Technology

This publication provides an analysis of the main challenges faced by civil society organisations (CSOs), of the trends and drivers of change and of the future prospects for relations between policy-makers at the national and European level and CSOs. It was developed with the purpose of examining what might await European CSOs in the next 13 years until 2030, what are the main challenges and how these should be tackled. Based on desk research of recent analyses and studies, series of interviews with representatives of academia, European and national CSO platforms and members of EESC and pan-European survey, it identifies major societal trends that have been most affecting European CSOS in the last five years : demographic changes, economic crisis, digitalisation, populism and shrinking of civic space. This overview is accompanied by strategies recommended for CSOs and the EU and national public authorities.

There has arguably never been a greater disconnect between the apparent strength of the global economy and the magnitude of geopolitical, financial and operational risks that organisations are facing. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects momentum in the global economy to remain strong in 2018. The US economy will continue to motor along, the euro area will absorb more of the slack in its labour markets and Chinese consumption, investment and exports will all remain strong. Higher commodity prices will prove a fillip for emerging-market exporters, while a gradual tightening of monetary conditions will not take hold to the extent that it slows growth. Taken together, these factors mean that the global economy is forecast to expand by 3% in 2018, up from a mediocre annual average pace of 2.6% in 2015-16.
Despite the encouraging headline growth figures, the global economy is facing the highest level of risk in years. Indeed, this favourable economic picture appears to come from a completely different world to the one where headlines are dominated by protectionist rhetoric, major territorial disputes, terrorism, surging cyber-crime and even the threat of nuclear war. The global economy has seen periods of high risk before, with threats emanating from the regional and the national level, as well as from state and non-state actors. What is unique about this period of heightened risk, however, is that unlike other periods in recent decades, risks are also originating from the global level, as the US questions its role in the world and partially abdicates from its responsibilities. These moves have signalled the end of the US-led global order and the beginning of a new order. Although the new order will emerge over the next decade, there will be a period of uncertainty as multiple global and regional powers vie for power and influence. For organisations attempting to negotiate these concerns in order to take advantage of the numerous and growing economic opportunities, the stakes are obviously high.
In this report we identify and assess the top ten risks to the global political and economic order. Each of the risks is not only outlined, but also rated in terms of its likelihood and its potential impact on the global economy. This is a small snapshot of our risk quantification capabilities. We also provide operational risk analysis on a country-by-country basis for 180 countries through our Risk Briefing. Meanwhile, we provide detailed credit risk assessments on 131 countries via our Country Risk Service.

This report brings together evidence about skills and lifelong learning, discussing the barriers and the implications for the UK. This evidence will help government to develop the policies needed to adapt to a changing workforce.

The open, rules-based international order in Asia is under threat. The set of post-World War II arrangements designed by the United States and its allies and partners provided an unprecedented degree of stability, security, prosperity, and freedom globally and in the region but the continuation of this system under US leadership is no longer guaranteed. As the United States and its Asian and European allies and partners face a diverse array of new challenges in the Asia-Pacific and at home, Washington must reassess its goals, strategy, policies, and its very commitment to leadership in the region. At a time when the United States promotes “America First,” to what extent does a dated order in Asia continue to serve US and allied interests? Will the United States be willing to sustain its long-standing security-provider role in the region, and do its allies find preexisting US commitments credible? How can the United States, and likeminded Asian and European states, best contribute to security, prosperity, and democratic values in the region? Does China’s rise permit the possibility of greatpower cooperation, or is some level of competition —and even outright conflict— inevitable? To what extent, in the changing regional economic architecture, are the United States and its partners willing to make alterations in governance structure in order to adapt to the new economic weight of emerging economies? How do issues that are likely to be high-priority agenda items in the near future (e.g., food, water, and energy security; the environment; urbanization; demographic change; and disruptive technologies) challenge existing frameworks that have shaped regional affairs and societies? These are among the questions that must be addressed as the United States seeks to secure its interests in Asia, and as Asian partners look to the United States for leadership. The Asia-Pacific may be the world’s most dynamic geopolitical region. According to some projections, the majority of all global economic activity could take place within Asia by 2050.
Military might often follows economic power, and Asian countries are already spending more than European states on defense. Both of these developments reflect a broader shift in global power from West to East. If the twentieth century could be characterized as the “Trans-Atlantic Century,” the twenty-first century may well become known as the “Trans-Pacific Century.”

Emerging artificial intelligence (AI) tools will provide propagandists radically enhanced capabilities to manipulate human minds. Human cognition is a complex system, and AI tools are very good at decoding complex systems. Interactions on social media, browsing the Internet, and even grocery shopping provide thousands of data points from which technologists can build psychological profiles on nearly every citizen. When provided rich databases of information about us, machines will know our personalities, wants, needs, annoyances, and fears better than we know them ourselves. Over the next few years, MADCOMs—the integration of AI systems into machine-driven communications tools for use in computational propaganda—will gain enhanced ability to influence people, tailoring persuasive, distracting, or intimidating messaging toward individuals based on their unique personalities and backgrounds, a form of highly personalized propaganda.

The world faces a confluence of changes and technological advances that are fundamentally altering the relationship between individuals, economies, and society. Innovations in a diverse set of fields including robotics, genetics, artificial intelligence, Internet-enabled sensors, and cloud computing are individually disruptive. Collectively they are world changing. Experts around the world have come up with different names and descriptions for this phenomenon: Klaus Schwab calls it the “fourth industrial revolution”; Alec Ross points toward the “industries of the future”; Steve Case recognizes it as the “third wave” of the Internet; and Martin Ford looks toward the “rise of the robots.”

Although these thinkers have slightly different visions for the future, there is a shared recognition that existing assumptions and economic models need adjustment. For both developed and developing countries, the innovation- and technology-driven economy offers significant risks and opportunities. On the one hand, this change offers the potential for increased global prosperity, efficiency, and quality of life. On the other hand, if poorly managed, this transition could disrupt employment models, pathways out of poverty, and stability around the world.