RSS:

Newsletter subscribe:

Defence Strategy

Deception operations

Abstract Original Language: 
Souvent assimilées à la ruse et aux stratagèmes, les opérations de déception sont une pratique de guerre à la fois ancienne et méconnue, tant au niveau stratégique que tactique ou opératif. Leurs principaux procédés sont la dissimulation, la simulation ou l'intoxication, qi toutes contribuent à tromper l'ennemi et lui faire croire à ne illusion qui doit causer sa perte. Malgré une efficacité maintes fois démontrée dans l'histoire, cette pratique ne va pas sans poser de dilemmes-d'ordre culturel et éthique mais aussi en matière d'allocation des ressources. Alors que progressent sans cesse dans les armées le développement des réseaux, la numérisation et l'intelligence artificielle, les nouvelles technologies semblent toutefois offrir un terrain fertile à un renouveau des opérations de déception. Bien employées, celles-ci permettraient de nuancer la fin du confort opératif prédit aux forces occidentales et d'éviter l'avènement d'un nouveau blocage tactique.
Original Language: 
Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Friday, June 15, 2018
Abstract in English: 
Often associated with cunning and stratagems, deception operations are as old as warfare while frequently neglected, whether at the strategic, tactical or operational levels. Its main methods are concealment, simulation and intoxication, all of which help to deceive the enemy and make him believe in an illusion aimed at causing his loss. Despite its proven effectiveness, this practice is not without cultural, ethical as well as resource allocation dilemmas. Modern armed forces are witnessing the constant upgrading of information networks, digitization and the development of artificial intelligence. These new technologies seem to provide a fertile ground for a renewal of deception operations. If well used, the latter would help mitigate the "end of the operational comfort" (i.e. the end of the material, technological and strategic superiority allowing western powers to deploy their forces without encountering major hindrances nor strong resistance from the enemy) predicted to Western forces and prevent a new tactical blockage.
File: 
Country of publication: 
File Original Language: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
60
Country Original Language: 
Share: 

Korean Peninsula Military Modernization Trends

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Thursday, September 22, 2016
Abstract in English: 
Military modernization efforts are a key variable when assessing the Korean Peninsula, and one where the shifting strategies and military efforts of the United States and China play an increasingly important role. The modernization trends of all the countries involved in the region have great significance in determining the types of engagement that could be fought. Modernization affects deterrence and assessments of the potential course of any engagement, as well as estimate of types of forces the United States needs to commit to the region, both in times of peace and in times of tension.
There are serious limits to the unclassified data available for comparisons of Northeast Asian military modernization—especially for China and the DPRK. Unclassified sources do not include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other weaponry, and they do not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also often do not include battle management, ISR, or Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) assets. These are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
55
Share: 

European Union in the World 2025: Scenarios for EU relations with its neighbours and strategic partners

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Thursday, May 26, 2016
Abstract in English: 
Who would have thought a decade ago that not only the European Union but also its neighbourhood both in the East and in the South would have been turned upside down due to a series of crises? Back in 2006 the EU had gone through a successful ‘big bang’ enlargement absorbing ten Central and Eastern European countries and was about to take two more states on board. The economy was doing well, ideas for establishing a ‘ring of friends’ in the immediate neighbourhood were flowering and Russia was seen as a close partner. Yet things have gone differently than might have expected. The financial crisis, the Arab Spring and its consequences, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine, the development of ISIS, the war in Syria and the growing number of refugees and migrants from North Africa and the Middle East are challenges the European Union has been facing in recent years.

Although predictions of the end of the European project seem to be premature, it has become obvious that the EU is in a serious crisis, both as an idea and as an organisation and international actor. Therefore simply reacting to crises is no longer an option. The EU desperately needs to think and act strategically if it wants to survive and to have any influence on the global stage.

Above all, it needs to define its future-oriented interests and how these interests can be reconciled with values that the EU attempts to project and protect. Against this backdrop, the Dahrendorf Forum – Debating Europe initiated a foresight project which aimed to set out different scenarios for the future relationship between the European Union and the five countries/regions of the Dahrendorf Forum: Ukraine and Russia, Turkey, MENA, United States and China.

The alternative futures engage in defining the most likely trajectories, downside risks, new trends and ‘unknown unknowns’. By reflecting the forward-looking challenges, the Dahrendorf Foresight Project tries to assess the EU’s role in the world in 2025.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
64
Share: 

A Game Changer? The EU's preparatory action on Defence Research

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Monday, April 18, 2016
Abstract in English: 
The Preparatory Action for Common Security and Defence Policy‐related research is currently under preparation, and it will serve as a test‐bed to prove the relevance of defence‐related research at the European Union‐level. The Preparatory Action could potentially see between €75 ‐ €100 million invested in defence‐specific research over a three‐year period beginning in 2017. The Preparatory Action follows on from a pilot project on CSDP research that was launched by the European Parliament with a budget line of €1.5 million over the 2015‐2016 period. The Preparatory Action aims to serve as a basis for an eventual, fully‐fledged, European Defence Research Programme. Indeed, should the work of the Preparatory Action prove successful, the next step would be to insert a specific thematic area on defence research within the next multi‐annual financial framework (2021‐2027) potentially worth some €3.5 billion.
The idea to specifically invest EU funds in defence research is potentially a ‘gamechanger’. Traditionally, the EU has suffered from important constraints when using EU funds for defence‐related activities. Presently, projects and programmes funded under the European Structural and Investment Funds, COSME (Europe’s programme for SMEs) and Horizon 2020 are still largely geared towards civilian rather than military projects, even though defence‐related projects are not formally excluded. One of the chief objectives of the Preparatory Action and of any eventual European Defence Research Programme is to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy by investing in key defence technologies.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
14
Share: 

Defense Modernization Plans through the 2020s

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Tuesday, January 26, 2016
Abstract in English: 
Since the enactment of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, much attention has been paid to the near-term effects of budgetary constraints on national defense. What has received less attention are the looming budgetary challenges defense faces beyond the BCA budget caps and the Defense Department’s five-year budget planning horizon. Many weapons programs will be at or near their peak years of funding requirements at roughly the same time in the 2020s, creating a modernization bow wave. Just as a large bow wave slows a ship by diverting its energy, carrying a large modernization bow wave is a drag on defense because it leads to program instability and inefficient procurement practices that weaken the buying power of defense dollars.

