Regions

The re-election of the Republic of South Africa as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council for 2011 to 2012 follows shortly after its previous tenure from 2007 to 2008, and has attracted attention from a variety of quarters. Much of this attention is the result of selective interpretations in the West of the country’s conduct during its previous tenure.1 This is unfortunate because the associated caricature of Africa’s largest economy, the only African member of the G20 and which aspires to membership of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and to permanent membership of the UN Security Council, prevents a serious interrogation of its potential role on the Council during the next two years.

In this monograph the Institute for Security Studies and the Pardee Center for International Futures provide an extensive analysis of the projected course of African development to 2050. Combining the deep and wide knowledge of Africa within the ISS with extensive use of the IFs modelling system, this discussion goes beyond past work in a number of ways. It looks across most major issue arenas: demographics, economics, sociopolitical change, the environment and human development itself, including health and education. It explores further into our future than perhaps any other extensive study of African futures has ever done. While not pushing forward specific policy initiatives, it provides a context within which those who pursue sustainable human development can consider policies.

This paper analyses future trends for intrastate conflict in Africa up to 2050 using the International Futures (IFs) model. After reviewing the main post-Cold War patterns of conflict and instability on the continent, the paper discusses seven key correlations associated with intrastate conflict in Africa. It then points to a number of reasons for the changing outlook, including the continued salience of various ‘structural’ conditions that drive intrastate violence even during rapid economic growth, recent improvements in human development alongside a strengthened regional and international conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding regime. Finally, the paper explores how multipolarity may impact on stability and forecasts trends for intrastate conflict in West, Southern, Horn/East and Central Africa. The authors expect large-scale violence to continue its steady decline, although the risk of instability and violence is likely to persist, and even increase in some instances.

This publication, the first in a series of three, considers the feasibility of the central economic growth target that is set out in South Africa’s National Development Plan 2030. It then explores some of the associated human development targets. The paper first looks at the core characteristics of the economy. Against that background and analysis we argue that the core economic growth target of 5,4 per cent average gross domestic product, the associated size of the economy and the income per capita targets are very ambitious. With a huge effort, clear leadership and painful adjustments the targets may be achievable, but it is hardly possible to overestimate the effort that will be required from across South Africa’s diverse interest groups and affected communities. Clearly the current capital- intensive nature of South Africa’s economic growth model will not succeed in delivering sufficient jobs without structural changes to the economy and to current policies. Many other targets, for example in education and infrastructure, are achievable with lower rates of economic growth. This may point to a lack of coherence between the models (and assumptions) used for detailed planning between the different sectors. While economic growth is very important for South Africa, the quality of growth is equally important if the country is to address its deep structural inequality and unemployment challenges.

Despite sterling growth in some countries, a number of African countries are caught in a vicious cycle of violence, chronic poverty, inequality and exclusion. These ‘more fragile’ states are on a slow trajectory to long-term peace and development. Using the International Futures system (IFs) data analysis and forecasting tool, the monograph provides a long-term forecast of 26 fragile African countries. The forecasts suggest that in the long-term ten countries on the continent will continue to remain fragile into the mid-21st century. Others, however, have a good chance of embarking on a pathway from fragility to middle-income conditions by 2030 or possibly 2050. The monograph concludes with a list of recommendations.

This paper presents three scenarios for South Africa up to 2030: ‘Bafana Bafana’, ‘A Nation Divided’ and ‘Mandela Magic’. The nation’s current development pathway, called ‘Bafana Bafana’ is the well-known story of a perennial underachiever, always playing in the second league when the potential for international championship success and flashes of brilliance are evident for all to see.‘Mandela Magic’, on the other hand, is the story of a country with a clear economic and developmental vision, which it pursues across all sectors of society. Competition is stiff and the barriers to success are high. The scenario of ‘A Nation Divided’ reflects a South Africa that steadily gathers speed downhill as factional politics and policy zigzagging open the door to populist policies. The impact of the policy and leadership choices that South Africans will make in the years ahead, explored in this paper, is significant. The South African economy could grow 23 per cent larger in ‘Mandela Magic’ compared with its current growth path (‘Bafana Bafana’). The paper concludes with seven strategic interventions required to set South Africa on the most prosperous 'Mandela Magic' pathway.

The eradication of extreme poverty is a key component of the post-2015 MDG process and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. This paper uses the International Futures forecasting system to explore this goal and finds that many African states are unlikely to make this target by 2030. In addition to the use of country-level targets, this paper argues in favour of a goal that would see Africa as a whole reducing extreme poverty to below 20% by 2030 (15% using 2011 purchasing power parity), and to below 3% by 2063.

This paper gives a snapshot of Africa’s conflict burden within a global context based on various prominent data providers. The analysis finds that armed conflict in Africa follows the general global pattern of declining levels if measured in relation to population size and population growth. The impact of the Cold War temporarily disrupted this pattern, leading to higher levels of armed violence than could be expected during the 1970s and 1980s. Recent trends point to an increase in armed violence from around 2010, potentially reversing the gains made immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Different to other regions, Africa shows a high level of so-called ‘non-state conflict’: conflict between various armed groups and factions that are fighting one another, and not the government. This is almost certainly due to weak and unconsolidated governance in many African countries. The Middle East, not Africa, is the region with the fastest growth in terrorism.

This paper first presents a summary of recent conflict trends in Africa, largely drawing on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. Then, to provide a picture of the potential future impact of changes in Africa’s development and security prospects up to 2063 (a timeline that ties in with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 initiative), the paper models the implications of three alternative futures for Africa. These are a 'Base Case’ scenario (the current trajectory), an "African Renaissance" scenario (a best-case scenario) and a ‘Politics of the Belly’ scenario (in which the trends analysed take a negative course).

This paper explores the changing power capabilities of Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa (the ‘Big Five’) over the next 25 years. Of these countries, Ethiopia and Nigeria are forecast to increase their power capabilities, whereas Algeria, Egypt and South Africa are expected to stagnate or decline. Of the Big Five, two currently punch above their weight – one that is rising, Ethiopia, and another whose growth is stagnant, South Africa. If Nigeria were able to take the necessary steps that would see far-reaching changes to the governance issues and social challenges that currently beset the country, it could become Africa’s lone superpower.