Security

Russia’s foreign policy has taken numerous unexpected turns since 2013. Developments such as the annexation of Crimea, the military intervention in Syria, the crisis in relations with Turkey and the instrumentalisation of obscure incidents such as the “Lisa F. case” to discredit the German government all took most Western experts and decision-makers by surprise. Moscow appears to be using unpredictability tactically to take the initiative vis-à-vis other actors. In the process, the Kremlin is deliberately taking risks with potentially unforeseeable consequences for European and inter-national security. The lack of transparency in decision-making processes and the absence of open public debate also make Russia’s foreign policy actions difficult to assess. Moreover, with decision making processes in Russia highly centralised and monopolised, the Kremlin is in a position to act rapidly and does not need to consult with international partners or take account of democratic procedures and domestic political reservations.
That does not mean, however, that there is no room for Germany and Europe to be better prepared. This study identifies conceivable surprises in Russian foreign policy that should expand our thinking about the activities of the political leadership in Moscow.

“The U.S.-Israel relationship is in trouble,” warn Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon in a new Council Special Report, Repairing the U.S.-Israel Relationship. Significant policy differences over issues in the Middle East, as well as changing demographics and politics within both the United States and Israel, have pushed the two countries apart. Blackwill, a former senior official in the Bush administration, and Gordon, a former senior official in the Obama administration, call for “a deliberate and sustained effort by policymakers and opinion leaders in both countries” to repair the relationship and to avoid divisions “that no one who cares about Israel’s security or America’s values and interests in the Middle East should want.”

There are no simple or reliable ways to estimate the trends in terrorism, and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) no longer provides any declassified estimate of global trends. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) does, however, provide a useful database for tracking media reporting. In addition to the START database, graphical analyses by key media sources provide additional information that is current, and helps illustrate the sharp contrasts in given sources and estimates. Several NGOs have also made useful estimates that provide additional perspective.

The report correctly draws a picture of global multipolarity. Of particular interest is the scope of its content and research, which was conducted not only in the developed world but also in the major poles of the emerging world. The analysis of the report is based on thorough and far-reaching research which is very useful to understand the complexities of the present global context.

Climate change is projected to produce more intense and frequent extreme weather events, multiple weather disturbances, along with broader climatological effects, such as sea level rise. These are almost certain to have significant direct and indirect social, economic, political, and security implications during the next 20 years. These effects will be especially pronounced as populations continue to concentrate in climate-vulnerable locales such as coastal areas, water-stressed regions, and ever-growing cities. These effects are likely to pose significant national security challenges for the United States over the next two decades, though models forecast the most dramatic effects further into the future.

There is no clear way to determine how much Chinese strategy shapes military spending versus how Chinese resources shape strategy; the two are always interdependent. An assessment of China’s defense spending does indicate, however, that Chinese economic growth has allowed it to finance a massive modernization program, and radically improve every aspect of its conventional and asymmetric warfare capabilities, including sea-air-missile-nuclear capabilities.
Although estimates of Chinese defense spending vary sharply, there is little controversy that China now dominates Asian military spending and is becoming the premier military power in Asia. This is partly driven by China’s perception of the potential threat from the U.S. and other Asian powers, but is also driven by the fact that China can now afford such efforts, support them largely with its own technology base, and cannot forget its recent past.

Military modernization efforts are a key variable when assessing the Korean Peninsula, and one where the shifting strategies and military efforts of the United States and China play an increasingly important role. The modernization trends of all the countries involved in the region have great significance in determining the types of engagement that could be fought. Modernization affects deterrence and assessments of the potential course of any engagement, as well as estimate of types of forces the United States needs to commit to the region, both in times of peace and in times of tension.
There are serious limits to the unclassified data available for comparisons of Northeast Asian military modernization—especially for China and the DPRK. Unclassified sources do not include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other weaponry, and they do not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also often do not include battle management, ISR, or Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) assets. These are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization.

The vulnerability of satellites and other space assets to cyberattack is often overlooked in wider discussions of cyberthreats to critical national infrastructure. This is a significant failing, given society’s substantial and ever increasing reliance on satellite technologies for navigation, communications, remote sensing, monitoring and the myriad associated applications. Vulnerabilities at the junction of space-based or space-derived capability with cybersecurity cause major national, regional and international security concerns, yet are going unaddressed, apart from in some ‘high end’ space-based systems. Analysing the intersection between cyber and space security is essential to understanding this non-traditional, evolving security threat.
Cybersecurity and space security are inextricably linked. Technologies in satellites and other space assets are sourced from a broad international supply base and therefore require regular security upgrades. And the upgrades via remote connections could serve to make space assets vulnerable to cyberattacks. In everyday life, satellites are regularly used to provide internet services and global navigation satellite system (GNSS) technologies which are increasingly embedded in almost all critical infrastructure.

Competition in space is not a new phenomenon. The Space Race between the Soviet Union and United States was one of the defining aspects of the Cold War era. While astronauts are no longer national celebrities and media coverage has greatly diminished, competition in space remains fierce. The United States, China, Russia, Europe, and numerous others all seek to use outer space in a way that best forwards national interest.

China, in particular, has substantially increased its outer space efforts and capabilities in the post-Cold War era. China’s 2015 Defense White Paper refers to space as the “commanding height in international strategic competition”, and its commitment to active programs further underlines this strategic development. China already possesses advanced space-based C4ISR capabilities, a growing fleet of modern launch vehicles, the BeiDou satellite navigation program comparable to U.S. GPS, an array of counterspace and ASAT weapons (kinetic-kill, directed-energy, co-orbital, and cyber), and an advanced manned space program.

This report assesses the conditions under which a global Water Grand Strategy (WGS) might be created and implemented by stakeholders in the United States within the next one to two years. While numerous American organizations are addressing water challenges the world over, no explicit policy or vision coordinates their multiple endeavors. As a result, the United States does not maximize its influence in finding solutions to the world’s most pressing water challenges.
This report evaluates the need for a WGS and explores the possible ends of such a strategy. It summarizes what the United States is already doing in the water space,1 and identifies the current model’s strengths and weaknesses. It outlines a process for forging a “Whole of America” water strategy—a stakeholder-driven process—and addresses key implementation challenges.