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Foreword

Ann Mettler
Head, European Political Strategy Centre,
Chair, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System

On behalf of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), it is a great pleasure to welcome you to the 2016 Annual Conference, which convenes under the timely theme of ‘Global Trends to 2030: Society and Governance’. As last year, the two-day event is hosted by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

Drawing on the insights of the 2015 ESPAS report on ‘Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges ahead?’, we look forward to hosting experts and practitioners from around the world to discuss what divides and unites us in the digital age and to gain insights on the impact of new technologies on issues of democracy, security and trust.

This year’s event will also focus on the role of connectivity for ensuring sustainable growth and inclusive prosperity, with a particular focus on cities and public governance. Furthermore, the discussions will examine the role that universities and think tanks have in bringing evidence into policymaking, as well as the critical importance of managing by anticipation.

With such a wide array of pertinent issues, we have set out to capture some of the valuable insights of our guests. It is with immense pleasure that we present you with this rich collection of forward-looking, anticipatory essays from our participating experts on the critical trends that are defining the future of our societies and governance systems.

Our aim is simple: we want to ensure that our speakers’ contributions are able to reach beyond the conference’s immediate audience. We want to stimulate strategic thinking by raising awareness of the innovations and opportunities – as well as the potential discontinuities and complexities – affecting the world of work and welfare, public services and governance.

The ESPAS process is committed to identifying global long-term trends facing the European Union and its decision-makers. In addition, it is intended as a framework for engaging with international strategic allies, counterparts and experts from around the world in order to reflect on common global trends and challenges.

This publication represents an important step in this direction and we are tremendously grateful that amidst their heavy professional, academic and personal commitments, our speakers generously responded to our request for contributions. The result is a unique collection of over 40 original short essays addressing the different themes of this year’s Annual Meeting. The diversity of perspectives, we hope, will stimulate our readers’ thinking about the ways in which mega-trends, game-changers and our policy and political choices intersect and what this may mean for the future.

Along with the ESPAS leadership, including the ESPAS Honorary President, James Elles, I sincerely hope that you will enjoy this collection of think-pieces and that they may trigger further dialogue and reflection on the future of our societies and governance systems.

Sincerely,

Ann Mettler
Many people meaningfully contributed, both intellectually and practically, to the organisation of the 2016 annual ESPAS conference and to the making of this accompanying publication, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to them.

First and foremost, I would like to warmly thank our speakers and contributors. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the ESPAS Steering Group and their collaborators for a collaboration that has been growing ever stronger: Klaus Welle, Anthony Teasdale and Frank Debié from the European Parliament, Jim Cloos and Leo Schulte Nordholt from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; Christian Leffler and Alfredo Conte from the European External Action Service (EEAS); Jiří Buriánek and Béatrice Taulègne from the Committee of the Regions; Luis Planas and Pierluigi Brombo from the European and Social Affairs Committee (EESC) and, of course, James Elles, ESPAS’ Honorary President.

Even more so, I wish to genuinely acknowledge the contributions of all the members of the ESPAS teams across all participating institutions who worked untiringly for this year’s conference and this publication: Danièle Réchard, Freya Windle-Wehrle and Eamonn Noonan have been the pillars of the EPRS. Julia Clerck-Sachsse, Carlo Marzocchi and Francesco Fusaro from the European External Action Service (EEAS), the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU and the European and Social Affairs Committee (EESC) respectively.

At the EPSC, I would particularly like to express my gratitude to Ruby Gropas, Ricardo Borges de Castro, Leonardo Quattrucci and Natacha Faulimmel, who have steadily carried through the entire process over this past year; Paweł Świeboda, who has always had purposeful and insightful suggestions; Agnieszka Skuratowicz, Mihaela Moldovan and Tina Gunda, who oversaw the full organisation of this event and ensured that this all came together; Jonáš Jančařík, who set up our website and orchestrated our online presence; Annick Hilbert, who created this year’s ESPAS design and beautifully laid out this publication; Rachel Smit for her sharp editing; and of course Carmen Tresguerres, who has worked closely with all to ensure that we always strive for more and better.
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The Future of Society
GAME CHANGERS FOR INCLUSIVE INNOVATION
The digital revolution has democratised innovation. On the one hand, users are much closer to producers and influence the way a product develops; they try out, evaluate and give feedback. Also, the digital economy allows new – and smaller – players to enter the market and scale-up. In addition, the digital economy has created new markets, or new economic prospects. Think about bridging the gap between idle resources and potential users or customers. Uber or Airbnb are classic examples.

In the digital-physical world in which we live, we increasingly need open innovation, that is, involving more actors in the innovative process – scientists, entrepreneurs, users, governments and civil society.

I see three major challenges ahead for Europe in this regard:

- the lack of disruptive market-creating innovation;
- the scarcity of venture capital, and the difficulty of scaling-up start-ups to global competitiveness;
- and a risk culture that accepts that failure is an inherent component of entrepreneurship.
WHAT WILL MAKE A PROSPEROUS SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
It’s not hard to say what prosperity is: high levels of well-being and income, wealth and health, as well as confidence that you’ll thrive in the future. Nor is it hard to see what drives prosperity: the combination of stability and freedom, the rule of law and plenty of investment, human capital and healthcare, imaginative science and the absence of war.

By all of these measures, the last two generations have seen unprecedented advances in prosperity: dramatic rises in life expectancy (40 years in a century) and the presence of democracy; falls in poverty (to less than 10% of the world population) and deaths from warfare; and today, tides of new scientific knowledge and technology promise further dramatic improvements to health, mobility and daily life, the integration of humans and machines, and leaps to new forms of collective intelligence.

So what’s the problem? The problem is partly optical – a rise of politicians proclaiming a story of decline – and partly real, in that many of the foundations of progress in prosperity are in doubt.

For two generations it was plausible that more openness, and more flow (of capital, people, goods or information) contributed to the public good. It became an article of faith that globalisation and more open trade led to general benefits, stridently asserted by leaders and gurus of all kinds. Now, large minorities have seen their income stagnate, and fear that their children will be worse off than them, and probably jobless, thanks to the combination of migration and automation. Technological change continues to be ‘capital-biased’, meaning a declining share of income for labour, and new job and wealth creation continues to concentrate in areas with high levels of graduates. The promise of shared prosperity which underpinned so much economic policy over the last 70 years is now called into question.

For two generations it seemed obvious that democracy was the only plausible governing model for advanced societies, and that its competitors (fascism, communism, dictatorship…) had been defeated for good. Now that confidence has been shaken. In the old democracies, where the forms of democracy have changed little since the 19th century, large minorities have lost faith not just in politicians and political institutions, but even in democracy itself.

For two generations optimists could point to the inexorable spread of science, facts and evidence. Now social media act as echo chambers of lies as well as truth and popular politicians take pride in their contempt for consistency and accuracy.

For two generations it seemed obvious that the world was becoming ever healthier. Now we see a growing risk of epidemics and pandemics and the threat of...
rising antimicrobial resistance which could threaten tens of millions of lives by mid-century.

After a period when large parts of the world thought that war was a thing of the past, confrontation between heavily armed, technologically advanced countries is once again a serious prospect, with Russia a belligerent aggressor around Europe, and China flexing its muscles.

These changes are both cause and effect of a shift in political climate, a rising tide of nationalism in the US (Trump), Russia (Putin) and parts of Europe (from Marine Le Pen to Alternative für Deutschland), echoed in China under Xi, India under Modi and Japan under Abe.

How to respond? If optimistic openness was the thesis, we now see a dark anti-thesis. Simply to assert the old thesis ever more stridently doesn’t work. Instead we need to design new syntheses. They must avoid both nostalgia, and the tendency to fetishize globalisation and technological advance as ends in themselves, rather than as means. This is what I mean by dialectical thinking, and it’s what we badly need now.

The syntheses will need to: maintain the momentum of the vanguard firms, industries and places, but focus much more on access, spread and adoption elsewhere in society and the economy; reshape education better to fit the future, but also offer new routes to security in welfare and employment; strike a better balance between free flow and barriers and buffers (in everything from cybersecurity to migration); mobilise the full energy of entrepreneurship and innovation, but channel it more to social needs and opportunity for all; accelerate the next generation of technologies in ways that enhance humanity rather than replacing it; and reinvigorate democracy and politics in ways that respect peoples’ need for belonging, and for a share in power.

None of this is easy. But this is the serious work that must start if we are to prosper in the future. It requires Europe to think dialectically, achieving a balance between conflicting ideas, rather than taking them to their logical conclusions (the consistent mistake of the more extreme partisans of globalisation).

And, because the future is unknowable, it requires vigorous experiment in each of these fields to flesh out a synthesis that works in practice and not just in theory. Only then can we escape from fatalism and from the dictatorship of no alternatives.

The future requires Europe to think dialectically, achieving a balance between conflicting ideas.
WHAT DIVIDES AND WHAT UNITES IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @graphicrecorder
In the online world, people are used to instant, accessible and personalised services. But the infrastructure for politics is still based on technology developed in the 18th and 19th centuries. In many parts of everyday life, voters are used to a consumer experience where they get instant feedback and personal participation; but party membership, ballot boxes and stump speeches do not offer the same speed, control or personal engagement. The institutions of representative democracy at national and EU level – political parties, elected members, law-making – do not offer the same quality of experience for their ultimate consumers.

This matters because it is causing voters to switch off. Broad participation by most of the population in the practice of democracy is vital for societies to remain open because it ensures pluralism and prevents takeover of power by narrow interests. But in some countries and some elections, turnout is regularly below a third of registered voters, especially in European Parliament elections.

The internet is driving the major trends that create this disconnection and disruption. Here are four vital areas in which politics should adapt, including at EU level:

- **Expectation.** Voters have a growing sense that political parties and law-making are out of touch, but not that politics is irrelevant. This is understandable given how we interact with other parts of our lives digitally. Online life is instant, transparent, easy and connected – while politics is often slow, laborious and secretive. How can politics meet people’s new expectations about decision-making?

- **Affiliation.** The model of mass membership political parties is losing support, at least in its current form. Across Europe, formal party membership is dwindling in most countries. But people are interested in new forms of affiliation, especially through social media and alternative networks. And online affiliation with political groups is growing as people find new ways to engage. How to channel this desire for affiliation into political institutions?

- **Location.** Digital technology allows people to find myriad new ways to express their political views publicly, outside of formal political spaces. Every day there are millions of conversations about political issues in new digital spaces: on Twitter timelines, Facebook newsfeeds, comment threads, blogs and videos. This new ‘digital commons’ reflects the hopes, views and beliefs of citizens – but it is not easy to connect these new debates to formal political engagement at the moment. Political institutions still expect voters to come to them, but their websites are not where the action is. How to take political issues to the places where there is hot debate nowadays?
• **Information.** The internet has made vast amounts of data and a huge range of information sources across an enormous spectrum of issues available to every human with an internet connection. How is this information overload affecting engagement with politics? Web sources are also dramatically changing the nature of political reporting and journalism, making it far more dynamic and pluralistic. At the same time, competition from web-based sources and social media is forcing traditional mainstream media outlets to change their business models. How to keep political reporting accurate and pluralistic so that voters get reliable information on which to make their political choices? How to ensure voters, representatives and institutions are not overwhelmed with data and switch off?

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**Stefano Scarpetta, Director, Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, OECD**

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**The Future of Work**

The world of work is changing rapidly. Several ongoing mega-trends – including globalisation, digitalisation and demographic changes – coupled with rapid change in values and preferences regarding work, have the potential of significantly affecting the quantity and types of jobs in our economies, as well as how and by whom they will be carried out.

Driven by these trends, the future of work will offer unparalleled opportunities. New technologies and new markets will generate new and more productive and rewarding jobs. The ability to de-bundle jobs into smaller tasks will allow work to be carried out more efficiently on a truly global, digital assembly line. In the future, workers are likely to have more to say about who they work for, how much they work, as well as where and when they work. Such increased flexibility will provide greater opportunities for under-represented groups, such as women, senior workers and those with disabilities, to participate in the labour market.

However, there are also significant challenges associated with the new world of work. While fears of mass unemployment caused by automation and globalisation are exaggerated, significant upheaval is nevertheless likely as jobs are destroyed in some areas, while others emerge elsewhere. Adjustment costs may be significant and are more likely to fall on the least skilled and the most disadvantaged.

At the same time, many of the existing jobs will involve new tasks and require new competencies and skills. While building the right skills is more than ever essential to prepare young people to this dynamic labour market, a parallel major agenda is also that of adapting and upgrading the skills and competences of those already in the labour market. Failure to make significant progress in this area may well lead to further increases in inequality if not mass technological unemployment. Moreover, some of the new forms of work that are emerging raise serious concerns about the quality of jobs that are created and the degree of protection the workers involved have given the existing institutions and polices.
There are many uncertainties on how the world of work will look like in the next 10-15 years and thus detailed planning for the potential changes that might occur will most likely be ineffective. It is important, however, to strengthen the resilience and adaptability of labour markets, so that workers and countries can manage the transitions with the least possible disruption, while grasping the new opportunities.

Modernising education and life-long learning programmes, re-thinking labour market regulation and overhauling social protection are only three of the most important policy initiatives that will be necessary to ensure that changes in the world of work result in fair and efficient labour markets, rather than becoming yet another reason for social cleavage.

Bruce Stokes, Director of Global Economic Attitudes, Pew Research Center

Populism: From Backlash to Framing the Future

The rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic is one of the defining social, political and economic phenomena of the current era.

The growing gap between the rich and the poor and the widespread economic turmoil in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis has helped fuel populist sentiment. But populism is not solely a byproduct of economic inequality and hard times. Populist backlash has its roots in broadly shared anxiety about the loss of traditional ways of life, unease with rising racial and ethnic diversity and the erosion of public faith in existing institutions of democratic society. All of these concerns would, arguably, be more manageable in an era of rapid and broadly shared economic growth. But the prospect of slower growth thanks to aging populations and anemic productivity in both Europe and the United States suggests that improved living standards are unlikely to serve as a brake on populist political movements any time soon.

In 2007, even before the economic downturn, a median of 75% of Europeans in eight EU nations believed that their traditional way of life was getting lost, according to a Pew Research Center survey. In the United States, public regret about what had been lost thanks to the rapid pace of change stood at 73%.

Once the financial crisis hit European and American confidence, the economy tanked. In 2009, a median of just 16% of the public in seven EU nations thought the economy was doing well. Today, that median stands at 37% – an improvement, but hardly a ringing endorsement of economic fortunes. Importantly, the aggregate figure masks wide disparities: 75% of Germans are pleased with their economic conditions, but only 12% of the French and 13% of the Spanish agree. Economic confidence in the US has followed a similar trajectory: in 2009, 17% said the economy was doing well, in 2016 44% hold this view.
Along with general economic worries, there is widespread concern about inequality. A median of 60% in seven EU nations surveyed in 2014 said the gap between the rich and the poor was a very big problem. And 46% of Americans agreed.

Populist sentiment has also been stoked by frequent outcries over the influx of immigrants and refugees. About a third (a median of 34%) of Europeans in 10 EU nations surveyed in 2016 believe that the increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in their country makes their nation a worse place to live. In many EU nations this sentiment is more prominent from those on the right of the ideological spectrum than on the left. Moreover, a median of 50% believes that refugees are a burden, taking jobs and social benefits. And a median of 43% of Europeans hold an unfavourable view of Muslims in their country. In general this view is also much more likely to be expressed by those on the right ideologically than those on the left.

In the United States, 8% of the registered voters say increasing racial and ethnic diversity is bad for the country. That share about doubles when looking at supporters of Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump (17%). Only 3% of supporters of Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton agree. Registered voters are also polarised on the question of whether immigrants are a burden on the US. Less than one-in-five of Clinton supporters (17%) think so, but the share quadruples among Trump supporters 69% of supporters of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump say immigrants are a burden on society and 57% believe Muslims living in the US should be subject to more scrutiny.

Finally, people on both sides of the Atlantic have lost faith in democratic leadership and societal institutions. Only 42% of Americans trust their political leaders, down from 64% in 2000, according to a recent Gallup survey. Only 20% have confidence in Congress. In 2007, in the six EU countries with the largest population, a median of 73% expressed a favourable view of the European Union in a Pew Research Center survey. In 2016 that median is 49%. In 2014 favourability of the EU parliament was just 40%.

Populism on both sides of the Atlantic has its roots in the economic crisis, but also in public concern about diversity and refugees. Moreover, there is a shared decline in public faith in some of the key institutions of democratic society and in those who are elected to lead it. With multiple factors feeding the rise of public anger, fear and frustration, populism may prove to be a powerful political force in both Europe and the United States for some time to come.
TRUST AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @graphicrecorder
People are waking up to their own power, coming together at a scale and speed unimaginable just a few years ago. New crowd-based and participatory models and values are transforming politics, business and other sectors of society.

How can we better understand the changing nature of power and move beyond the usual banal discussion about the role of technology and social media to a more structural discussion about the new models, values and forms of participatory power that are emerging? What do these shifts mean for existing institutions, and what ought we expect from emerging ‘new power’ players? Will platforms like Uber, Airbnb and Facebook actually further concentrate power, even as they offer new kinds of agency to people?

How should governments and other actors respond to forces like ISIS that are using sophisticated new power techniques to propagate their ideology of violence? How do we reconcile the growing popularity of old power ‘strongmen’ leaders with the increase in political protest and spontaneous social movements around the world?

Will movements like Black Lives Matter in the US or Occupy globally ‘consolidate’ their role and institutionalise in their next phases, or will they stay diffuse?

What can governments and the public sector learn from new power – and what can they do to adapt?
CONNECTIVITY FOR PROSPERITY

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @ graphicrecorder
Transportation is humanity’s greatest lever for economic growth. More than any other technology, transport is the catalyst for big leaps in culture and ideas. And transport has itself been the engine for growth on a global scale. The Great Acceleration of the Rail Age enabled the transport of produce and people in volume, which in turn enabled urbanisation and the development of the mass market. Powered by coal, constructed of iron and steel, and financed on new capital markets, the railways themselves became a primary driver of the Industrial Revolution.

That was then, this is now. The great question facing global leaders is whether our current transportation options can meet the inexorable and conflicting demands of growth and environmental stewardship. At current 2.7% annual rates of growth, mobility demand in the developed world will double in 25 years and rise sixteen-fold in a century. Existing modes have served us well, but offer only incremental improvements when a step-change in performance and energy efficiency is required.

Hyperloop One’s mission is to deliver that step-change and to bring fast, cheap, clean and reliable mass transportation to the billions who can’t afford more than a bus, whilst offering city to city travel times faster than a private jet.

Our aim is to do for people and cargo what global fibre networks did for the internet – create on demand, point to point transportation that’s at once banal and miraculous: imagine attending a morning meeting in Paris, being in Brussels for lunch and then in Frankfurt for your daughter’s soccer match by 17:00. With Hyperloop operating on demand, offering 10 to 20 minute travel times between many city pairs, and tightly integrating of smart mobility solutions for on-demand ‘final mile’ feeder/distributor services, Europe could connect in a new ecumenopolis.

With Hyperloop, urban planners can alleviate housing shortages by locating new, green developments 80 to 300 kilometers away, yet accessible to central business districts within minutes. Inefficient use of scarce airport capacity by disproportionately polluting short haul flights can be replaced by faster ground transport. Congestion and emissions at ports can be slashed, with Hyperloop shuttling containers quietly and around the clock to inland terminals.

Ever since the advent of fast steamships, new transportation paradigms have arrived at regular intervals, roughly every 80-100 years. Shipping, rail, automobile, air travel. The time for a new mode of transportation that delivers superior performance at a competitive price without damaging the environment is here. Welcome to the Age of Hyperloop.
Pascal Lamy, President Emeritus Jacques Delors Institute.

**Time for Sustainable Connectivity**

Increasing connectivity is and will remain one of the main engines of globalisation as it keeps slashing the cost of distance. Hence a growing international integration of production systems and a constant Ricardo-Schumpeterian pressure for efficiencies.

This is fine as long as these efficiency gains are, or perceived to be, fairly distributed. But, as we have seen in recent times, opening may turn to protectionist or isolationist discourse if gains are not equitably distributed.

This is also fine as long as economic development remains compatible with ecological sustainability, which is not the case anymore.

Conclusion: whereas less connectivity would be absurd, more connectivity does not work for sustainable prosperity under any conditions and these conditions need more attention than in the past. They have to do with social and cultural security, different structures of relative prices (capital / labour, environmental externalities), new forms of accountability and democratic choices, approximating global ethics, etc.

A new version of what I called the ‘Geneva consensus’ as opposed to the old Washington consensus.

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Simon Schäfer, CEO & Founder, Factory

**Why Tech Innovators are Poised to Save the World**

When trying to understand the societal impact of tech entrepreneurs on modern society, we need to look back, back to hippie culture and the San Francisco music revolution of the sixties, the birthplace of tech entrepreneurship in its current form. The common and strikingly new belief at that time was that we are responsible for the future of our planet, that an inclusive and networked society is more balanced and likely to be more sustainable; that race, gender and sexual orientation do not matter and need to be
tolerated in whichever form. That misfits and outlaws are admirable, if not role models.

Today’s tech entrepreneurs have the DNA of this exact cultural expression incorporated in their commercial endeavours. Many go as far as saying they only make money to build things, not to have money. They need money to change the world from within.

The result is very benchmarkable: The effort made to achieve a diversified corporate culture, to create an environment in which young people are inspired to create regardless of their origin is at the core of many successful companies today.

Fast growing, lean in structure, highly diversified and ultimately creating wealth and prosperity through employee stock option programmes, whilst taking their people on a global journey to discover new things. Founders and their teams benchmark against the best, truly believe in meritocracy and - even if they fail as a business - learn on an internationally superior level how to implement innovation. Startups drive our society forward.

The many founders I know who have created significant wealth did not settle in Cayman Islands and buy a yacht, but reinvest in their peers - maintaining a fragile ecosystem that is ultimately aspiring to be self sustaining.

So how could society and government not embrace this changing-the-world-to-the-better trend in capitalism, which ultimately relies on a connected and inclusive society?

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Mark Spelman Co Head Future of the Digital Economy and Society Initiative, World Economic Forum

**Future of Digital Economy and Society**

The exponential growth in digitisation and internet connectivity is creating significant new opportunities for business and society. What makes the changes so significant is the combination and leverage of multiple technologies: algorithms, sensors, data, cloud, artificial intelligence, machine learning and virtual reality working together that is new. These digital technologies can also combine with other technologies such as 3D printing, robotics, advanced materials, and energy storage, to have a multiplier effect on the way we live and work. The result is that digitisation is transforming what we do - from smart factories, to smart homes, to smart health - from the means of production to our personal well-being.

Much of the focus on the digital economy has been on the growth of digital industries relative to the rest of the economy, technology investment, internet usage, digital jobs and digital skills. Governments have been busy creating the enabling conditions for the digital economy from new computing curriculum, digital skills strategies, to new eGovernment services. These initiatives are important in that they enhance efficiency, reduce costs and encourage innovation.

Where there has been less focus is on the opportunity to realise specific societal benefits through the application of these new digital technologies. For example, cars are evolving into sophisticated,
connected data platforms which allow for new features from assisted vehicles to semi autonomous and ultimately fully driverless vehicles and robo-taxis. The societal benefit is that assisted driving features will improve overall vehicle and road safety as well as reducing fuel consumption.

In the UK, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has estimated there is a 7% reduction in crashes for vehicles with a basic forward-collision warning system and a 14% reduction for those with automatic braking. Assisted driving has the potential for value creation, through value addition for the industry, value impact for customers, and value impact for society and the environment. Assisted driving can deliver a number of societal benefits: less people killed or injured on the roads; reduced CO2 emissions, and savings for customers who opt for usage based insurance premiums through the adoption of ADAS ‘advanced driver assistance systems’ in cars.

The full benefits of digitisation will not be realised without a sharper societal lens; digital benefits require multiple players to come together; for cars it will involve the car manufacturers, driver groups, highways agencies, insurance sector with Government playing a catalysing role.

Connected cars are only the start of a wide range of potential societal benefits; there are opportunities for new mobility solutions that connect road, rail, ferry, public and private transport with walking and cycling. Multiple solutions will require platforms to work together to recognise the traveller and allow for new ways of integrating transport. The societal benefits through time saved and reduced emissions could be significant in many cities. Add to transport solutions the possibility of more efficient use of available logistics capacity, which would offer better rates, more convenience and real time tracking of goods. Logistics has low utilisation rates, particularly in trucking fleets, due to empty backhauls faced by most truckers. The EU trucking industry is very fragmented; well over 90% of the players operate a fleet of less than 20 trucks. The creation of a logistics platform to match demand with empty backhaul capacity opens the door to improved utilisation; which in turn offers the potential for less empty trucks, lower emissions and lower delivery costs.

