2017

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

The present paper maps out some of the tangible potential consequences of Brexit on the European armament industry. A year after the UK’s vote to leave the bloc, there has been altogether little thinking dedicated to the issue. Will the UK have access to EU research funding up to and after 2020? What is the potential impact of Brexit on the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and its directives, on OCCAR and the LOI? What repercussions might it give rise to for bilateral or multilateral European programmes? What will be the impact of negotiations on UK-EU defence company agreements, from Thales to Airbus, and from MBDA to Leonardo? The aim of the following report is to provide a modicum of clarity on issues, which may seem uncharted in places, and inscrutable at times.

This report is based on discussions in the CEPS Task Force on EU Reform. The group met four times between September 2016 and January 2017. Participants included members of the European Parliament, former members of the college of Commissioners, former members of the European Council and Council of Ministers, as well as leading scholars on EU politics and law. A list of members and their organisational affiliation appears in the Annex. Pieter de Gooijer, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom to the Netherlands to the EU, and Pawel Świeboda, Deputy Head of the European Political Strategy Centre of the European Commission acted as observers to the proceedings of the Task Force.
CEPS’ Task Force on EU reform has looked into constitutional issues and citizens' involvement in politics, migration and asylum, euro area economic governance, and trade policy. These are all areas where the added value of the Union's action is clear and where we still have unfinished business. We have tried to draw up a list of proposals for actions that are positive and can bring solutions where populist discourse cannot. Our recommendations are achievable, realistic, concrete, based on objective facts and figures, and part of a broader long-term approach. We do not shy away from considering possible treaty change, but focus first on what can be done quickly and easily, if there is a willingness to act.

This Report explores how EU civilian crisis management (CCM) has evolved over the past decade, showing how the concept and activity have been transformed by changes in the international security environment as well as in the EU’s institutional setting. Security challenges such as organised crime, illegal migration or terrorism have made the traditional divide between internal and external security increasingly irrelevant. New types of CCM actors have thus emerged, in the field of Justice and Home Affairs in particular, that have de facto embraced crisis management in response to new threats. This publication seeks to identify the challenges as well as the opportunities that these changes present for CCM, and examines inter alia how EU CCM actors and policies have adapted to the new environment and how they can best serve the Union’s strategic priorities as identified by the EU Global Strategy.

Two years after the EU formally launched its strategy for an Energy Union, this Report examines the energy challenges facing the different regions of Europe, investigating shared priorities and common projects, as well as barriers to integration and cooperation. A series of chapters devoted to distinct regions examines what role the Energy Union can play to help address their energy challenges, including those related to energy security and relations with external suppliers. The Report also looks at efforts to push forward with the construction of the Energy Union via regional initiatives, including some that reach beyond the borders of the EU. Such initiatives have shown how progress on all five pillars of the Energy Union is important for the energy security of the EU and how progress need not be uniform across Europe. Notably, the deepening and interconnection of energy markets – nationally, regionally, within the EU, and beyond its borders – are central to this process

As well as introducing new decisions and actions in the field of security and defence, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) stresses the imperative to build resilience in the EU neighbouring countries and surrounding regions.
As the EUGS approaches its first anniversary, and shortly before the release of a Joint Communication on resilience by the EEAS and the Commission, this volume, the second in the EUISS post-EUGS series, seeks to shed more light on the different definitions of the concept and how these may be applied in specific functional and geographic areas. It aims to clarify not only the meaning of the term but also its policy implications in the wider security context, showing how resilience needs be understood as a dynamic process involving a number of EU policies, external partners and local players.

Preventive diplomacy, or the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, has been one of the foundations of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Asia and beyond and stands as an expression of a rule-based international order. Moreover, in its key strategic documents, including the recently released Global Strategy, the EU has highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy, as reflected in the proposed ‘integrated approach’ to conflicts and crises.
This Report, which draws on the main presentations made during the 2016 CSCAP EU Committee meeting devoted to this topic, examines the role of the EU as a preventive diplomacy actor and explores how in pursuing this strategy it can contribute positively to security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo), the so-called ‘sleeping beauty’ of EU defence, is awake. Still barely predictable only a year ago, PeSCo is an ambitious, binding and inclusive legal framework aimed at incentivising defence cooperation among member states. PeSCo is based on binding commitments between member states that could promote increased defence spending, improve force commitments for EU operations and stimulate European defence equipment programmes. In addition to the regular assessment of these commitments, PeSCo will also house a number of concrete projects designed to improve the effectiveness of EU military operations and to sustain European capability development. Taken together, these elements are designed to potentially shape national mindsets and practices in defence through a structured framework at the EU level.
Elaborating on the likely form and extent of PeSCo, this Chaillot Paper not only sketches out the historical metamorphosis of PeSCo but it also looks more specifically at how it could change the operational and capability development dynamics of EU defence cooperation. The paper is not primarily occupied with questions about its finalité politique, but it is rather an analytical guide to assist experts and lay readers alike navigate the major operational and capability issues at stake.