Chinese Defence

Competition in space is not a new phenomenon. The Space Race between the Soviet Union and United States was one of the defining aspects of the Cold War era. While astronauts are no longer national celebrities and media coverage has greatly diminished, competition in space remains fierce. The United States, China, Russia, Europe, and numerous others all seek to use outer space in a way that best forwards national interest.

China, in particular, has substantially increased its outer space efforts and capabilities in the post-Cold War era. China’s 2015 Defense White Paper refers to space as the “commanding height in international strategic competition”, and its commitment to active programs further underlines this strategic development. China already possesses advanced space-based C4ISR capabilities, a growing fleet of modern launch vehicles, the BeiDou satellite navigation program comparable to U.S. GPS, an array of counterspace and ASAT weapons (kinetic-kill, directed-energy, co-orbital, and cyber), and an advanced manned space program.

China has set new records in the ways, means and speed with which it has expanded its outposts in the South China Sea. Neighbouring states such as Vietnam have also extended their bases on small islands and reefs, but they have done so over many years and not within a few months. The total surface area created by China has been ironically dubbed “The Great Wall of Sand” by the commander of the US Pacific Fleet. Despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary, the expansions signal an emerging militarisation of the South China Sea, whose plentiful resources and energy deposits have long been viewed as potential causes of conflicts.

The South China Sea is currently one of the world’s most contentious zones. But the situation risks becoming even worse, despite the fact that all of the region’s states depend on stable and secure sea lines of communication. At its core, this is a regional conflict about sea routes, territorial claims and resources that primarily involves ASEAN states and China. Nevertheless, it also has global repercussions. First, it concerns a “superhighway of the sea”, on which almost a third of the world’s sea trade is transported. Any impediment to the shipping traffic would have a direct impact on world trade in general but also particularly on Japan and South Korea. Second, the South China Sea is closely connected to the rivalry between Bejing and Washington because important allies and partners of the US are involved in the dispute about China’s territorial claims. Third, it is a conflict about international norms and laws that calls into question a fundamental principle of the liberal world order: “freedom of the seas” versus exclusive maritime zones. This study addresses the main reasons, the development and the implications of the island dispute as well as ways of containing it both regionally and internationally.

The emergence of the People’s Republic of China as an increasingly significant military power in the Western Pacific presents major implications for Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and regional security. But a comprehensive assessment of the current and possible future impact of China’s military capabilities and foreign security policies on Tokyo and the alliance, along with a detailed examination of the capacity and willingness of both the United States and Japan to respond to this challenge, is missing from the current debate. Such an analysis is essential for Washington and Tokyo to better evaluate the best approaches for maintaining deterrence credibility and regional stability over the long term.

The Future of US Extended Deterrence in Asia to 2025, by Brent Scowcroft Center Senior Fellow Robert A. Manning, examines the past, present, and future of US extended deterrence in Asia and outlines how the United States, along with its allies and partners in the region, can counter China’s growing military and economic power. The report covers a number of future concerns for the US-South Korea alliance, the US-Japan alliance, and new threats to deterrence in the cyber and space domains.

China and India, the world's two most populous countries, will exercise increasing influence in international affairs in the coming decades, and each country's role on the world stage will be affected by the progress that it makes and by the competition and cooperation that develop between them. This monograph focuses on the progress China and India seem likely to achieve from 2010 through 2025 in four domains: demography, macroeconomics, science and technology, and defense spending and procurement. In each domain, the authors seek answers to these questions: Who is ahead? By how much? and Why? The authors find that India has distinct advantages over China in terms of demographics; that the two countries are surprisingly close in terms of forecasted economic growth, although China's overall economic output is likely to remain significantly higher than India's; and that, for both science and technology and defense spending and procurement, China's current substantial margins over India are likely to rise but by amounts that will vary widely depending on several alternative scenarios. The monograph concludes with implications for policy and for further research.