Research

“Creative Disruption: Technology, Strategy, and the Future of the Global Defense Industry” identifies trends in the technology, security and business environments; highlights the disruptive effects of these trends; and offers recommendations for improving the United States’ ability to harness new sources of innovation. This report is the culminating effort of Creative Disruption: The Task Force on Strategy, Technology and Global Defense Industry, a months-long research agenda, co-chaired by the Honorable William J. Lynn III and ADM James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), that included numerous working groups, interviews and surveys.

Authored by Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program Ben FitzGerald and Research Associate Kelley Sayler, with a foreword by Creative Disruption Task Force co-chairs Mr. Lynn and ADM Stavridis, the report highlights the "growing disconnect" between Defense Department (DOD) needs and what the existing business climate and acquisition strategy and structures are able to provide. The report concludes with strategic-level recommendations for increasing DOD’s ability to access and leverage shifting sources of innovation, emanating from both the commercial and traditional defense sectors, including both domestic and international suppliers.

In the coming years, prosperity in Germany will have to be generated through technology and knowledge to an increasing degree. Technological progress will become the sole driver of growth in the long run as growth contributed by labour and capital declines in the face of demographic change.
Germany must now chart the course for this transformation.

Radical technological change will slash marginal costs, opening up completely new business models. This will change value added in key sectors including mobility, healthcare and energy, and increase integration with services.

Germany must take more concerted action than it has so far to set the course for industrial policy going forward. Although Germany still boasts a range of outstanding benefits as a business location, it must tackle weak points in the start-up environment, venture capital, public investment and regulatory parameters for key technologies.

The strategic priorities of German industrial policy must continue to be the deepening of the European single market and the international trade and investment regime. Bilateral and multilateral trade policy has moved into rougher waters while the untapped potential right here in the European Union
is wholly underestimated.

In the digital world too, a good balance must be found between productivity and social cohesion. While this vision is still forming on the horizon, the political course taken now will determine whether it will turn into a positive or a plaintive reality.

In 2015, the European Commission invited key personalities from European industry, government, the European Parliament and academia to advise it on establishing a Preparatory Action on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-related research.

The primary mission of this Group of Personalities was to help establish recommendations for a long-term vision for EU-funded CSDP-related research which can boost European defence cooperation. These recommendations address the overall scope and governance of future EU-funded CSDP research and highlight possible collaboration and coordination mechanisms. The overarching goal of the Preparatory Action and CSDP-related research is to create a framework that would facilitate a collaborative approach to defence among the member states.

This report is the result of several months of regular conversation and consultation among a group of experts encompassing the ‘sherpas’, officials from the European Commission and the EUISS.

The re-election of the Republic of South Africa as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council for 2011 to 2012 follows shortly after its previous tenure from 2007 to 2008, and has attracted attention from a variety of quarters. Much of this attention is the result of selective interpretations in the West of the country’s conduct during its previous tenure.1 This is unfortunate because the associated caricature of Africa’s largest economy, the only African member of the G20 and which aspires to membership of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and to permanent membership of the UN Security Council, prevents a serious interrogation of its potential role on the Council during the next two years.

In this monograph the Institute for Security Studies and the Pardee Center for International Futures provide an extensive analysis of the projected course of African development to 2050. Combining the deep and wide knowledge of Africa within the ISS with extensive use of the IFs modelling system, this discussion goes beyond past work in a number of ways. It looks across most major issue arenas: demographics, economics, sociopolitical change, the environment and human development itself, including health and education. It explores further into our future than perhaps any other extensive study of African futures has ever done. While not pushing forward specific policy initiatives, it provides a context within which those who pursue sustainable human development can consider policies.

This paper analyses future trends for intrastate conflict in Africa up to 2050 using the International Futures (IFs) model. After reviewing the main post-Cold War patterns of conflict and instability on the continent, the paper discusses seven key correlations associated with intrastate conflict in Africa. It then points to a number of reasons for the changing outlook, including the continued salience of various ‘structural’ conditions that drive intrastate violence even during rapid economic growth, recent improvements in human development alongside a strengthened regional and international conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding regime. Finally, the paper explores how multipolarity may impact on stability and forecasts trends for intrastate conflict in West, Southern, Horn/East and Central Africa. The authors expect large-scale violence to continue its steady decline, although the risk of instability and violence is likely to persist, and even increase in some instances.

This publication, the first in a series of three, considers the feasibility of the central economic growth target that is set out in South Africa’s National Development Plan 2030. It then explores some of the associated human development targets. The paper first looks at the core characteristics of the economy. Against that background and analysis we argue that the core economic growth target of 5,4 per cent average gross domestic product, the associated size of the economy and the income per capita targets are very ambitious. With a huge effort, clear leadership and painful adjustments the targets may be achievable, but it is hardly possible to overestimate the effort that will be required from across South Africa’s diverse interest groups and affected communities. Clearly the current capital- intensive nature of South Africa’s economic growth model will not succeed in delivering sufficient jobs without structural changes to the economy and to current policies. Many other targets, for example in education and infrastructure, are achievable with lower rates of economic growth. This may point to a lack of coherence between the models (and assumptions) used for detailed planning between the different sectors. While economic growth is very important for South Africa, the quality of growth is equally important if the country is to address its deep structural inequality and unemployment challenges.

This policy paper provides an overview of a longer monograph that provides long-term forecasts of fragility in Africa. Using the International Futures system (IFs) data-analysis and forecasting tool, the paper provides a long-term forecast of 26 fragile African countries. They are chosen on the basis of comparative lists of fragile countries based on indicators that reflect the fragility syndrome. In conducting the forecast, the authors argue that fragility should be understood as a syndrome, or set of related conditions, that operates in a system that is mutually reinforcing.

Despite sterling growth in some countries, a number of African countries are caught in a vicious cycle of violence, chronic poverty, inequality and exclusion. These ‘more fragile’ states are on a slow trajectory to long-term peace and development. Using the International Futures system (IFs) data analysis and forecasting tool, the monograph provides a long-term forecast of 26 fragile African countries. The forecasts suggest that in the long-term ten countries on the continent will continue to remain fragile into the mid-21st century. Others, however, have a good chance of embarking on a pathway from fragility to middle-income conditions by 2030 or possibly 2050. The monograph concludes with a list of recommendations.

This paper presents three scenarios for South Africa up to 2030: ‘Bafana Bafana’, ‘A Nation Divided’ and ‘Mandela Magic’. The nation’s current development pathway, called ‘Bafana Bafana’ is the well-known story of a perennial underachiever, always playing in the second league when the potential for international championship success and flashes of brilliance are evident for all to see.‘Mandela Magic’, on the other hand, is the story of a country with a clear economic and developmental vision, which it pursues across all sectors of society. Competition is stiff and the barriers to success are high. The scenario of ‘A Nation Divided’ reflects a South Africa that steadily gathers speed downhill as factional politics and policy zigzagging open the door to populist policies. The impact of the policy and leadership choices that South Africans will make in the years ahead, explored in this paper, is significant. The South African economy could grow 23 per cent larger in ‘Mandela Magic’ compared with its current growth path (‘Bafana Bafana’). The paper concludes with seven strategic interventions required to set South Africa on the most prosperous 'Mandela Magic' pathway.