Digital opportunities come in many forms. A Europe that has always believed in a balanced socio-economic model needs to look at digital in the same way. The digital economy is growing faster than the rest of the economy; but this growth undervalues the additional societal benefits that can be achieved through time savings, reduced emissions, and better utilisation of assets. To achieve these societal benefits will require forward looking policy makers and collaboration across sectors.

One thing we know is that digital is blurring industry boundaries and enabling new cross industry partnerships to be formed; realising societal benefits through digital begins will the identification of opportunities in sectors such as transport and energy and then requires strong cross sector collaboration to agree on the policies, incentives, standards and pilots to unlock societal value for all our citizens.
THE FUTURE OF SECURITY

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @graphicrecorder
The Future of Security and Preparing for It: Why the Security Union is Needed

Terrorism and organised crime threaten our values and our way of life. Neither respects national borders. Indeed their business models thrive on the lack of coordination between states. The only way to defeat the terrorists and criminals is by working together effectively. In today’s world, security of one Member State is the security of all. National security remains the sole responsibility of Member States, but they cannot effectively address alone threats which are transnational.

So what can we do at EU level to support Member States in fighting terrorism and enhancing security?

- **we need to squeeze the space that terrorists, cyber and serious criminals operate in** – with relevant EU wide legislation where useful, setting standards by focussing on implementation: doing what we have agreed to do, helping Member states with delivery on the ground, as well as being ready to enforce the rules. And ensuring that the relevant agencies – Europol and Eurojust for example – work together and with Member States.

- **we need to tackle the root causes of terrorism including radicalisation** – through prevention and de-radicalisation work. This work is best done at the local level – led by grassroots and civil society - but the EU can help with funding and by facilitating networks allowing for best practice to be shared. Radicalisation also happens in the internet. We can work at EU level to ensure illegal content promoting Daesh for example is taken down by internet companies.

- **finally, we need to build our resilience** – critical infrastructure of course – IT, airports, ports and so on, ‘soft targets’ – such as public spaces but also society’s resilience at large.
How Crime and Terror Have Merged: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus

The conventional wisdom used to be that terrorists are middle-class and educated. In October 2016, the World Bank published a study according to which the majority of Islamic State fighters were better educated than their peers. But the picture among European jihadists is strikingly different. Far from being middle-class, they are at home in the ghettos of big cities like Paris and Brussels, and many of them have criminal pasts.

Khalid el-Bakraoui, who blew himself up in a Brussels metro station in March 2016, was previously involved in bank robberies and carjackings. Brahim Abdeslam, one of the suicide attackers during the November 2015 attacks in Paris, had a history of drug trafficking and robbery. And the three jihadists involved in the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 were robbers, fraudsters, and counterfeitters.

This is no mere coincidence. As we demonstrate in a recently published report, throughout Europe, criminals have been drawn to jihadism. Two-thirds of German foreign fighters had criminal records. According to Belgium’s Federal Prosecutor, half of his country’s jihadists had criminal records prior to leaving for Syria. And officials from Norway and the Netherlands have told us that ‘at least 60 percent’ of their jihadists have been involved in crime. No wonder, then, that the Islamic State has been labelled ‘a sort of super-gang’.

What is it that they find so appealing in extremism? In our examination of 79 European jihadists with criminal backgrounds, we saw that they often searched for ‘redemption’ from their past sins. Jihadism offers them the chance to wipe the slate clean. This typically followed on from a shocking event or personal crisis – what Quintan Wiktorowicz has termed a ‘cognitive opening’ – which prompted them to reassess their life, and become open to new ideas and beliefs.

Our examination reveals another worrying trend: that jihadism licenses the use of crime. From senior leaders within the jihadist scene, down to street-level supporters, there is the idea that anything taken from the disbelievers is simply ghanima, or the ‘spoils of war’. Anwar al-Awlaki, the al-Qaeda leader who was killed in a US drone attack in 2011, infamously justified this in his ‘Ruling on dispossessing the disbelievers’ wealth in Dar al-Harb (the lands of war’). Islamic State has even issued instructions in its magazines advising would-be jihadists to commit white-collar crime, by forging payslips and taking out credit from banks. It seems that jihadists, therefore, are actively encouraged to commit crimes.

One of most effective examples of this was Khalid Zerkani, who became an influential figure in the Molenbeek jihadist scene prior to his 2014 arrest for...
terrorist-related offences. He encouraged a gang of young men to rob tourists in Brussels, and would then distribute the proceeds amongst the group, earning him the nickname *Papa Noël* (Father Christmas). Speaking at his trial, one witness said that Zerkani told the young men that ‘to steal from the infidels is permitted by Allah’.

This religious veneer, combined with Zerkani’s charisma, was massively influential: he was responsible for upwards of 70 men mobilising to Syria. Amongst his recruits was Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who helped coordinate the attacks in Paris. This phenomenon is worrying, as it offers criminals an opportunity for ‘redemption’ without requiring any change in their behaviour. It simply repurposes crime, under a religious sanction.

There are a number of steps that can be taken to counteract this nexus of crime and terrorism. Above all, we need to re-think radicalisation, as the behaviour of those who adopt extremist ideas does not always match up to long-held notions about displays of religion. Being ‘pious’ is no guarantee that criminal behaviour has stopped, while acting like a ‘gangster’ does not preclude involvement in terrorism. Countering terrorist financing should also target all streams of financing, including small-scale, petty crime, and illicit trade such as counterfeiting. As the Mayor of Molenbeek, Francoise Schepmans, has recently said, radicalisation thrives on other forms of criminality, and it may be wise to first target lower offences.

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*Anja Kaspersen, former Head of International Security, World Economic Forum*

**The Darker Side of New Technologies: How A New Global Security Order Has Arrived**

Understanding the impact of new technologies on global security has never been more urgent – but responses are falling behind and there is no framework on the table to get back on track.

After decades of relative stability, international political and security systems are now coming undone at the seams. Strong states are becoming more stand offish. Growing asymmetries in norms and interests are compromising international law.

Geo-strategic balances are shifting as large armies are growing less important than access to data, technological prowess and digital literacy. As warfare is becoming robotised and artificial intelligence militarised, we face a new arms race with potentially destabilising consequences.

Rapid technological advances are making it cheaper and easier to develop new ways of causing harm at scale. The ‘democratisation of destruction’ is exemplified by cyber attacks on critical network systems, which are likely to become more commonplace.
Decentralising threats create an incentive for states to collaborate on designing effective responses to their shared challenges – but political systems still assume a zero-sum approach to security, and trust is eroding. Fear-mongering populist politicians are filling the vacuum in global leadership as electorates feel helpless and fatigued by the sense that problems outside their immediate environment are unsolvable and elected leaders cannot be trusted to have their best interests at heart.

Political leaders are not technology literate. Innovators and entrepreneurs lack understanding of the security implications of their work. And we lack mechanisms to bring the two together.

Together, these intersections add up to a critical inflection point that will increasingly transform our lives in ways we struggle to understand, let alone control. It is all too easy to concoct a frightening vision of the future. How do we minimise the prospects of sleepwalking into dystopia? There are no easy answers, but the first step is to acknowledge the risks and make a greater effort to include all stakeholders, disciplines and generations in an honest and informed conversation. To genuinely commit to stability and responsible innovation we need to rebuild trust – which requires a demonstration of positive change and transparent leadership.

As the Nobel-winning physicist and tech optimist Dennis Gabor once put it, ‘The future cannot be predicted, but futures can be invented’.

The ‘democratisation of destruction’ is exemplified by cyber attacks on critical network systems, which are likely to become more commonplace.

The social contract is breaking down, as connectivity is enabling people’s sense of identity and loyalty to shift from the state of which they are citizens, to more fragmented groups and/or transnational movements based on shared beliefs. We have not yet developed ‘a cyber social contract’ to protect ourselves, the structures we rely on, and the internet itself. Data security, accountability and transparency in design and policy remain more of an after-fix than a priority.
PLANNING AND DECIDING IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @graphicrecorder
In 2016, the vulnerabilities at top levels of leadership are greater than at any time in recent history. The implications are deeply troubling. A proliferation of ‘unthinkable’ events since the Russian seizure of Crimea in early 2014 has revealed a new fragility at the highest levels of the corporate, public policy and investment worlds. The ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected, non-normative events at critical moments has proved not just to be wanting but perilously inadequate.

Examples of the ‘new normal’ keep stacking up. Most recently, they include: Brexit, Europe’s migration crisis, the sudden 60% reduction in oil prices, and the new frailty of political stability. Traditional parties and structures are being challenged by the new, radical, disruptive scale of digital empowerment and public disillusionment. Who a few months ago seriously raised the prospect of US President Donald Trump? Even the sudden possibility in recent weeks confirmed two dark new realities: the destabilising impact of the ‘new normal’ of ‘unthinkables’, plus the narrowness and inadequacy of risk assessments.

These challenges raise major questions about the appropriateness and configuration of the human capacity of those at the highest levels to cope with and respond effectively to the fast growing proliferation of ‘unthinkables’.

New research confirms how pressures resulting from an ever-more compressed time scale often overwhelm decision-makers’ capacity to act effectively. New solutions and answers need to be found rapidly, especially in the areas of behaviour, culture, mindsets and systems.

The ongoing research project ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’ led by Nik Gowing and Chris Langdon explores the inability to handle the ‘new normal’. It is based on scores of confidential high level interviews and conversations. They are captured in 2,000 pages of transcripts. The interim findings are available at www.thinkunthinkable.org.

Two dark new realities are confirmed: the destabilising impact of the ‘new normal’ of ‘unthinkables’, plus the narrowness and inadequacy of risk assessments.
In the past two decades, the world has been experiencing a period of unprecedented transition in political, social, economic and environmental areas mainly driven by an exponential change in technology. The rate of change in many aspects of human society is expected to continue creating both opportunities and perils. A recently introduced phrase – ‘a black elephant.’ – is used to describe existing and foreseeable problems of great magnitude and complexity. There are many black elephants: failed and failing states, global warming, water scarcity, mass immigration, income inequality, and rising global powers challenging the international order. Additionally, the growing role of non-state actors and super-empowered individuals in domestic and international affairs has increased the complexity of addressing these black elephants in the strategic environment.

It has been argued that the exponential growth in technology, the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning and human-machine interface will help humanity to create abundance and will solve our problems. Others suggest that AI and robotics will create disruption resulting in high unemployment and, raising ethical concerns and wider instability.

Our social, economic regulations and our political systems have yet to adapt to these conditions. Compounded by the complexity, these changes will create uncertainty that will present further challenges to decision-makers. In an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, where changes are taking place more rapidly than ever. Strategic foresight helps decision-makers understand the present, but also describe the future so that the right decisions made today will help shape a better tomorrow.
By creating a series of ‘different futures’, based on the most significant but uncertain forces shaping our environment, decision makers are encouraged to re-examine their own assumptions about the future. When planning for any organisation’s future, decision makers are faced with an increasingly complex and dynamic external environment. For some elements of this environment, such as demographics, it is possible to identify broad trends; while others, such as the turbulent geopolitics, are more challenging to predict. In considering an uncertain future and how best to position the organisation, scenario planning is a useful tool. By creating a series of ‘different futures’, based on the most significant but uncertain forces shaping our environment, decision makers are encouraged to re-examine their own assumptions about the future. The process results in individuals stepping away from the so often reactive, incremental strategic planning – a natural response to uncertainty – in favour of a more forward looking, proactive approach.

At the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, we undertook a scenario planning exercise in 2016 for just this purpose. Involving several levels of Bank staff, this exercise focused on the central question of ‘In what kind of world will the Bank be operating in 2030?’ As mentioned, we have a better grip on some elements of the future than on others – our team explored four megatrends: the rise of emerging markets and urbanisation, the accelerating scope, scale and impact of technology; the ageing world population; and climate change and environmental degradation. Other elements of the world in 2030 were deemed more uncertain and research identified more tentative trajectories, for example considering the future of energy or financial services as well as more speculative questions surrounding conflict and social cohesion. This research, and the fundamental questions behind it, led to the creation of four ‘different futures’ for us to consider in our exercise.

As we reflected on possible future worlds in which the EBRD might operate, we identified two uncertainties which could have a profound impact on the Bank’s operating environment. The first, will ‘our’ world be characterised by top down or bottom up power and processes? And the second, is economic development leading to more or less inclusion, especially with regards to employment and opportunity? We saw these as the ‘drivers behind the drivers’ of the economic, social and political systems of the future, providing a skeleton framework to structure our strategic thinking.

