China

The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility. US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated. The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.

China is the EU’s second biggest agri-food exports market. It is also the second destination for the export of EU products protected by geographical indications (GI), accounting for 9% of its value, including wines, agri-food and spirits. The EU-China Agreement on the Protection of Geographical Indications, concluded in November 2019, is expected to realise higher potential for exporting EU GIs to the country since market access is now guaranteed. But the US-China Economic and Trade Agreement, signed in January 2020, has set down a couple of precautionary measures, including a consultation mechanism with China before new GIs can be recognised for protection in the Chinese market because of international trade agreements. As a result, EU GIs could be brought under tighter US scrutiny before being recognised for protection in China. Analysis reveals, however, that only a handful of EU GIs may be affected by the latter Agreement, if at all.

In this short presentation, Dr Franck Debié, Director of the Library and the Knowledge services in the European Parliament, Associate Professor of Geopolitics at Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris (Paris Sciences et Lettres University), Member of the Steering Committee of the European System for Policy Analysis and Strategy (ESPAS) outlines his view of the key findings of the three ESPAS reports (2012, 2015, 2019) on long-term trends to 2030 for the Ideas Network 2030, an Oxford based network regrouping policy-makers, business actors and researchers. The discussion took place on 14 September 2019. In his conclusions he stressed that: 'the successive ESPAS reports help us to progressively narrow our focus on those issues which will force Europeans to engage in a joint conversation on policy options for the future: the rise of China, climate change, aging and migration, digital disruption, and the growth of nationalism.

The outlook for gas demand in China is one of the most important questions facing the global gas market, as it will have significant consequences for gas producers and consumers across the world. The rapid rise in China’s gas demand has been catalysed by environmental concerns, in particular air quality, in the country’s major cities and the authors of this report, Akira Miyamoto and Chikako Ishiguro, provide a detailed analysis of the progress that has been made in introducing environmental legislation to pursue the goal of cleaning up China’s skies. They consider the impact that this has had on gas consumption in China over the past decade before analysing the major goals of the Blue Sky Action Plan and outlining its potential consequences for gas demand over the next two to three years.

There are numerous analyses about China and its future, as well as about Chinese engagement with Latin America. This report examines, in detail, how the growth of China, with its power and role in the global economy, is likely to transform Latin America and the Caribbean through economic, political, and other forms of engagement with the region. The report considers multiple scenarios regarding the future of China, the resolution of its security challenges, and possible departures from its current trajectory. It focuses primarily on the question of what Latin America and the Caribbean will look like if China succeeds in its ongoing economic and political engagement in the region.

Who will win the battle of new mobility services? Our Automotive Disruption Radar provides new insights Since 2017 we have been charting a concept of mobility in transition with our semi-annual Automotive Disruption Radar (ADR). The current fourth edition confirms the main developments: more and more people think that using a car does not necessarily mean that you have to own one, consumers can increasingly imagine buying a car with electric drive and more and more cities are granting permits to trial autonomous vehicles on their streets. Last but not least, the number of employees in R&D departments around the world working on new mobility concepts and autonomous vehicles is still rising.

In developing its international trade strategy since 2006, the EU has placed a strong emphasis on concluding Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with dynamic East Asian economies. Until very recently, however, no explicit mention has been made of China – the region’s largest and most dynamic economy – as a possible candidate for an FTA with the EU. This oversight becomes even more glaring if one considers the magnitude of the economic intercourse that already exists today between these two trading partners. China is the logical sequel in the Union’s trade strategy for East Asia. This study attempts to provide a solid analytical basis for negotiations on an EU-China Free Trade Agreement (formally, Free Trade Area treaty). The first official suggestion for such an FTA, made by Chinese President Xi Jin Ping in the spring of 2014, has recently been considered, cautiously and under various conditions, by the EU as well.

The EU faces challenges from the outside and the inside. Most of those are the symptoms of big underlying trends, and handling them needs foresight. The Global Trendometer tries to provide foresight for decision makers in the EU by analysing the changes in these long-term trends. This publication does not offer answers or make recommendations. It presents summarised information derived from a range of carefully selected sources. This issue of the Global Trendometer analyses long-term trends on India, the labour-share of income, and democracy and artificial intelligence. It also features two-pagers on geoengineering, remittances, food security in China, economic waves, the US after Trump, public procurement and deep fakes.

The purpose of this report is to provide a comparative perspective of China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative (OBOR), as seen from the various European Union (EU) member states. The Chinese leadership officially launched this framework in autumn 2013, presenting it immediately as a key national concept and foreign policy priority for the years to come. Yet OBOR is not a formal policy or a well-defined strategy, but rather a very broad conceptual framework for policies that aim at contributing to greater economic integration within Asia, between Asia and Europe, and between Asia and Africa through a diversity of activities and projects. At the heart of OBOR is a strategic approach to infrastructure development in a very broad sense. Accordingly, China’s first action plan on OBOR1 identified transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructure as priorities.