Military Modernization

The past few decades have seen the acceptance of a new calculus in the role that air power can - and will - play in the future security environment. This is the result of fundamental shifts in the character and conduct of war and the technology-aided ability of air power to rapidly adapt to emerging situations. Wars or conflicts that have been fought over the past half century have all been irregular in character even if the intensity, tempo and spread have been as much as, and at times more than, what could be termed high-intensity war.

In this paper, we consider the main objectives of GPV 2027 (gosudarstvennaia programma vooruzheniia, Russian for "10-year state armament programme") and examine whether Russia’s financial and defence-industrial capabilities are sufficient to meet them. We then consider how the Russian armed forces are likely to be equipped by the mid-2020s, should the main objectives of GPV 2027 be achieved. Although the programme itself is classified, enough details have entered the public domain – for instance, through statements by officials, news reports, federal budgets and draft budgets – for educated inferences to be made as to its broad contours, likely priorities and strategic direction. Such assessments are the basis of this paper.

Military modernization efforts are a key variable when assessing the Korean Peninsula, and one where the shifting strategies and military efforts of the United States and China play an increasingly important role. The modernization trends of all the countries involved in the region have great significance in determining the types of engagement that could be fought. Modernization affects deterrence and assessments of the potential course of any engagement, as well as estimate of types of forces the United States needs to commit to the region, both in times of peace and in times of tension.
There are serious limits to the unclassified data available for comparisons of Northeast Asian military modernization—especially for China and the DPRK. Unclassified sources do not include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other weaponry, and they do not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also often do not include battle management, ISR, or Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) assets. These are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization.