Global Trends

The ECRI Statistical Package 2019 provides data on outstanding credit granted by monetary-financial institutions (MFIs) to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) for the period from 1995 to 2018. Credit volumes and annual growth rates are broken down by sector and credit type to enable detailed insights into credit market developments over time and across countries. It comprises 45 countries including the EU Member States, EU candidate and EFTA countries as well as the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. 2018, loans to EU households and non-financial corporations(NFC) increased by 2.7%, the second consecutive year of the expansion.For the fourth year in a row, total loans in New Member States (NMS) grew faster than in old Member States (EU-15). Compared to the previous year, the total loans growth rate in 2018 accelerated from 2.2% to 2.7% in EU-15, while it slowed from 5.9% to 3.5% in NMS. Between 2017 and 2018, household loans increased by 2.8% and non-financial corporations (NFC) loans increased by2.6%. Total household loans grew most in in Slovakia (+11%), Romania (+9%) and Lithuania (+8%), while the largest contractions were registered in Cyprus (-31%), Greece (-7%) and Latvia (-5%). Finland (+19%), Hungary (+19%) and Luxembourg (+11%) were amongst the Member States with the largest growth rates in NFC loans. In turn, significant reductions were registered inalia, Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia.

The OECD Economic Outlook is the OECD's twice-yearly analysis of the major economic trends and prospects for the next two years. The Outlook puts forward a consistent set of projections for output, employment, prices, fiscal and current account balances.
Coverage is provided for all OECD member countries as well as for selected non-member countries. This issue includes a general assessment, a series of focus notes on selected macroeconomic and structural issues, and a chapter summarising developments and providing projections for each individual country.

The tool examines interconnections of global trends. Its goal is to promote integrated thinking and to spark debate and further research on trend relations.

Total global military spending rose for the second consecutive year in 2018, to the highest level since 1988—the first year for which consistent global data is available. World spending is now 76 per cent higher than the post-cold war low in 1998.* World military spending in 2018 represented 2.1 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or $239 per person. ‘In 2018 the USA and China accounted for half of the world’s military spending,’ says Dr Nan Tian, a researcher with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure (AMEX) programme. ‘The higher level of world military expenditure in 2018 is mainly the result of significant increases in spending by these two countries.’

This paper addresses the present state of play and future trends, uncertainties and possible disruptions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data in the following areas:
Political: AI is biased, difficult to scrutinise and to estimate its power, and – more so when embodied in autonomous systems – potentially dangerous. Policy responses are accountability, transparency, safety and control, and public debate. These should be based on ethics. AI will lead to better governance, more debate, new policy actors and processes, a contest over centralisation, and the EU catching up. AI might progress in a revolutionary or evolutionary mode, lead to new political divisions, and change democracy. AI might be misused as a “superior orders” defence. What if data analysis changes or replaces democracy?
Socio-economic: Big Data is changing the role of data, is often dependent on sensitive information, is handicapped in the short term but better in the long term due to data protection, and its industry is in danger of monopolisation. AI lowers the cost of prediction, replaces human prediction and human labour and causes social problems, increased nudging and misuse of the term AI. AI will lead to more data, economic growth and more job market distortions. AI might lead to new industry giants, a request for more privacy, new state solutions, yet unknown jobs, AI taxes and increased state ownership. What if new economic ideologies emerge, singularity strikes or AI monopolies are broken up?
Geopolitical: AI is increasing the power competition between the US and China and gives both more power. Europe tries to create businesses and find its strengths. All are investing in military solutions and the west has a slight disadvantage here. AI will lead to a shakeup of the international system, hierarchies and networks becoming more powerful, and real-life deception being more difficult. AI might lead to China becoming the most powerful power overall and in AI. The future of AI R&D and the success of Europe’s broad approach is uncertain. What if there are two digital worlds, China becomes a data-privacy defender, and AI become targets?
Technological: Superintelligent AI is invested in and researched, challenged by philosophy, and possible this century. It might imitate the brain, be assembled together or be designed by other AIs. An intelligence explosion or a conscious AI could be possible, and might be the last invention of humanity. It would require long term funding, need to overcome many technical hurdles, be dangerous due to its intellect, possibly be contained with collective intelligence, and maybe have humans lose their jobs, safety or purpose.
Key questions for policy-makers: What makes European AI distinctive? What areas can and should we prioritise, if any? What should be regulated? How could and should the EU foster AI development, avoid monopolisation, provide data pools, use high data standards, link researchers and corporations, balance fundamental with applied AI research and private with state funding, boost applications, compensate for job loss, keep AIs away from dangerous actors, support EU foreign policy (neighbourhood, FPI, democracy and human rights, aid and development, economic freedom), improve our lives with AI, change the geopolitical AI race, deal with autonomous weapons and superintelligent AI and organise Foresight?

This paper analyses the issues of poverty and exclusion in the context of the major trends that characterise the present and will shape the near future. It also explores the uncertainty that emerging trends may pose for EU societies in terms of poverty and exclusion, and looks at options and alternative paths to counteract these two phenomena.