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The Munich Security Report (MSR) 2023 is published ahead of the 59th Munich Security Conference (MSC) almost exactly 12 months after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s war marks a turning point not only for European security but also for the international order. But where is world politics turning? This question is at the heart of this year’s MSR. Covering human rights, global infrastructures, development cooperation, energy policy, and nuclear security, the report analyzes intensifying authoritarian revisionism and the growing contest between different visions for the international order. In doing so, the MSC’s flagship publication also provides inspiration for how the defenders of the liberal, rules-based order can reenvision the order to make it both more resilient and attractive to a wider community.

This paper continues a series launched in spring 2020, which sought to identify means to strengthen the European Union's long-term resilience in the context of recovery from the coronavirus crisis. The previous
papers were: 'An initial mapping of structural risks facing the EU' (July 2020), which set out some 66 potential structural risks confronting the European Union in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis; 'Capabilities and gaps in the EU's capacity to address structural risks' (October 2020), which looked at those risks from the mapping which were considered as more immediate and significant, and considered ways in which the EU and Member States could address them, either with existing capabilities or through filling gaps in policies and instruments; and 'Options to enhance the EU's resilience to structural risks' (Aril 2021), which examined in greater detail, in 25 of the fields presented in the previous papers, possible action by the EU and highlighted proposals from various quarters, including the European Parliament itself, and at potential or actual constraints that might hinder action in these fields. This latest paper first looks anew at 15 risks facing the European Union, in the changed context of a world coming out of the coronavirus crisis, but one in which a war has been launched just outside the Union's borders. It then looks in greater detail at 11 policy responses the EU could take to address the risks outlined and to strengthen the Union's resilience to them.

While plastics are extremely useful materials for modern society, plastics production and waste generation continue to increase with worsening environmental impacts despite international, national and local policy responses, as well as industry commitments. The urgent need to make the lifecycle of plastics more circular calls for an expansion of national policies and improved international co-operation to mitigate environmental impacts all along the value chain.
The first of two reports, this Outlook intends to inform and support policy efforts to combat plastic leakage. The report quantifies the current production, use, disposal and key environmental impacts throughout the entire plastics lifecycle and identifies opportunities for reducing the negative externalities. It also investigates how plastics use and waste have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic across sectors and regions. The Outlook identifies four key levers for bending the plastics curve: stronger support for recycled (secondary) plastics markets; policies to boost technological innovation in plastics; more ambitious domestic policy measures; and greater international co-operation.

The current coronavirus crisis emphasises the need for the European Union to devote more effort to anticipatory governance, notably through analysis of medium- and long-term global trends, as well as structured contingency planning and the stress-testing of existing and future policies. In order to contribute to reflection on and discussion about the implications of the coronavirus pandemic for EU policy-making, this paper builds on an initial 'mapping' of some 66 potential structural risks which could confront Europe over the coming decade. Taking 33 risks which are assessed as being more significant or likely, it looks first at the capabilities which the EU and its Member States already have to address those risks, and then looks at the various gaps in policy and instruments at the Union's disposal, suggesting possible approaches to overcome them in the short and medium terms.

While there has been progress over the past decades, with militaries and security institutions increasingly analyzing and incorporating climate change risks into their assessments, plans and policies, the “World Climate and Security Report 2020” shows that the risks are increasingly urgent, and more must be done. This contributed to the report’s “Key Risks and Opportunities” findings.
This report is published by the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) chaired by Tom Middendorp, former Chief of Defence of the Netherlands and Senior Research Associate at the Clingendael Institute. Louise van Schaik, Head of our EU & Global Affairs Unit & Planetary Security Initiative, is a co-author.
The report is written from the vantage point of international military and security experts, providing a global overview of the security risks of a changing climate, and opportunities for addressing them. It recommends “climate-proofing” international security – including infrastructure, institutions and policies, as well as major emissions reductions to avoid significant-to-catastrophic security threats.

The Western Hemisphere has a unique advantage in global energy markets. It is rich in natural resources, from conventional fuels such as oil and natural gas, to critical minerals such as lithium for batteries. The region is also poised to become a leader in newer and emerging energy resources. It has, for example, abundant potential for solar and wind energy and other advanced energy technologies, such as nuclear energy. It enjoys high and rapidly growing levels of renewable energy, especially in power generation, largely based on significant levels of legacy, utility-scale hydropower.1
Many of the Americas’ subregions share cross-border electric power or liquid fuel interconnections. The vast majority of its nations share common values, including a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and shared prosperity. The countries of the Americas are bound together through market-based trade, mutual investment, and deep cultural and security ties. Moreover, the hemisphere is indispensable to US energy security. The United States derives the majority of its imports of oil, gas, and electricity from its neighbors and there is considerable potential for trade in increasingly high-value minerals.

For something as unknown as the future, it appears to have become surprisingly predictable. A Google search of ‘future 2030’ yields more than 97 million results, all more or less claiming similar things: that 2030 will see a more connected, yet fragmented world, with hazardous shifts in demography and energy, and dangerous changes in technology, environment, and politics.
The future, while overall negative, appears to be a rather certain place.
This illusion of definitiveness is created by two dynamics: first, the pessimistic tone that runs through the vast majority of foresight reports. This is a common feature when it comes to future thinking, with one study showing that all studies undertaken on the future over the last 70 years have one thing in common; pessimism. The reason for this is simple: although both optimism and pessimism are natural human dispositions, the latter is more prevalent by far. Humans are, genetically speaking, biased towards the negative – some studies even indicate that this is particularly the case for Europeans. Second, pessimism in foresight is encouraged by the grave air that surrounds it: in general, negative statements are given more attention than positive ones. That said, more pessimism in foresight does not equal greater accuracy, as one study shows.

Over the last ten years, the United States has become the world’s leading producer of oil and gas, going from energy import dependence to energy dominance. This shift is due to the ability to produce from shale plays, a story which started in Texas and grew to have global ramifications. In a new report, The Future of Shale: The US Story and Its Implications, Global Energy Center Senior Fellow Ellen Scholl looks at the factors which enabled the rise of oil and gas production from shale deposits, focusing on the developments which have transpired in Texas.
This Global Energy Center report examines the Texas experience to draw lessons learned for countries hoping to utilize their shale resource potential and implications for global energy markets and geopolitics. The report concludes that the US case illustrates the challenges of operating in both a rural and an urban environment, underscores the unique advantages of the enabling ecosystem in the country, and demonstrates the importance of size and scale.