Security

Through a combination of stable technology, dedicated technicians and, resistance to random outages, the Internet has been resilient to attacks on a day-to-day basis, creating an extended period of prosperity. Yet, as we approach nearly absolute dependence on the Internet, cyber attacks of the future can and will affect globally interconnected systems like electrical grids and worldwide logistics systems. This Internet of tomorrow will be a source of global shocks for which risk managers, corporate executives, board directors, and government officials are not prepared.

At the onset of the Arab Spring, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that the foundations of the Middle East risked “sinking into the sand” of unrest and extremism. Three years later, the region is still in a period of prolonged tumult and uncertainty. A large youth bulge, poor economic prospects, and uneven development across the region presents significant challenges to a more stable Middle East, but, more positively, the next five to ten years could see a reintroduction of Iran to the international community and a new regional dynamic if the ongoing P5+1 talks reach a lasting nuclear agreement. What is certain is that the future of the Middle East will have profound effects globally and will continue to substantially influence the global political, economic, and security environment.

In his latest report, “Middle East 2020: Shaped By or Shaper of Global Trends,” Mathew Burrows, director of the Strategic Foresight Initiative in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, addresses the possible medium- and long-term consequences of the ongoing developments in the region and the various factors driving the monumental changes. The report explores three alternative futures: one optimistic, in which relations among powerbrokers in the region turn a corner for the better, and two more pessimistic scenarios-fragmentation and decreasing state authority or the emergence of a new authoritarianism.

Germany has never been as prosperous, secure, and free as it is today. But power and influence entail responsibility. This also means that it has to take on new responsibilities.

The CSIS Affordable Military Working Group, and the earlier CSIS Defense Drawdown Working Group, examined the dramatic effects of both fewer and weaker defense dollars in an effort to deal with a deep budget drawdown without significantly weakening national security. This latest report defines a set of strategy options, each with associated capabilities, gleaned from other leading think tank reports as well as the study team’s analysis. The report identifies capability priorities for the 2021 and beyond security environment and recommends a force structure for a 2021 affordable military.

This study brings together work in progress on a long-term project to identify and analyse the 'cost of non-Europe' in a number of policy fields. This concept, first pioneered by the European Parliament in the 1980s, is used here to quantify the potential efficiency gains in today's European economy from pursuing a series of policy initiatives recently advocated by Parliament - from a wider and deeper digital single market to better coordinated national and European policies for defence and development. The benefits may be measured principally in additional GDP generated or a more rational use of public resources. The latest analysis suggests that the European economy could be boosted by almost 1.6 trillion euro per year - or 12 per cent of EU-28 GDP (2014) - by such measures over time. The study is intended as a contribution to the on-going discussion about the European Union’s policy priorities over the current five-year institutional cycle, from 2014 to 2019.

Built on the previous reports drawn up under the ESPAS project to date, this study seeks to map more comprehensively the five major trends that are likely to shape the future and will need to be taken into account by the Union as it defines coherent strategic options for the next governance cycle. They include:
- A richer and older human race characterised by an expanding global middle class and greater inequalities
- A more vulnerable process of globalisation led by and economic G3
- A transformative industrial and technological revolution
- A growing nexus of climate change, energy and the competition for resources
- Changing power, increased interdependence and fragile multilateralism

Good governance is based upon foresight that allows decision makers to highlight their choices under a new perspective. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) has turned to forward planning and foresight to react to new political and socioeconomic developments in Europe.
The aim of this report is to identify the future challenges that confront the CoR and the European local and regional authorities (LRAs) at the horizon in 2025. It draws up three possible scenarios with predictions about the future evolution of European integration and the implications for the LRAs and the CoR.
The future evolution of European integration necessarily involves an identification of a number of trends, challenges and opportunities over the coming decades. Subsequently, the report formulates key questions for debate and provides practical options and suggestions on how LRAs can make progress.

Global Strategic Trends (GST) describes a strategic context for those in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and wider Government who are involved in developing long term plans, policies and capabilities. Without a strategic context there is a risk that planners, policymakers and capability developers may assume a future that adheres to preconceived thoughts and assumptions.

As well as providing a strategic context, this 5th edition of Global Strategic Trends (GST 5) identifies long term threats and opportunities, out to 2045. GST does not attempt to predict the future, it cannot. Rather, it describes those phenomena that could have a significant impact on the future and combines these differing perspectives to produce a multifaceted picture of possible outcomes.

The SFA builds upon the principles described in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept as the basis for ensuring Alliance security in the future. It is based on recent national and international studies that address the timeframe out to 2030 and beyond. The SFA used previous ACT futures analyses (e.g. the Multiple Futures Project) as a starting point for its investigation. The report also captures the results of four separate ACT-led workshops that discussed political, sociological, economic, technological, scientific and environmental trends and their implications for NATO as an organisation and for Alliance members’ security as a whole.

For this project, disruptive emergencies are defined as unplanned and non-routine events that have a significant consequence or impact on people, property and infrastructure, or could seriously damage the security of the EU. The impacts include harm to people (including psychological impacts), short or long term economic damage, and physical damage to property and the environment. Disruptive emergencies have been classified as either:
- Hazards - the results of nature or technical failure, including human error; or
- Threats - the results of terrorist or criminal activity (including state sponsored)
Disruptive emergencies do not include everyday occurrences, such as street crime.
The scope of the project includes emergencies that occur either within the EU (or are covered by the EU Civil Protection mechanism, such as the forest fires in 2007), or events outside the EU, that have a major impact within the EU, such as the potential break down of the energy system due to the decision to close nuclear plants as a result of Fukushima.
In undertaking this project I drew on my experience of undertaking FLA in the UK government and as a consultant; and experience of work on the preparedness for and resilience towards disruptive emergencies. This includes work on disruptive emergencies as part of the UK National Security programme (CONTEST) and the associated National Risk Register. I conducted desk research and interviewed a number of experts on the subject. I also took account of comments made following a presentation to the EFFLA Committee at the commencement of the project.
This report neither covers the provision of humanitarian assistance by the EU after emergencies; nor an assessment of future risks or an audit of the capability of DG Research and Innovation to respond to them.
There is lot of activity by Member States and the European Commission directed towards the anticipation of, preparedness for, response to and recovering from disruptive emergencies. The recommendations cover areas where DG Research and Innovation can contribute to these activities.