This report details the plans for major acquisition programs over the next fifteen years and explores the complicating factors that may make the situation more problematic for policymakers. It analyzes a range of options to mitigate the bow wave, including increasing the budget, cutting additional force structure, and making trades among major acquisition programs. The report finds that while none of the choices available are easy, it provides an opportunity for the new administration taking office in 2017 to better align modernization plans with defense strategy.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
42
Share: 

Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Wednesday, January 20, 2016
Abstract in English: 
In 2015, Congress tasked the Department of Defense to commission an independent assessment of U.S. military strategy and force posture in the Asia-Pacific, as well as that of U.S. allies and partners, over the next decade. This CSIS study fulfills that congressional requirement. The authors assess U.S. progress to date and recommend initiatives necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Pacific Command area of responsibility through 2025. Four lines of effort are highlighted: (1) Washington needs to continue aligning Asia strategy within the U.S. government and with allies and partners; (2) U.S. leaders should accelerate efforts to strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability; (3) the United States should sustain and expand U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region; and (4) the United States should accelerate development of innovative capabilities and concepts for U.S. forces.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
290
Share: 

The 2014 South African Defence Review: Rebuilding after years of abuse, neglect and decay

Title Original Language: 
Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
Abstract in English: 
After three tortuous years, cabinet approved the Defence Review in March 2014. The review is a huge improvement on the previous public document. Its 15 chapters include considerable background material that may not all have been necessary – but given the state of the SANDF, this is as much a manual to fix the department as it is a path towards the future. The result is a mixture of matters that relate to internal administration, policy, strategy, military doctrine, discipline and human resources. Although it does not set out alternative force design options, the review does present the costs of its preferred option. This policy brief interprets a number of the review’s key conclusions and presents associated policy considerations, with a focus on the financial affordability of the expenditure targets.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
8
Share: 

NATO's New Strategy: Stability Generation

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Monday, September 14, 2015
Abstract in English: 
The new threat landscape the transatlantic community faces means that NATO must adapt its strategy to remain relevant. While many transatlantic policymakers and thought leaders have called for a new strategy for NATO, few have outlined what that strategy should actually entail. This report proposes that NATO adopt a new strategy called "Stability Generation," built on the concept of ensuring stability in the NATO region and reducing the threat of significant conflicts in NATO's neighborhood.

To accomplish this, NATO must add resilience as a core task to its existing tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. NATO must also enhance capabilities in the East against conventional and hybrid conflicts, in the South against instability arising from conflicts and extremism in neighbor¬ing countries, and across the Alliance to decrease vulnerabilities and enhance resilience, particularly with respect to cybersecurity.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
21
Share: 

For a European White Paper on the Security of Europe

Title Original Language: 
Télécharger
Abstract Original Language: 
EuroDéfense-France s’est interrogée sur l’intérêt, mais aussi les difficultés, les risques et les conditions à satisfaire pour réaliser un livre blanc européen sur la sécurité et la défense. Son travail ne préjuge en aucune manière des résultats d’un tel exercice, qui pourrait conduire à plus d'intégration, ou simplement à un partage gagnant-gagnant résultant d’une subsidiarité bien comprise et appliquée de manière intelligente.

Une synthèse des principales réflexions d’Eurodéfense-France est exposée ci-après. Elle est articulée autour de 4 questions:
- pourquoi a-t-on besoin d’un livre blanc européen sur la sécurité et la défense?
- quels sont les obstacles à résoudre et les opportunités à exploiter pour le faire?
- comment le réaliser: contenu et processus?
- comment l’exploiter à Bruxelles et dans les capitales?
Original Language: 
Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Tuesday, September 1, 2015
Abstract in English: 
EuroDéfense team has examined the interest, and also the difficulties, the risks and the conditions necessary to complete a European White Paper on security and defence. In no way does this work prejudge the results of an exercise like this which might lead to greater integration or simply to win-win sharing resulting from subsidiarity that is fully understand and implemented intelligently. A summary of the main ideas is set out in four questions:
- Why do we need a European White Paper on security and defence?
- What obstacles have to be overcome and which opportunities can be used to do so?
- How should it be achieved: content and procedure?
- How could it be used in Brussels and in the Member States?
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
20
Country Original Language: 
Share: 

Retrench or Rebalance? America’s Evolving Defence Strategy

Date of Editorial Board meeting: 
Publication date: 
Monday, September 15, 2014
Abstract in English: 
The US military is at a crossroads. After a decade of war with nearly unlimited defence spending, the Pentagon must determine how to absorb nearly $500 billion in cuts over 10 years amid debate over how the ‘future force’ should be structured and equipped. The challenges of force planning for Pentagon strategists will only be exacerbated by an uncertain and challenging security environment combined with a war-weary public, debates over the United States’ role in the world and fears of its ‘retrenchment’.
File: 
Country of publication: 
Cover page image: 
Number of pages: 
22
Share: 
Subscribe to RSS - Defence Strategy