Based on this analysis, we at the EBRD have derived areas where early positioning would make sense irrespective of which ‘future’ materialises, and others where it is better to wait until there is greater visibility. We are now helping sector and country teams adopt the same methodology in their planning, with the aim of shifting the culture throughout the organisation away from incrementalism, and towards tackling uncertainty head-on.
Leadership matters: hundreds of books are published every month with the word leadership in the title. Yet there is no universal theory of leadership or agreement on how good, bad, better or great leadership can be evaluated or measured.

One the one hand, societies everywhere are searching for leaders and leadership systems that can deliver realistic hope. One the other hand, advances in education, the spread of democracy, prosperity gains and social media have contributed to a diffusion of power and authority within societies and across the world. The turnover of political and business leaders in democratic societies seems to be occurring at an accelerating pace – shaped by and contributing to structural short-termism.

Thinking about the future leadership of Europe in terms of all good vs. all bad futures e.g. integrated vs. fragmented, is not useful. Instead it is helpful to reflect on why different stories of leadership co-exist. Leadership stories reflect five different myths of progress – see table.

In the classical Hero myth, a leader was an individual who tried against the odds to achieve the impossible. Success was not guaranteed. It was the competition itself that was important, as it still is in the Olympics – to bring out the best and reward the best, so everyone tries to win. But the loser, too, has honour.

In the Democratic/Scientific Myth, a leader is a wise and honest broker of the truth. In the Economic myth, a leader is always one step ahead of the competition: winning is everything. A leader who fails, is blamed.

In the Ecological myth, leadership is a whole system capability. Entrepreneurial and generous individuals play their part in enabling new and shared value. The health of the whole system is contingent on the quality of cooperation and self-awareness of the whole system and its wider context.

Which of these stories of leadership are being/should be used to hold leaders accountable for the stories they are telling about the future of Europe?

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<td>Growth</td>
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<td>Competition</td>
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<td>Maximising advantage</td>
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Angela Wilkinson former Head of Strategic Foresight, OECD, author of ‘Strategic reframing’
Our democracies have a common life – but there is much disorder in it – the cultivation of suspicion towards foreigners, the manipulation of fear and the knowing disregard for truth. If our democracies were in healthier shape, we could face the challenge of resurgent authoritarianism with confidence, but there are few democracies, whether in the Central European region or elsewhere, that are in good shape. There is so much inequality and injustice; so much corruption and self-dealing, so many unanswered attacks on the independence of institutions, from the courts to the press.

There are moments when it becomes easy to believe we will never bring order to our common matters. There are moments too when the work that universities do seems beside the point, and our research seems too obscure to be of any use.

We need to rededicate ourselves to what universities uniquely do; this is even more so the case for the Central European University.

The one thing we must teach all our students, if our societies are to remain free, is to know what knowledge truly is. For without knowledge, without respect for research, science and reason, democracies cannot bring order to our common life.

Our societies have never deluged with so much information and never been in greater need of knowledge. From our smart phones and computers, a torrent of data deluges us every day. We are more confused than ever because we have wandered from the continent of truth. A university is the guardian of that continent of truth. We need to teach that some things are true. Some are false. Some ideas take us forward toward deeper understanding of reality, while others take us back into darkness and confusion. Some ideas have survived the test of falsification while others have been rightly discarded. Of course, we must not set ourselves up as a knowledge elite. We need to be humble guardians, aware of how often universities have abused their authority and proclaimed truths that turned out, upon examination, to be false.

Even a humble guardian, however, must keep faith with the history of our sciences. We must believe that over time, after inconceivable effort, and many backward steps, we have made progress. The continent of certainty grows slowly larger. Expanding its boundaries and defending the core of what we know to be true are the essential work of universities in bringing order to our common life.

Democracies cannot solve their problems if demagogues and populists are allowed to despise the hard-won knowledge of experts, if the facts of climate change, migration, racial discrimination, inequality can be conjured away by the dark technologies of political illusion.

A university dedicated to a free and open society has one function, to graduate men and women who are citizens, citizens who know that our common life has no order without knowledge. However much we may dispute the content and meaning of knowledge, democracies cannot dispute that it exists, and that once established as such, knowledge must be the lodestar that guides us to accept the legitimacy of what we decide together – on the basis of what we know together.

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1. This contribution is adapted from Professor Ignatieff’s inaugural address as Rector of the Central European University. It was delivered on 21 October 2016 in Budapest.
Enrico Giovannini, Professor of Statistics, University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'

Minimising Vulnerability and Fostering Resilience: An Investment for the Future of Europe

The ESPAS Report Global Trends to 2030 noted that ‘The world is becoming steadily more complex, more challenging and also more insecure’. Since the publication of the Report in 2015, the sense of uncertainty has become even stronger in Europe and elsewhere. The referendum on Brexit, the 2016 US elections, as well as the political conditions in several European countries have demonstrated the risks that even well-established institutional systems can face due to a growing sense of uncertainty and dissatisfaction among citizens with current policies.

In the 2016 ‘State of Union’ address, President Juncker rightly recognised the risks of dissolution that Europe is facing underlining that the ‘the next 12 months are decisive if we want to reunite our Union’. A stronger Europe must be built over the key principles contained in Art. 3 of the Treaty, particularly with regards to ‘social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations, and protection of the rights of the child’.

To do that in the age of uncertainty is a huge challenge, but it is not impossible, as the experience of some European countries show. This is why two key concepts should drive European policies: ‘an investment in people is an investment in future’ and ‘none left behind’.

The first principle requires a change in the current mindset and in accounting rules: today, if a company buys a computer, this is an investment, often subsidised by tax benefits; if it offers training to its employees, this is a cost. The same applies to public administrations. In a knowledge-driven economy this is a nonsense. Human (and social) capital, the most important driver of economic growth and societal well-being, has been largely reduced over the last decade and we are not doing enough to rebuild it.

The second principle is at the centre of the United Nations ‘Agenda 2030’ for sustainable development, to which all European countries have subscribed. It requires a serious fight against all inequalities, as already stated in Art. 3 of the Treaty, especially inequalities of opportunities. This is where Europe lacks a common vision, as if this would be a ‘social’ problem to be dealt by individual countries. On the contrary, existing inequalities put at risk our economic future, as well our common political perspectives.
For these reasons, reducing people’s vulnerability to current and future shocks and building resilience of our economies and societies should be the first priority for the Union. Tangibly, this could involve the following:

1. EU-wide programmes for people at risk of poverty and social exclusion (who are today more than 120 million across the 28 member states) based on minimum income, intensive re-training and active labour market policies;

2. a EU five-year plan, similar to the EFSI, to rebuild human (and social) capital and prepare people for the new industrial revolution that is ongoing; and

3. change in fiscal rules, so that expenditures in human capital are treated as an investment, and not as a cost.

As proposed in the abovementioned ESPAS Report ‘The world of the future, combining volatility, unpredictability and complexity, will require interdisciplinary approaches that enable anticipation, facilitate reaction and forge resilience. Above all, it requires the prioritisation of long-term objectives and strategies’. This means overcoming the usual distinction between economic and social policies, and stimulating in any possible way economic and social investments.

If the future of the European Union relies on the future of its citizens, investing on them is the only way to have a future.
The Future
of Governance
THE FUTURE OF THINK TANKS
Think tanks play a fundamental role in shaping policy agendas. They mobilise expertise and put forward evidence. They push for innovative change and they build networks and communities through which they nurture and spread ideas and catalyse action.

The current environment of fast-paced transformations and increasingly complex and intertwined challenges at local, national and global levels would seem to create a perfect backdrop for think tanks to engage in dynamically, offering creative, pragmatic and actionable policy solutions on tangible issues.

And yet, the current conjuncture is also a particularly testing time for think tanks as we enter a ‘post-truth’ society, in which facts and expertise are increasingly challenged as the basis for policy and decision-making, in favour of more media-inviting catchphrases. This shift not only generates uncertainty and ambiguity around policymaking; it also leads to disinterest, disdain and even rejection of knowledge and evidence.

So, how should think tanks respond to this changing reality?

First, they must commit to taking on the much-needed function of repeatedly, constructively and boldly putting forward evidence-based assessments, in spite of the current apparent contempt for facts feeding into more effective and efficient policies.

Second, they have a critical role to play in confronting the trap of ‘automatic thinking,’ groupthink and confirmation bias. A 2015 World Development Report on Mind, Society and Behavior highlights the patterns in which policymakers prefer to avoid being exposed to opposing or differing views by selecting and filtering evidence in a way that confirms their views. The role of think tanks is to challenge these patterns by providing a platform to introduce new ideas, expanding the scope of the debate and of the participants.

Finally, on the way to 2030, in an increasingly networked society, think tanks must provide a space between governments, research and academia, and, increasingly, civil society and media, within which ideas can be tested, strategies can be debated, and action for the future can be designed.
WILL UNIVERSITIES AND EVIDENCE-BASED RESEARCH MATTER?
Among the European Union’s best assets are its highly-educated population, its universities, and its research capacity. Europe’s universities have, through the course of their rich history contributed hugely to modern thought and to modern science. They have helped shape the world that we know today.

Past glories will not sustain us forever. Universities need to change in order to serve the needs of tomorrow’s economy and society. This is not in debate. There is a need for more skills - and more research - in science and technology, for example. Universities will continue to have a central role in the drive for technological innovation.

We face a future in which machine capacity - and machine intelligence, albeit with certain constraints - will far outstrip human capacity. Technology holds immense promise - but this promise is accompanied by threats, and even existential threats. It follows that the need to improve our knowledge of the human and social sciences does not diminish - it increases.

Change should not mean throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Cutting-edge education and research on the human dimension will remains fundamental.

It may be that the longstanding division between natural sciences on one side, and social sciences on the other, has become outdated. There is certainly room for a conversation not just about becoming inter-disciplinary or cross-disciplinary, but about rethinking inherited concepts of disciplines and their boundaries.

Most of all, universities must play their part in developing the values and norms that are needed to guide and direct our path into a future that will look very different from the present, and that will offer a completely different set of opportunities and risks.
The Future of Society

REBOOTING DEMOCRACY
Pierre Calame, Honorary President of the Charles Léopold Mayer Fondation and author of "Sauvons la démocratie!"

A European Citizens’ Foundational Assembly

Democracy is in tatters. In a period of rapid change, in particular of the scale and width of interdependencies among societies and with biosphere, institutions and methods of governance, including representative democracy, have shown great inertia, both conceptually and institutionally. This means that we attempt to manage present and coming societal challenges with a conceptual and institutional framework created centuries ago. Talking about governance means adopting a much broader historical perspective, looking for general principles which should guide our badly needed quest for a governance and a democracy appropriate to our needs.

The most urgent issue for the EU is the conscience of being one community. The way forward lies in the organisation of a citizens’ foundational assembly in two stages, first local and then European, and we can set out concrete steps to this goal.

In a very unusual call to political leaders, the French Catholic bishops recently stated: ‘the republican social contract to live together on the national territory is not self-evident anymore’. Since the French Revolution and its deification of the Nation, the ‘republic was one and indivisible’ and the existence of an eternal national community was unquestioned. The bishops’ call reminds us what governance is really about: to found the community - and not only, as we seem to think, to manage an existing community.

This is the deep meaning of the EU crisis. It will not be addressed by national referendums or by controversies among experts on the balance of powers between European institutions or between member states and Europe.

Taking stock of a breakthrough in deliberative democracy, we can reconcile citizens with the EU through the organisation of a foundational assembly in two stages, first local and then European, and we can set out concrete steps to this goal.
Nearly all democratic theories characterise democracy as an open-ended, necessarily incomplete and dynamic project. Its concrete form varies over time and across regions; and the scope of self-determination may shrink or expand even if its legal framework may remain unaltered. However, when we think of the relationship between democracy and the Internet, we often focus on rather traditional forms of democratic engagement and control. This may concern, for example, new opportunities for participation or more transparency and accountability in political decision-making. Yet, if we regard the Internet as a mere tool for political action, we risk overlooking that and how digital technologies and democratic practices mutually influence each other and thereby create something new.

A practical example concerns the recent international debate about Facebook’s content policies. A Norwegian journalist had uploaded a Pulitzer Prize winning picture by Nick Ut from 1972 showing a group of terrified Vietnamese children running away from Napalm bombing. At its centre is a naked nine year old girl who had torn off her burning clothes. Because Facebook’s rules ban nudity, the social network took down the famous picture and all subsequently uploaded copies in protest of this policy, including who Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg accused Facebook of editing ‘our common history’.

The protest against Facebook is by no means an isolated incidence. With the growing pervasiveness of social networks and new forms of algorithmic decision-making, we can observe an increasing politicisation of their underlying rationalities. People do not only question the ‘curation’ of content; they also ask for greater algorithmic accountability and transparency. Interestingly, these new areas of democratic engagement unfold on an international level. Moreover, they include issues traditionally considered private such as trade secrets (i.e. algorithms) or freedom of contract (i.e. terms of service). Thus, the Internet enables democratic action but simultaneously may itself become subject of democratic engagement.

We risk overlooking how digital technologies and democratic practices mutually influence each other and thereby create something new.
INEQUALITY AND GOVERNANCE

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: © graphicrecorder
The gap between rich and poor has widened. Austerity programmes enacted by a series of EU governments since 2009, with the aim of reducing budget deficits, have had a disproportionate effect on those with lower incomes and exacerbated income differences. 1 in 4 Europeans are estimated to be at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU. Recent publications (e.g. Branko Milanovic’s Elephant chart) suggest that lower middle classes in rich countries have been one of the most prominent losers of globalisation in the past couple of decades. And they fuel expectations that inequality will further increase in years to come.

Not only does this represent a reversal of progress for the EU – income inequality had declined in most member states in recent decades – but it also is at odds with one of the foundational purposes of the Union: inclusive growth.

Inequality can be measured across several dimensions. Young people (between 15 and 24) for instance, are the only age group whose income has not grown in real terms over the past half century. Moreover, they have been disproportionately hit by the crisis. One in five workers in this age group is unemployed. In some countries, such as Spain and Greece, it is one in two. These conditions could leave lasting scars. Historic evidence suggests that unemployment early in careers, or even graduating from school in times of economic crisis, can have lasting, harmful effects on young people’s lifetime careers and salaries.

The interaction of all these dimensions – the income gap, a skills gap, an age gap, a gender gap, the digital divide, and the vulnerability of particular household compositions – could feed a vicious cycle for vulnerable groups, including young people, the older poor, low-skilled workers, migrants and their children, and single parents and their children. These groups are at risk of becoming trapped in poverty and social exclusion. If there is one challenge governments should single out for attention, it is breaking this vicious cycle affecting the most vulnerable groups in our society.
The future of work and technology and increasing income gaps are among the most discussed topics of long-term prospects at the moment. However, systemic perspectives and global as well as local strategies to improve the long-term outlook are often lacking. Government long-term and large-scale strategies are needed to address the potential scope and spectrum of unemployment and income gaps in the foreseeable future due to the acceleration, globalisation, and integration of technological capacities and population growth.

Some key facts:

- The World Bank has shown that the rate and level of poverty is falling worldwide; however, income gaps are growing. Oxfam found that the richest 1% of the population owns about 46% of global wealth, while the bottom 50% of the population barely owns some 0.7% of the world’s wealth, about the same as the world’s 85 richest people.
- The OECD estimates that technology is likely to account for some 80% of the drop in the labour share among its members.
- Since the rate of return for investments into high tech and financial instruments is so much greater than investment into labour, the income gaps are likely to increase, making the world increasingly unstable.
- According to the World Bank, a billion people will enter the job market over the next ten years, while one projection expects 2 billion jobs to be lost by 2030.

And, what is the role of Governments?

The Millennium Project is currently conducting a global study to help Governments create a set of long-range phased strategies to address future technology-work dynamics and income gaps. The results have been used to create three Future Work/Technology Global 2050 Scenarios, as input to national planning workshops organized by Millennium Project Node chairs around the world (www.millennium-project.org/millennium/ai-work.html).
CITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
It is vitally important to recognise that planetary urbanisation is one of the main drivers of the ecological predicament the world is in. Indeed, the ‘sustainability’ of contemporary urban life – understood as the expanded reproduction of its socio-physical form and functioning – accounts for 80% of the world’s resource use, of global ecological degradation, and of the world’s waste. What I wish to foreground in this contribution is that these urban roots that structure global socio-ecological flows and the feeble techno-managerial attempts to produce more ‘sustainable’ forms of urban living actually are customarily ignored by both researchers and policy-makers, while it is precisely these socio-metabolic flows that continue to sharpen the combined and uneven socio-ecological patterning that marks contemporary urbanisation dynamics.

I see urbanisation as a socio-ecological metabolic process whose functioning is predicated upon increasingly longer, often globally structured, metabolic flows that fuse together materials, natures, and peoples in socially, ecologically and technologically articulated, but uneven, manners. I am concerned, therefore, with the question of the urbanisation of nature, that is the process through which all manner of natures, from a wide range of localised ecologies, are socially mobilised, economically incorporated, bio-chemically metabolised and technologically transformed in order to support the global urbanisation process.

Consider, for example, how the everyday functioning of urban IT-networks, social media, smart infrastructural networks and eco-architecture, informatics, and the like are predicated upon mobilising minerals like Coltan from some of the socio-ecologically most vulnerable places on earth, upon global production chains that are shaped by deepening uneven socio-ecological conditions, and upon a ‘re-cycling’ process that returns much of the e-waste to the socio-ecologically dystopian geographies of Mumbai’s or Dhaka’s suburban informal wastelands.

Therefore, there is an urgent research and policy agenda opening up that should focus on exploring and considering the geographically uneven constellations associated with globally constituted smart technological networks, connectivities, and transformations through which the metabolic circulations of matter, people and natures are organised, and to recognise the pivotal role of urbanisation therein.

The ‘sustainability’ of contemporary urban life – understood as the expanded reproduction of its socio-physical form and functioning – accounts for 80% of the world’s resource use, of global ecological degradation, and of the world’s waste.
FORESIGHT
AND GOVERNANCE

Mindmap from the 2015 Annual ESPAS Conference

Source: @graphicrecorder
A focus on the short term often overemphasises negative, trends of doom and gloom. Developing and using foresight enables realistic hope. It pushes beyond sugar-coated ideology about what the future should be and the evidence-based pessimism that is driving fear of the future.

Foresight is a disciplined approach to futures thinking that enables societies to thrive under disruptive changes and to collaborate to create new and better future possibilities for all. It is not about wishful thinking. The aim is not to predict, but to be better prepared. To develop a more explicit, testable, contestable and useful sense of the future that is already emerging in the here-and-now.

What will 2030 or 2050 look like, sound like, and feel like? The unexpected can happen faster than anyone anticipates in 2016. Imagine it is good news. We have access to boundless clean energy. Trust is distributed across networks. Gender parity has been achieved. Peace and prosperity are working hand in hand.

If you could immerse yourself in this future – experience it somehow – and then look back to the present day, what would you notice? How would your priorities and options for action differ from what you are doing today? Would today’s key trends still be significant? The power of foresight is in refreshing and reframing the present.

Looking forward from 2016, we are in danger of becoming overwhelmed by evidence-based pessimism. The distant future has become a source of fear. Probabilistic trend analysis, business-as-usual scenarios and conditional projections are necessary but insufficient. They fail to incentivise action until crisis.

There is no appetite for dystopian visions or overly optimistic utopias which lack insight, innovation and frustrate progress. Rather, we can use foresight to generate new insights about the present day – to inspire innovation, identify new solution spaces and populate these with new seeds of change.
The last decade was marked by a fundamental misalignment between the global economic system and the societies which it is expected to serve, between political systems that must enable prosperity and progress and the rising expectations of voters. This is at the heart of the social upheaval, rising populism and the declining trust in institutions seen in many western democracies.

Forming policy responses in this environment necessitates new modes of engagement, co-creation, and collaboration. Policy-making is about problem solving. Solutions however require strategic insight and future-orientated idealism, grounded in pragmatic implementation plans for the here-and-now. In complex globally interconnected systems such solutions are increasingly illusive and require broad coalitions of actors working in unison.

Under such conditions, mutuality, which is the recognised interdependence of stakeholders, serves as an enabling social lubricant for collaboration.

We thus propose that an approach to policy-making that employs strategic foresight methods such as scenario planning in an integrated manner with dialogue and diplomacy as social learning processes for the development of mutuality, is crucial and complimentary to the technocratic planning tools already in use. Such approaches enable broad participation by cross-sectoral stakeholders in the policy-making process, amounting to a mechanism for contending perspectives to be articulated and compared and for common ground to be sought.

For global interdependence to be sustained into the future, higher levels of stakeholder mutuality will be crucial.

To create these coalitions amid competing interests and perspectives is the goal of participative strategic foresight methods employed for stakeholder mutuality. This implies methodological complexity and ambiguity. It implies diversity and contestation. It is in this nexus, between foresight, strategic option-generation, and ethical concession that policy-makers must craft their interventions.
Europe towards 2030
Your Mindmap or Worldcloud from the 2016 Annual ESPAS Conference

If you want to share, please take picture and send to: EPSC-EU-STRATEGIC-FORESIGHT@ec.europa.eu
Decision-makers have always been faced with the tasks of addressing crises, leading change and responding to the unexpected.

Recently, however, unexpected and constant change has become the norm, while the interconnections between separate and distinct crises are more tightly knit than ever. Technological innovations have amplified these trends to an unprecedented degree in terms of pace, scope, complexity and impact. And, while some crises are already loud and visible, others are less easy to spot or to predict, although they may potentially be more toxic in the long run.

In 2015, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker spoke of the ‘polycrisis’ facing Europe. Indeed, decision-makers at all levels of government, in the public and private sectors, in academia and in the non-profit sector, are engaging in ‘polycrisis management’. It has almost become banal to describe this as the ‘new normal’.

While polycrisis management is fundamentally necessary, it is just as critical to invest resources and reflection in preparing for the future, as this is the only way to recalibrate towards effective governance aimed at medium and long-term objectives. This is the only way that we can take part in shaping trends – be they global or local – while also building capacities throughout our societies, our institutions and across our systems of governance, to better equip them for change, to make them more adaptable – in short: to build their resilience.

To thrive in conditions of polycrisis and change, a strategic ability to anticipate, identify and respond to opportunities and risks is needed. Responding is not just about reacting, it is about being adaptive.

For Europe, this means reflecting on which strategic investments – in infrastructure and in human capital – will have the most impact and be most sustainable; it means making the most out of the opportunity to pool resources together across Member States; it means reviewing the European method to ensure it remains robust, relevant and effective.
The winners of globalisation are often said to be the millions in the emerging economies who have been lifted out of poverty in recent decades, together with those who were already rich and are now richer. The losers are said to be concentrated in the developed countries - the squeezed middle whose jobs, income and prospects have been hit.

Concerns about jobs and prospects in the west have generated scepticism towards globalisation. One outcome is renewed questioning of the role of international trade. Economists have long argued that trade is not a zero-sum game, but that it increases prosperity. Accordingly, a return to a bilateral rather than a multilateral framework risks creating even greater economic difficulties. But this does not convince those whose economic prospects have worsened.

A consensus may be emerging in favour of stronger efforts to compensate the losers of globalisation. This would imply a reorientation of globalisation in practice, rather than its abandonment.

A variety of strategies have been proposed, as Europe and the west seeks to manage a large-scale economic and social transition in the coming decades. Some prioritise the role of innovation as a source of new jobs and new prosperity. Others favour a return to redistributive policies and better social protection. The way forward could well involve a combination of measures.

On a broader level, globalisation seems to have damaged the social contract that characterised European democracies in the modern era. There are many signs of greater political polarisation and in cases political paralysis. Is it time to seek to adapt and renew the social contract, not just at national level, but also at European and international levels?
Over the past few years, the EU has had to confront a series of crises that have put a lot of strain on its governance system and opened new fault-lines across European societies: sovereign debt issue, migration, Brexit, Ukraine, Russia’s newfound assertiveness, terrorism. The outcome of the US elections will also have to be factored in over the coming months and years.

All this has taken place against the backdrop of an increasingly interconnected world where information and sometimes disinformation travels fast, requiring constant and rapid reactions from holders of public office; and where winners and losers of globalisation seem to live in increasingly different universes, with growing anger from those who are or feel left out.

The latter challenges are global; but the EU is in a particularly difficult position, first, because of its institutional set up: its system is more geared towards carrying out long term structural reform than towards managing crises. Second, as a Union of States and peoples, the EU has to cope with multiple and sometimes conflicting legitimacies. Communication under those circumstances proves to be a particular headache, and an area where the EU certainly has to reinvent its functioning.

In the EU, the horizontal character, political sensitivity and sheer size of these challenges has triggered a strong increase of the guiding and steering role of the European Council, which gathers the Member States’ Heads: existential questions are ‘Chefsache’. This is inevitable but the need for crisis management has to some extent lowered the European Council’s capacity for developing longer term visions. It can also at times cause strains across the system. Some people claim that this interferes with the co-decision powers of the legislators (European Parliament and Council of the Union). On the other hand, the European Council - whose members are certainly the most legitimate representatives of their peoples - is the closest you get to a (collective) government within the EU and is the indispensable institution for setting the general direction of where the EU is headed.

A key challenge for the EU concerns the growing demands of citizens and stakeholders to have their say and play a direct role in governance. The internet and social media have provided grass-root movements with an entirely new speed and scale, creating opportunities for people to make their voices heard. Over the years, the EU has developed new tools of information, transparency and public consultation, but struggles to find the right balance between openness and effectiveness. The EU’s tradition of regulating areas of increasing technical complexity by externalising regulation to de-politicised, ‘expert’ agencies and watchdogs has also come under scrutiny.

The European institutions and the administrations serving them need to find new ways to respond to these developments while continuing to ensure effective policy-making.
Our strategic environment is changing rapidly. We live in a world that is at once more connected, contested and complex. The fragile societies, instability and conflict which we meet in many parts of our neighbourhood and beyond also have consequences for our internal security and prosperity.

To take account of the new global context, our approach to conflict must also change. Greater connectivity is both an asset as it drives communication, trade and mobility, but also makes us vulnerable to cross border crime, terrorism, global pandemics and cyber-attacks. The rise in human mobility compels us to rethink our approach to migration, sustainable development, security and governance.

This increasing link between the internal and external policies is perhaps one of the most significant features of our time. As a result, the internal make-up of societies, how they are governed, levels of trust, economic prosperity and deeply anchored shared values play an important role in domestic resilience as well as in international relations, driving or exacerbating conflicts where society is weak and divided, and mitigating or even preventing crises when a strong societal fabric exists.

This is particularly apparent in the EU’s near surroundings. Many countries to our East suffer from economic, political and energy related vulnerabilities. War and conflict situations in Libya, Syria and Iraq have enabled extremists to undermine existing societal structures and feed parallel criminal and terrorist networks. Further South, regions prone to instability and violence suffer from a toxic combination of poverty, weak governance and poor infrastructure, corruption, human rights abuses and conflict ridden electoral politics as well as the increasing impact of climate change.

Demographic trends threaten to increase the risk of conflict in years to come. By 2030 the global middle class is expected to rise to 5 billion. But inequalities are set to rise too, potentially triggering social discontent and upheaval in both the developing and the developed world. Disparities in wealth, education, digital connectivity and employment opportunities (notably for the young) present risks of increased social tension as well as conflict.

To anticipate these changes, foreign policy needs to increasingly focus on fostering a social fabric that is able to withstand tension both internal and external. The EU Global Strategy takes account of this growing link between societal resilience and conflict prevention, not least by pursuing follow up policies in the field of building resilience, adopting an integrated approach to crises and conflicts that puts a premium on prevention and post-crisis reconstruction as well as by strengthening the links between our internal and external policies. Building on this nexus, Agenda 2030 and the realisation of the SDGs are key elements in the EU’s strategy in promoting a sustainable and cohesive way of living together and sharing the planet and its natural resources.

In the years to come we need to focus even more on adopting tailor made approaches in our external relations that integrate the strong link between resilient vibrant societies and preventing conflict.
Cities and Regions of Tomorrow: Drivers of a Better Future?

Cities are catalysts for policy change and the 21st century will be shaped by metropolitan values: diversity, creativity, industriousness, entrepreneurialism.

The challenge facing the Metropolitan generation to build modern cities and smart regions is monumental. As far as urbanisation and metropolisation are concerned, polycentric development is the key approach to encourage regions and cities to combine resource potential and boost flows and interactions. The process towards polycentric regions is particularly evident in Europe. This coalescing of cities into regional urbanised entities is linked to the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial era and as such, can be considered as the spatial manifestation of changes in economic, political-institutional societal and technological process, most notably the 'globalisation' in our society.

Many decisions today will shape longer paths to achieve liveable cities and regions by 2030 and 2050; cities and regions that will be economically robust, environmentally resilient, providing quality of life and social inclusion. Are we perfectly aware of these challenges and well prepared to face them? What does building a long term urban vision mean?

More specifically, what meta conditions are needed to ensure that the respective 'Urban Pact' strategy initiated by the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the EU (2016) in close cooperation with the Committee of the Regions becomes a sustainable pathway towards this end?
Advances in technology, wealth and income concentration, shifting demography, migration flows, under employment and climate change are transforming our societies. The (dis)empowered citizen, as introduced by the World Economic Forum 2016 Global Risks Report, describes the tensions between the growing cyber connectivity empowering citizens with more information and means of communications against the increasing feeling of exclusion from meaningful participation to decision-making among citizens and civil society.

Alongside a growing proportion of people distrusting their government, we register also a decline of trust and membership in established political parties and organisations in Europe. At European Union level, the political and economic crisis has called into question the very foundations of EU and fueled the distance between people, organisations and institutions.

For Jean Monnet, one of the founding father of the European Union, ‘Nothing can be done without citizens but nothing can last without institutions’. In this context, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), set up by the 1957 Treaties to involve civil society organisations, aims at complement the representative democracy with the participatory democracy and strengthening the role of civil society organisations. In its recent opinion, the Committee has stressed that Europe will be able to avoid extremism, defend its democratic values and establish a ‘community of destiny’ through greater transparency, ownership and participation by citizens and organised civil society at both national and European level.

Looking forward to 2030, how can the expectations of the (dis)empowered citizen and the deriving challenges be addressed? How can civil society organisations adapt to the shifting external contexts and take the opportunity to play their crucial role in societal development? How can traditional institutions of ‘organised’ civil society respond to, and support, citizen engagement? How civil society organisations can thrive from the new models for citizens’ expression and generate increasing involvement in national and European governance?

2. Edelman Trust Barometer 2015
3. SOC/423, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Principles, procedures and action for the implementation of Article 11(1) and 11(2) of the Lisbon Treaty
Biographies of the Contributors to ESPAS 2016
Cinzia Alcidi

Dr. Cinzia Alcidi is Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, where she leads the Economic Policy Unit, and fellow at LUISS - School of European Political Economy. Prior to joining CEPS, she worked at the International Labour Office in Geneva and taught International Economics at University of Perugia (Italy). Her research activity includes macroeconomics, economic policy and EU governance. She has experience in coordinating research projects and networks. She has published extensively on the economic policy and governance of the euro area and participates regularly in international conferences. She holds a Ph.D. degree in International Economics from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva (Switzerland).

Benjamin R. Barber

Benjamin R. Barber is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Fordham School of Law’s Urban Consortium, and President of the GLOBAL PARLIAMENT OF MAYORS project, which held its inaugural convening in The Hague in September 2016.


Barber has been an outside adviser to President Bill Clinton and has consulted with national and municipal political and civic leaders around the world.

A founding editor of the international quarterly *Political Theory*, Barber has written for the *Financial Times*, *Washington Post*, and *New York Times*, as well as *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, *Nouvel Observateur*, *El Pais* and *La Repubblica*. He has also written extensively for television and theatre.

Pierre Bollinger

Pierre Bollinger is the Head of Outreach, Partnerships and International Affairs of France-Stratégie (CGSP), a governmental think-tank under the authority of the French Prime Minister.

Prior to joining it in 2011, he served as an Advisor for Non-Governmental Affairs at the French Embassy in Washington (2007-2011) and worked as an Associate Director at the American Center of Sciences Po. A political scientist by training, he holds Masters in Philosophy and Political Science from the Université Paris 1-Sorbonne and Sciences Po, and was a Visiting and Teaching Fellow at Harvard University’s GSAS, as well as a Fulbright grantee. He is also a co-founder of the French Political Theory Review *Raisons Politiques* (Presses de Sciences Po.).
Jiří Buraniek

Jiří Buriánek has been the Secretary General of the Committee of the Regions since June 2014. He served previously as Director at the Secretariat-General of the Council, responsible for network industries (energy, transport, telecommunications/information society) and European infrastructures (Connecting Europe Facility and Trans European Networks). Prior to this, he has also served as Enlargement Manager at the European Commission’s DG Joint Research Centre and as Secretary General of PostEurop, the European Restricted Union of the UN Special Agency of the Universal Postal Union uniting 42 European Universal Service Providers.

Pierre Calame


Jim Cloos

Jim Cloos is Deputy Director-General in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, where he oversees teams dealing with the preparation of European Council meetings, co-legislation, inter-institutional relations, and support to the rotating Presidency.

He started his career as a Luxembourg diplomat, working at the Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the EU from 1987 to 1992 and eventually becoming Deputy Permanent Representative. During the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 1991 he took an active part in the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. After moving to the European Commission, he headed the Cabinet of the Commissioner in charge of agriculture between 1993 and 1995 and was Head of Cabinet to the President between 1995 and 1999. Between 2001 and 2006, he was Director for relations with the US in the Council Secretariat and a close collaborator of the High Representative Javier Solana.
Jim Cloos read Russian and Linguistics at the University of Reading, UK, then obtained post-graduate diplomas in Soviet and Eastern European Studies at the Paris Institut d’Études Politiques and in International Trade at the university of Paris IX Dauphine. He is the co-author of National Leaders and the Making of Europe, an ‘insiders history’ of the European Council from 1975 to the present day (John Harper, 2015), as well as of Le traité de Maastricht: genèse, analyse, commentaires (Bruylant 1993). He also published numerous articles on institutional questions, the CFSP and transatlantic relations.

Matt Dann

Matt Dann oversees the management of the non-research operations, including finances, strategy and managing institutional relations with stakeholders, for the European Economics think tank Bruegel. Matt is an experienced media professional who has worked in both television and the financial sector. He is a graduate of Keele University, England, and has an MBA from Solvay Business School of the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

James Elles

James Elles was a British Conservative Member of the European Parliament for the South East region of the UK from 1984 to 2014. Since stepping down, he has remained active in a number of fields. Apart from being Chairman of the South East Conservative European Network (SECEN ), he is a Member of the Steering Committee of the European Internet Forum (EIF) (which he co-founded in 2000); he continues to chair the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) which he founded in 1992; and is Honorary President of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis (ESPAS) which he started in 2010, examining long-trends to focus on priority challenges facing the EU in the years ahead.

Enrico Giovannini

Enrico Giovannini is an Italian economist and statistician, member of the Club of Rome. Since 2002 he is full professor of economic statistics at the Rome University ‘Tor Vergata’.

From April 2013 to February 2014 he was Minister of Labour and Social Policies in the Italian Government, and prior to that (2009–2013) he was President of the Italian Statistical Institute (Istat), and Director of Statistics and Chief Statistician of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001-2009).
He is Senior Fellow of the LUISS School of European Political Economy, Vice-president of the High Level Group on Competitiveness and Growth of the European Council, Co-Chair of the ‘Independent Experts Advisory Board on Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’ established by the UN Secretary-General, member of the European Statistical Governance Advisory Board (ESGAB) responsible for supervising the functioning of the European Statistical System, member of the ‘Commission économique de la Nation’ established by the French government, member of the Council of the International Statistical Institute and of boards of several Italian and international institutions.

He was Visiting Fellow at the European Political Strategy Centre in 2015-2016. In 2014, the President of the Italian Republic made him ‘Cavaliere di Gran Croce al Merito della Repubblica’, the highest ranking honour of the Italian Republic.

Nik Gowing

Nik Gowing has been the main presenter on BBC World since February 1996. He was a founding presenter of Europe Direct and has been a guest anchor on both HARDtalk and Simpson’s World.

Before joining the BBC, Nik was a foreign affairs specialist and presenter at ITN for 18 years. From 1989 to 1996 he was diplomatic editor Channel Four News, from ITN in London. In 1981, he won a BAFTA for his exclusive coverage of the imposition of martial law in Poland, and won a medal at the New York Television Festival for his nightly coverage of the 1991 Gulf War.

Heather Grabbe

Heather Grabbe is Director of the Open Society European Policy Institute, the EU policy arm of the Open Society Foundations established by George Soros.

From 2004-2009 Dr Grabbe was Senior Advisor to European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, responsible in his Cabinet for the Balkans and Turkey. Before joining the Commission, she was Deputy Director of the Centre for European Reform think-tank, working with Charles Grant on a wide range of European issues. Her academic experience includes research at the European University Institute (Florence), Chatham House (London), Oxford and Birmingham universities, and teaching at the London School of Economics.

Her publications include Can the EU Survive Populism? (with Stefan Lehne, 2016, Carnegie Europe) and The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanisation through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (2006, Palgrave).
Edgar Grande holds the Chair in Comparative Politics at the University of Munich. His research interests are focused on problems of governance, globalisation, European integration and political conflict.


