portfolios and responsibilities.

A strategic perspective typically begins with a vision of what a desirable future state of the world might be. Translating a vision into policy requires an understanding of the challenges to achieving the vision and employing processes for setting specific goals to meet those challenges, identifying indicators to measure both status and progress toward goals, and designing and implementing policy measures that will contribute to achievement of goals.

The re-election of the Republic of South Africa as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council for 2011 to 2012 follows shortly after its previous tenure from 2007 to 2008, and has attracted attention from a variety of quarters. Much of this attention is the result of selective interpretations in the West of the country’s conduct during its previous tenure.1 This is unfortunate because the associated caricature of Africa’s largest economy, the only African member of the G20 and which aspires to membership of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and to permanent membership of the UN Security Council, prevents a serious interrogation of its potential role on the Council during the next two years.

In this monograph the Institute for Security Studies and the Pardee Center for International Futures provide an extensive analysis of the projected course of African development to 2050. Combining the deep and wide knowledge of Africa within the ISS with extensive use of the IFs modelling system, this discussion goes beyond past work in a number of ways. It looks across most major issue arenas: demographics, economics, sociopolitical change, the environment and human development itself, including health and education. It explores further into our future than perhaps any other extensive study of African futures has ever done. While not pushing forward specific policy initiatives, it provides a context within which those who pursue sustainable human development can consider policies.

This paper analyses future trends for intrastate conflict in Africa up to 2050 using the International Futures (IFs) model. After reviewing the main post-Cold War patterns of conflict and instability on the continent, the paper discusses seven key correlations associated with intrastate conflict in Africa. It then points to a number of reasons for the changing outlook, including the continued salience of various ‘structural’ conditions that drive intrastate violence even during rapid economic growth, recent improvements in human development alongside a strengthened regional and international conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding regime. Finally, the paper explores how multipolarity may impact on stability and forecasts trends for intrastate conflict in West, Southern, Horn/East and Central Africa. The authors expect large-scale violence to continue its steady decline, although the risk of instability and violence is likely to persist, and even increase in some instances.

This publication, the first in a series of three, considers the feasibility of the central economic growth target that is set out in South Africa’s National Development Plan 2030. It then explores some of the associated human development targets. The paper first looks at the core characteristics of the economy. Against that background and analysis we argue that the core economic growth target of 5,4 per cent average gross domestic product, the associated size of the economy and the income per capita targets are very ambitious. With a huge effort, clear leadership and painful adjustments the targets may be achievable, but it is hardly possible to overestimate the effort that will be required from across South Africa’s diverse interest groups and affected communities. Clearly the current capital- intensive nature of South Africa’s economic growth model will not succeed in delivering sufficient jobs without structural changes to the economy and to current policies. Many other targets, for example in education and infrastructure, are achievable with lower rates of economic growth. This may point to a lack of coherence between the models (and assumptions) used for detailed planning between the different sectors. While economic growth is very important for South Africa, the quality of growth is equally important if the country is to address its deep structural inequality and unemployment challenges.

This policy paper provides an overview of a longer monograph that provides long-term forecasts of fragility in Africa. Using the International Futures system (IFs) data-analysis and forecasting tool, the paper provides a long-term forecast of 26 fragile African countries. They are chosen on the basis of comparative lists of fragile countries based on indicators that reflect the fragility syndrome. In conducting the forecast, the authors argue that fragility should be understood as a syndrome, or set of related conditions, that operates in a system that is mutually reinforcing.

Despite sterling growth in some countries, a number of African countries are caught in a vicious cycle of violence, chronic poverty, inequality and exclusion. These ‘more fragile’ states are on a slow trajectory to long-term peace and development. Using the International Futures system (IFs) data analysis and forecasting tool, the monograph provides a long-term forecast of 26 fragile African countries. The forecasts suggest that in the long-term ten countries on the continent will continue to remain fragile into the mid-21st century. Others, however, have a good chance of embarking on a pathway from fragility to middle-income conditions by 2030 or possibly 2050. The monograph concludes with a list of recommendations.

This paper presents three scenarios for South Africa up to 2030: ‘Bafana Bafana’, ‘A Nation Divided’ and ‘Mandela Magic’. The nation’s current development pathway, called ‘Bafana Bafana’ is the well-known story of a perennial underachiever, always playing in the second league when the potential for international championship success and flashes of brilliance are evident for all to see.‘Mandela Magic’, on the other hand, is the story of a country with a clear economic and developmental vision, which it pursues across all sectors of society. Competition is stiff and the barriers to success are high. The scenario of ‘A Nation Divided’ reflects a South Africa that steadily gathers speed downhill as factional politics and policy zigzagging open the door to populist policies. The impact of the policy and leadership choices that South Africans will make in the years ahead, explored in this paper, is significant. The South African economy could grow 23 per cent larger in ‘Mandela Magic’ compared with its current growth path (‘Bafana Bafana’). The paper concludes with seven strategic interventions required to set South Africa on the most prosperous 'Mandela Magic' pathway.