Eurasian geopolitics

Since it was launched in May 2009, the Eastern Partnership (hereinafter EaP) aimed to provide for political association and economic integration of the EaP states with the EU, having as its main goal the creation of a stable, prosperous and secure Eastern neighbourhood. The EaP has been a heterogeneous creation since it combined states with different ambitions and was perceived in different ways by the EU and its partners. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, with some exceptions in the case of Armenia at the beginning, have considered the EaP as a practical platform with which to facilitate people-to-people contacts, sectorial and economic cooperation with the EU. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the contrary have viewed the EaP as an opportunity to advance political and economic ties with the EU, that would later lead to a membership perspective.

This article explores the various futures of relations between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine. After distilling two major drivers we construct a future compass in order to conceive of four futures of relations between the EU and Ukraine. Our scenarios aim to challenge deep-rooted assumptions on the EU’s neighbourhood with Ukraine: How will the politico-economic challenges in the European countries influence the EU’s approach towards the East? Will more EU engagement in Ukraine contribute to enduring peace? Does peace always come with stability? Which prospects does the idea of Intermarium have? Are the pivotal transformation players in Ukraine indeed oligarchs or rather small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs? After presenting our scenarios, we propose indicators to know in the years to come, along which path future relations do develop. By unearthing surprising developments we hope to provoke innovative thoughts on Eastern Europe in times of post truth societies, confrontation between states and hybrid warfare.

Marking the 40th anniversary of the start of their dialogue ASEAN and the EU have agreed to work towards establishing a strategic partnership. While trade has always been the cornerstone of the relationship - ASEAN is the EU’s third largest trade partner - the EU’s ambition to expand its role as a global actor demand increased engagement. Both sides face common challenges that can only be addressed through joint responses that involve all stakeholders. To be strategic the partnership must embrace all aspects, from trade to energy, from climate change to security issues, from human rights to sustainable development. Deepening and enhancing relations between one of the most dynamic region in the world and the largest and most affluent market will bring important benefits to both European and ASEAN citizens. The last years have seen an increase in contacts but the many challenges faced today by the EU, internally and in its close neighbourhood, risk to require all attention and put the EU-ASEAN relations at risk. Finally the study argues that strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the relationship would, besides supporting representative democracy in Southeast Asia, contribute to maintaining the momentum launched in 2012.

An annual collection of wide-ranging essays by CSIS experts, 2016 Global Forecast discusses the issues that will matter most to America and the world’s security and prosperity in the year ahead.

The removal of international sanctions on Iran carries the potential to radically restructure the Eurasian energy architecture
and, as a consequence, reshape Eurasian geopolitics. The Euro-Atlantic community’s interests will be most impacted by Iran’s choice of export destinations for its natural gas delivered by pipeline. By defining the pattern of major energy flows through long-term supply contracts and costly pipeline infrastructure investment, the pattern of Iran’s piped gas exports in the immediate post-sanctions period will influence the development of both China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative and the European
Union’s “Eastern Neighborhood” policy.
This report estimates Iran, within five years, will likely have 24.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas available for annual piped gas exports beyond its current supply commitments.
Not enough to supply all major markets, Tehran will face a crucial geopolitical choice for the destination of its piped exports. Iran will be able to export piped gas to two of the following three markets: European Union (EU)/ Turkey via the Southern Gas Corridor centering on the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), India via an Iran-Oman-India pipeline, or China via either Turkmenistan or Pakistan.