Co-founder & Chief Executive Officer of Purpose.com Jeremy has been building movements since the age of 8 when, as a child activist in his native Australia, he ran media campaigns and lobbied leaders on issues like children’s rights and nuclear non-proliferation. In 2005, he co-founded GetUp, an Australian political organisation and internationally recognised social movement phenomenon that today has more members than all of Australia’s political parties combined. In 2007, Jeremy was a co-founder of Avaaz, the world’s largest online citizens’ movement, now with more than 40 million members.

In 2011, Jeremy received the Ford Foundation’s 75th Anniversary Visionary Award for his work as a movement pioneer and the World Economic Forum named him a Young Global Leader. He also serves as Chair of the Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Civic Participation. In 2012, Fast Company named him one of the Most Creative People in Business. The World e-Government Forum has named him as one of the top ten people who is changing the world of politics and the internet, and The Guardian named him one of the ten most influential voices on sustainability in the US. And in 2015, Jeremy received the Performance Theatre’s Inspired Leadership Award, whose previous recipients have included Richard Branson, Melinda Gates, and Paul Polman.

His work has been profiled in publications like The Economist and The New York Times, and his most recent thinking with Henry Timms on ‘new power’ was featured as the Big Idea in Harvard Business Review, as one of 2014’s top TED talks with more than 1.25m views, and by CNN as one of ten top ideas to change the world in 2015.
Jeremy has been a keynote speaker at venues such as the World Economic Forum at Davos, TED, the RSA, Chatham House, the United Nations, Blair House, The Economist Big Rethink, The Guardian Activate, and Social Media Week.

Jeremy began his career with the strategy consultants McKinsey & Company and he has degrees from Harvard University and the University of Sydney. He lives in New York.

Jeanette Hofmann, political scientist, heads the project group The Internet Policy Field at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB). She is also one of the founding directors of the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG) in Berlin. Jeanette Hofmann is honorary professor of internet politics at the Central Institute of Further Education at the Berlin University of the Arts (UDK).

She was a member of the Enquete Commission on Internet and Digital Society of the German Bundestag from 2010 to 2013. Jeanette Hofmann’s latest publications focus on conceptualising Internet Governance, the emergence of internet politics as a new policy domain in Germany, and the role of trust in the global regulation of the Internet.

Stijn Hoorens

Stijn Hoorens is Associate Director of RAND Europe and Head of RAND’s office in Brussels. RAND is a not-for-profit research organisation that helps to improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. Before joining RAND fourteen years ago, he held research positions at Delft University of Technology and at the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO).

Stijn has led and designed numerous policy studies advising various governments at national and international level. He has been involved in ESPAS for several years and led RAND’s study on Europe’s societal challenges. His research interests include issues around demography, employment, and skills.

He received his B.Sc. and M.Sc. in systems engineering, policy analysis, and management from Delft University of Technology.
Michael Ignatieff

Born in Canada, educated at the University of Toronto and Harvard, Michael Ignatieff is a university professor, writer and former politician.


Between 2006 and 2011, he served as an MP in the Parliament of Canada and then as Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Leader of the Official Opposition. He is a member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and holds eleven honorary degrees.

Between 2012 and 2015 he served as Centennial Chair at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York. Between 2014 and 2016 he was Edward R. Murrow Professor of the Practice of the Press, Politics and Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School.

He is currently the Rector and President of Central European University in Budapest.

Alan James

Alan James is VP Worldwide Business Development at Hyperloop One. Dr James has extensive experience in developing the strategic, economic, political and commercial cases for major infrastructure projects.

Hyperloop is a new mode of transport, operating on-demand, which is designed to move freight and passengers quickly, efficiently, and with minimal impact to the environment. Hyperloop One networks are capable of speeds over 1,000 km/h (622 mph), and radically transform connectivity and competitiveness of the cities, regions and countries they serve.

Hyperloop One, based in Los Angeles, is the company actually building Hyperloop and is scheduled to demonstrate a working system in early 2017.

In parallel with developing the technology, Hyperloop One is also developing business cases for the first wave of Hyperloop networks around the world. Alan is leading the company’s engagement with the EU and the Governments of member states where Hyperloop networks are proposed.
Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance, Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit, and CEO of the DFID funded Justice and Security Research programme at the London School of Economics. She has pioneered research on new wars and global civil society. She is convenor of the Human Security Study Group that reported to Javier Solana when he was High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and now reports to his successor Federica Mogherini. Her books include The Baroque Arsenal (1982), Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (2003) and New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Third edition, 2012).

Anja Kaspersen is Head of Strategic Engagement and New Technologies with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Anja is an international security policy entrepreneur, geo-strategic thought-leader and practitioner. Previously with the World Economic Forum, spearheading the Forum’s work on geopolitics, international security and new technologies, addressing violent extremism, the future of warfare and humanitarian action. Professional affiliations with the Hastings Centre, the World Policy Institute Council, the IEEE and the Harvard Future Society AI-Initiative. Former positions include a long and varied career with the Norwegian Government, international organisations, research, academia and the private sector. Aspiring yogi.

Mehmet Kinaci has a B.Sc. in Civil Engineering and earned his M.A. in International Security Management and Leadership. He served at the strategic and operational levels at NATO and National HQs, and was involved in NATO operations in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Afghanistan and other NATO programmes such as the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue. He also served at HQ ISAF where had the opportunity to interact with a variety of experts, including advisers to Afghan ministers and special advisers to international community representatives.

He joined Allied Command Transformation in 2010. His area of expertise includes Strategic Foresight and Energy Security. He was the team leader in the development of the ‘Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 and 2015 update Reports’ and is currently developing the SFA 2017 which aims to establish persistent foresight and future studies at Allied Command Transformation. SFA identifies trends that will shape the future strategic context and derive defence and security implications for the Alliance out to 2030 and beyond.

He successfully completed the NATO Executive Development Programme in 2011/2012 and continues his PhD in the International Studies programme of the Old Dominion University.
Sir Julian King

Julian King is Commissioner for Security Union. Sir Julian King KCVO CMG was appointed Her Majesty’s Ambassador to the French Republic. Julian King was appointed Director-General Economic and Consular at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in June 2014. Previous to this post, Julian was appointed Director General of the Northern Ireland Office in November 2011 to June 2014, Julian was Ambassador to Ireland from 2009 to 2011. From 2008 to 2009, he worked in the European Commission, on secondment, heading the Office of the British Commissioner.

Brigid Laffan

Brigid Laffan is Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (EUI), Florence. She was Vice-President of UCD and Principal of the College of Human Sciences from 2004 to 2011. She was the founding director of the Dublin European Institute UCD from 1999 and in March 2004 she was elected as a member of the Royal Irish Academy. In September 2014 Professor Laffan was awarded the UACES Lifetime Achievement Award. In 2012 she was awarded the THESEUS Award for outstanding research on European Integration. In 2010 she was awarded the Ordre national du Mérite by the President of the French Republic.

Pascal Lamy

Pascal Lamy is President Emeritus of the Jacques Delors Institute.

From September 2005 to August 2013, Pascal Lamy served for two consecutive terms as Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A committed European and member of the French Socialist Party, he was Head of Cabinet for the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, from 1985 to 1994. He then joined Credit Lyonnais as CEO until 1999, before returning to Brussels as European Trade Commissioner until 2004.

Mr. Lamy holds degrees from HEC School of Management, the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA).
Karl-Heinz Lambertz

Karl-Heinz Lambertz (born 4 June 1952) studied Law at the Catholic University Louvain-La-Neuve (UCL) and the University of Heidelberg. After his studies, Karl-Heinz Lambertz became consultant at the Office of the Minister for Institutional Reforms and deputy manager of Aerotech Ltd as well as consultant for SRIW (Société Régionale d’Investissement de Wallonie). From 1999 until 2014, he was Minister President of the German-speaking Community of Belgium. He held the positions of Minister of Employment, Policy for the Disabled, Media and Sport and Minister of Local Authorities. In 2014, Mr Lambertz became President of the Parliament of the German-speaking Community until becoming Senator of the Community in 2016.

He has been a member of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) since 1999, where he was President of the PES Group for 5 years, becoming First Vice-President of the institution in 2015. Mr Lambertz is Member of the Commission for Social Policy, Education, Employment, Research and Culture (SEDEC) and the Commission for Environment, Climate Change and Energy (ENVE). He is active in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities within the Council of Europe where he is President of the Socialist Group. From 2013 to 2014 Mr Lambertz was President of the Euregio Maas-Rhine (EMR) and became President of the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) in 2010.

In 2008, he was one of three senior Belgian politicians commissioned by King Albert II to investigate ways of enabling constitutional reform talks in the light of the long-running Belgian constitutional crisis.

Hans Peter Lankes

Hans Peter Lankes has been Managing Director, Corporate Strategy at EBRD since May 2011 and is a member of the Bank’s Executive Committee. In this function he has advised the President on the Bank’s strategy, was responsible for designing and achieving shareholder support for the Bank’s priorities and chairing the Change Management Board.

From July 2012 until June 2013 and again in October-December 2014 he served as Acting Vice President, Policy with the task of reorganising the Vice Presidency into the Bank’s hub for strategy and policy coordination. Since January 2015 he is the Bank’s Acting Chief Economist.
Christian Leffler

Deputy Secretary General for Economic and Global Issues at the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Born in Göteborg in 1955, Mr Leffler obtained a Bachelor’s degree in politics and international relations from the LSE. After doctoral studies at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva he joined the Swedish Foreign Service in 1980. Postings to Cairo and Paris were followed by the Political Affairs Department of the Ministry in Stockholm. After participating in the accession negotiations and in establishing the new working structures of the Representation in the first year of active Swedish EU membership, he became the first Swedish ‘Antici’, responsible under the Permanent Representative for policy coordination in the work in the Council of Ministers.

He joined the European Commission in 1996, where he took up the post of Commission ‘Antici’ and Head of the unit in the Secretariat General responsible for the coordination of relations with the Council of Ministers. In 1999, he became the Deputy Head of the Private Office of the Right Honourable Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations. From 2002 until 2007, he was Director in charge of the Middle East and South Mediterranean in the European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations.

He then spent three years as Head of Cabinet of Mrs Margot Wallström, Commission Vice President for Institutional Relations and Communication. During 2010 Mr Leffler was Deputy Director General of the DG for Development and relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States, as well as a senior adviser to EU High Representative for CFSP and European Commission Vice-President Catherine Ashton, assisting her in the preparation for the establishment of the new European External Action Service.

From the beginning of 2011 to 2015 he was Managing Director for Americas with the European External Action Service. Mr Leffler took up his current position on 16 September 2015.

Shiraz Maher

Dr. Shiraz Maher is Deputy Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) and a member of the War Studies Department at King’s College London. He currently leads the Centre’s research on the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts and also researches Salafi-Jihadi soteriology. The BBC has described him as ‘one of the world’s leading experts on radicalisation’. In 2016 he was shortlisted for the Orwell Prize in journalism for his pieces on radicalisation, foreign fighter mobilisation, and the terrorist threat to Europe.
Aaron Maniam is Director of Industry at Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, responsible for coordinating economic policies and regulating the manufacturing, services and tourism sectors, as well as overseeing long-term economic transformation.

He joined the Singapore government in 2004, serving on the North America Desk of the Foreign Service (2004-2006) and at Singapore’s Embassy in Washington DC (2006-2008), where he was the principal coordinator for Congressional liaison and issues relating to the Middle East. He was posted to the Strategic Policy Office (SPO) at the Public Service Division in 2008, where he worked on scenario planning and analysis of long-term trends relevant to Singapore. He was appointed the first Head of the Singapore Government’s newly-formed Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) in January 2010, while retaining his SPO portfolio. In July 2011, Aaron was appointed Director of the Institute of Policy Development at the Civil Service College (CSC), which organises leadership training programmes for public sector talent (the top 1% of the public sector workforce). In 2012, he started the CSC Applied Simulation Training (CAST) Laboratory, an experiment to apply principles of ‘serious play’ to training public officers to deal with complex environments. He led efforts to develop the College’s curriculum on complexity science, and convened the College’s multi-sector interest groups on Complexity and Governance.

He received his education at Somerville College, Oxford, where he graduated with double First Class Honours in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), was a Coombs Scholar and held the Mary Somerville prize for academic excellence. He was President of the Oxford Economics Society in 2000. In 2002, he received a Master of Arts degree in International and Development Economics from Yale University. He received a Master of Public Policy (with Distinction) from Oxford’s new Blavatnik School of Government (BSG) in 2014, which he attended on a Lee Kuan Yew Postgraduate Scholarship from the Singapore government.

In January 2011, Aaron was one of eight young leaders named an ‘Outstanding Young Singaporean’ by the Orchid Jayceettes of Singapore. In June 2012, he was conferred the Singapore Youth Award, the highest national honour for young people who exemplify excellence in their professional lives and community work, by the Prime Minister. He was identified by the World Economic Forum as a Young Global Leader in January 2013.
Mairead McGuinness

Mairead McGuinness MEP is Vice-President of the European Parliament.

As Vice-President, Mairead has responsibility for the Parliament’s information and communications policy; she oversees the Parliament’s scientific research body – STOA – and its link with the scientific community; and plays a leading role in the area of children’s rights as the Parliament’s mediator in cases of international parental child abduction. Mairead is a long-standing member of the Parliament’s Agriculture and Rural Development Committee, and the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee.

An agricultural economist, she focuses on the future shape of agriculture and rural development, global development policy, the environment and food safety and security.

Mairead chaired the Parliament’s investigation into the collapse of the Equitable Life assurance company which identified issues around weak financial regulation before the financial crisis of 2008.

In May 2014 Mairead was elected to the European Parliament for the third time. Prior to becoming an MEP she was a well-known journalist, broadcaster and commentator.

Ann Mettler

Ann METTLER is the head of the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the in-house think tank of the European Commission. The EPSC provides specialised and forward-looking advice to President Juncker.

Ann Mettler is also the Chair of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS).

Prior to assuming her position in December 2014, Ann was for eleven years executive director of the Lisbon Council, a Brussels-based think tank. From 2000-2003, she worked at the World Economic Forum, where she last served as director for Europe.

She holds Masters Degrees in political science and European law and economics, and graduated with distinction from the University of New Mexico, USA, and the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-University in Bonn, Germany.
Carlos Moedas was born in Beja (Portugal) in 1970. He graduated in Civil Engineering from the Higher Technical Institute (IST) in 1993, completing the final year of studies at the École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées in Paris (France). He worked in engineering for the Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux group in France until 1998.

He obtained an MBA from Harvard Business School (USA) in 2000, after which he returned to Europe to work in mergers and acquisitions at investment bank Goldman Sachs in London (UK).

He returned to Portugal in 2004 as Managing Director of Aguirre Newman and member of the Executive Board of Aguirre Newman in Spain. In 2008, he founded his own investment company, Crimson Investment Management.

In 2011, he became a Member of Parliament in Portugal and was appointed to the position of Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of Portugal, in charge of the Portuguese Adjustment Programme.

In 2014, he became Member of the European Commission, overseeing the portfolio of Research, Science and Innovation.

Geoff Mulgan was the first Chief Executive of the Young Foundation (2004-2011), which became a leading centre for social innovation, combining research, creation of new ventures and practical projects.

Between 1997 and 2004 Geoff had various roles in the UK government including director of the Government’s Strategy Unit and head of policy in the Prime Minister’s office. Before that he was the founder and director of the think-tank Demos.

He has also been Chief Adviser to Gordon Brown MP, a lecturer in telecommunications, an investment executive; and a reporter on BBC TV and radio.

He is a visiting professor at LSE, UCL, Melbourne University and a regular lecturer at the China Executive Leadership Academy. He is an adviser to many governments around the world, and has been a board member of the Work Foundation, the Health Innovation Council, Political Quarterly and the Design Council, and chair of Involve. He is also currently chair of the Studio Schools Trust and the Social Innovation Exchange.

Between 2015-2018 Geoff will be a senior visiting scholar at Harvard University, in the Ash Center at the Kennedy School.

Peter Neumann

Peter Neumann is Professor of Security Studies at the War Studies Department of King’s College London, and serves as Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

He has authored or co-authored five books, including *Old and New Terrorism*, published by Polity Press in 2009; and *The Strategy of Terrorism* (with MLR Smith), published by Routledge in 2008.

He holds an MA in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin, and a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London.

Marius Oosthuizen

Marius Oosthuizen is a member of faculty at the Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria, South Africa. He teaches leadership, strategy and ethics, and heads up the Future of Business Project that uses strategic foresight methods to explore the future of South Africa and Africa.

Marius is a graduate of the Oxford Scenarios Programme at Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, UK. He holds a Masters in Strategic Foresight from Regent University, Virginia Beach, USA and an Honours Bachelor in Systematic Theology from the University of South Africa (UNISA) and is currently completing a Masters in Applied Social and Political Ethics.

He works with business leaders, policy makers and civil society activists using his expertise in stakeholder dialogue, scenario planning, strategic foresight and systems thinking. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Association of Professional Futurists and recent participant in the London-based School of International Futures.

Luis Planas

Luis Planas has been Secretary-General of the European Economic and Social Committee since March 2014.

From 1986 to 1994, he served as a member of the European Parliament and, from 1996 to 2004, was head of the private office of two successive European Commissioners. From 2010 to 2011, he was Spanish ambassador and Permanent Representative to the EU. He was also Spanish ambassador to Morocco from 2004 to 2009 and has occupied a number of other positions at national and regional level in Spain. He was a member of the Spanish Parliament from 1982 to 1987 and three times served as regional minister in the government of Andalucia.

He holds a law degree from the University of Valencia. He is a regular speaker and has written articles and essays on European affairs.

He is married and has two sons.
Stefano Scarpetta

Stefano Scarpetta is Director for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs at the OECD.

Mr. Scarpetta joined the OECD in 1991 and held several positions in the Economics Department and in his current Directorate. He led several large-scale research projects, including: ‘Implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy’, the ‘Sources of Economic Growth in OECD Countries’; and contributed to others including ‘The Policy Challenges of Population Ageing’ and ‘The Effects of Product Market Competition on Productivity and Labour Market Outcomes’. From 2002 to 2006 he worked at the World Bank, where he took over the responsibility of labour market advisor and lead economist. In this capacity, he coordinated a Bank-wide research programme of Employment and Development and contributed extensively to the Bank’s investment climate assessments. He returned to the Economics Department of the OECD in November 2006 where he became the head of the Country Studies Division in charge of Japan, Korea, China, India, Mexico, Portugal, Denmark and Sweden. From March 2008 to June 2010, he was the editor of the OECD Employment Outlook and the Head of the Employment Analysis and Policy Division of the Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA). He became the Deputy Director of DELSA in June 2010 and in May 2013 has become Director.

He has published extensively in academic journals, including in the American Economic Review, The Economic Journal, Economic Policy and The International Journal of Industrial Organisation. He edited several books in the fields of: labour economics and industrial relations; economic growth; and industrial organisation. He is the co-director of the programme of work on Employment and Development at the Institute for the Studies of Labour (IZA, Bonn, Germany); Research Fellow of IZA; Member of the expert group on the minimum wage in France; Member of the Executive Board of the CAED (Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Data) network and member of the Scientific Committee of the DARES (French Ministry of Labour).

Mr. Scarpetta holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales (EHESS), Département et Laboratoire d’Economie Théorique Appliquée (DELTA) in Paris and a Master of Science in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Simon Schäfer

Simon Schäfer is CEO, Founder of Factory, a campus concept from Berlin, where startups can learn from each other and use collective knowledge to overcome early stage hurdles.

Simon is also the founder of Startup Europe Summit (SES), Europe’s foremost tech meets policy conference. Since 2015, Simon is member of the Board of Directors at Allied for Startup and member of the Advisory Board at the Lisbon Council since 2014. Simon is CEO of totalCommerce GmbH.
Mark Spelman

Mark Spelman is an international business leader who worked at Accenture for 26 years. He has significant experience in business and digital strategies, operating models and change management. His Accenture roles included being Global Head of Strategy, Global Managing Director for Thought Leadership and Executive Director for the Accenture Institute for High Performance.

Mark’s current roles include working for the World Economic Forum (WEF) to lead their Future of the Internet Initiative and chairing an EU-China Expert group on the Future of the Digital Economy. This work involves engaging leading thinkers and decision makers from Government, Business and Civil Society on digital disruption, access and internet governance.

Mark was Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce Executive Council in Brussels; his current non-executive roles include Chatham House, The Future Cities Catapult in the UK, a social enterprise Numbers For Good and Chairman of Leap a charity specialising in helping young people understand the causes and consequences of conflict.

He has an MA in Economics from Cambridge University and a MBA from INSEAD, France

Bruce Stokes

Bruce Stokes is the director of Global Economics Attitudes at the Pew Research Center. He is also a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and an associate fellow at Chatham House.

He is a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is a member. And for 23 years he was the international economics columnist for the National Journal, a Washington-based public policy magazine.

He is the author many Pew surveys, including most recently: Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs; Europeans Face the World Divided; Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit. Bruce is co-author of the book America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (Times Books, 2006) and author of the 2009 GMF Transatlantic Trends survey. In 2012 he co-authored A New Era for Transatlantic Trade Leadership (European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels) and The Case for Renewing Transatlantic Capitalism (demosEuropa, Warsaw). In 1996 he edited Open For Business: Creating a Transatlantic Marketplace (Council on Foreign Relations).
Prior to joining the EPSC as Deputy Head and acting Leader of the institutional team, Paweł ŚWIEBODA was President of demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy, an EU policy think tank based in Warsaw, from 2006 to 2015. Earlier, he was Director of the EU Department at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years 2001-2006 and EU Advisor to the President of Poland from 1996 to 2000.

A graduate of the London School of Economics and the University of London, UK, he is a member of a number of advisory boards of European think tanks as well as a member of the Global Agenda Council on Europe of the World Economic Forum. In 2013/2014, he was Rapporteur of the Review of European Innovation Partnerships.

Erik Swyngedouw

Erik Swyngedouw is Professor of Geography at Manchester University. His research interests include urban political-ecology, hydro-social conflict, urban governance, democracy and political power, and the politics of globalisation.

His was previously professor of geography at Oxford University and held the Vincent Wright Visiting Professorship at Science Po, Paris, 2014.


J.H.H. Weiler

J.H.H. Weiler is University Professor at NYU Law School and Senior Fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard. Until recently he served as President of the European University Institute, Florence. Previously he served as Manley Hudson Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School. He also served for many years as Member of the Committee of Jurists of the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. Prof. Weiler is Editor-in-Chief of the *European Journal of International Law* (EJIL) and the *International Journal of Constitutional Law* (ICON). He holds a PhD. in European Law from the EUI, Florence and honorary degrees from various European and American universities. He is the author of many works among them *The Constitution of Europe – Do the New Clothes have an Emperor* (translated into 8 languages).
Klaus Welle

Mr. Welle has had a long career in the European Parliament. To date, Mr. Welle has been Secretary General of the European Parliament since 2009. In this capacity he is the European Parliament’s most senior official. From 2007 until 2009 he was the head of the Cabinet of the President of the European Parliament. From 2004 until 2007, he was the Director-General for Internal Policies at the European Parliament. From 1999 until 2003, he was the Secretary-General of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. From 1994-1999 he was Secretary-General of the EPP Party. Mr. Welle holds a degree in Economics from the University of Witten/Herdecke, Germany.

Angela Wilkinson

Angela Wilkinson has over 30 years of experience in forward assessment, business strategy and public policy. An expert in developing the anticipatory capabilities of leaders and their organisations. Very experienced in directing major international initiatives to address pressing global challenges, she has conducted over 100 foresight initiatives, worked in 30 countries and in a wide range of sectors. Angela held senior positions at the OECD, University of Oxford and in several global firms.

Author of two books on scenario planning and numerous articles on uncertainty and risk. Fellow of the World Academy of Arts and Science, Angela holds a PhD in Physics.

Ibon Zugasti

Ibon Zugasti is Partner/Director at PROSPEKTIKER (www.prospektiker.es), International Projects Manager at LKS (www.lks.es), Chairman of the Millennium Project Node in Spain (www.proyectomilenio.org), Vice-President of Foresight Europe Network – FEN (www.feneu.org) and Deputy Director of the Iberoamerican Foresight Network – RIBER (www.riber.info).

Ibon has led several consultancy and research projects in fields like strategic foresight, sustainable development, labour and training, and energy.

He has also been advisor for the European Commission and Committee of the Regions of the EU and the World Bank. He is coauthor of different publications such as Latin America 2030: Delphi Survey and Scenarios (Millennium Project), An initial assessment of territorial forward planning/foresight projects in the EU (CoR), The water-energy-food nexus – Foresight for R&I in the context of climate change (EC) and also contributes to the yearly publication State of the Future (Millennium Project). He has been teaching strategic management and foresight in many Universities and conferences at the international level.