Security

This report assesses the defense policies of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as they apply to the Arctic. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its militarization of the Kola Peninsula, and its opposition to the liberal international order forced Arctic states to revisit their defense policies. Some focused attention on the Baltic Sea. Others focused on territorial defense. Still others focused on the Arctic. By 2021, however, each state had a relatively well-defined defense policy for the Arctic. This report details each policy’s content, trends over time within each country, and areas of convergence or divergence across countries. The report then places the concept of domain awareness within the context of Arctic defense strategies. The report concludes with recommendations on acquiring and using manned and unmanned systems, data links, distributed basing, and military exercises to ensure a secure and stable Arctic.

2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Almost every month, a new crisis dominated the news, contributing to a sense that this mounting tide of crises threatens to overwhelm us. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in Europe and beyond, concern about a growing loss of control is prevalent. In fact, findings from the Munich Security Index 2022 not only reflect the high level of risk perceived by respondents in the G7 and BRICS countries; they also suggest the emergence of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of crises that reinforce each other. Just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. Whether it is the seemingly endless pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or increasing geopolitical tensions, all these challenges contribute to a feeling of a loss of control. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed. This perception is highly dangerous because it can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Societies that have concluded that they cannot solve humankind’s most challenging problems might no longer even try to turn the tide. Will our stressed and overburdened societies end up accepting what they see as their fate, although they have the tools and resources to change it? Unfortunately, 2021 overall did not alleviate these concerns. With the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, for instance, the past year has also reinvigorated a debate about what international interventions are able to realistically accomplish. In light of the limited achievements of the United States and its partners in Afghanistan, hard questions arise about the West’s ability to build capable, legitimate state structures and promote stability elsewhere in the world. As Afghanistan now finds itself on the brink of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with civil liberties being severely restricted under Taliban rule, the investments of two decades of external intervention are at risk. While the West has ended an “endless war,” people in Afghanistan are looking toward an uncertain future.

Transatlantic leaders seem to have come to a common conclusion: the world’s liberal democracies are facing a new systemic competition. While they support a joint strategy for dealing with their autocratic challengers by strengthening cooperation with each other, they are only at the beginning of thinking about the best way to compete where they must – and to cooperate with competitors where they can. At last year’s Munich Security Conference, world leaders discussed a world shaped by “Westlessness” – as diagnosed by the Munich Security Report 2020. Unfortunately, various developments have vindicated last year’s dire analysis. Not only did Western countries continue to exhibit a lack of joint action on crucial global issues, the past year also saw continued attacks on liberal-democratic norms in key Western countries, with the storming of the US Capitol as the most emblematic symbol of the threat to democracy. But there is hope. In the midst of a global pandemic, almost exactly one year after a divisive Munich Security Conference 2020, the speakers at the virtual MSC Special Edition on February 19, 2021, including US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and other world leaders all voiced their support for a new beginning in the transatlantic relationship and for revamping cooperation among liberal democracies to prevail in a new age of systemic competition. After what can be called an “autocratic decade,” liberal democracies are now willing to push back to turn the “illiberal tide.” President Biden, having declared that “America is back” and ready to lead, is stressing at every opportunity that democracies find themselves at an inflection point and need to prove that democracy is not a phase-out model but can deliver tangible benefits to the people.

The current COVID-19 pandemic will change the world, like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terror attacks. For the foreseeable future, EU governments will be preoccupied with dealing with the pandemic’ immediate socio-economic consequences. However, other policy areas will be affected as well. With regard to the EU’s security and defence policy, COVID-19 is likely to extinguish the unprecedented dynamism that has characterised its development since 2016. Its most immediate impact is likely to be decreased funding for several new initiatives such as the European Defence Fund. The pandemic is also likely to reduce the EU’s readiness to address crises in its neighbourhood and may hasten the Union’s relative decline as a global power if its recovery is slow and wrought by prolonged disputes between the member states over the appropriate economic response to the crisis. Yet, the EU should not completely abandon its pre-COVID-19 security and defence agenda. Both during and after the pandemic, the Union will continue to face familiar challenges such as cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and instability in its neighbourhood.

Preventive diplomacy, or the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, has been one of the foundations of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Asia and beyond and stands as an expression of a rule-based international order. Moreover, in its key strategic documents, including the recently released Global Strategy, the EU has highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy, as reflected in the proposed ‘integrated approach’ to conflicts and crises.
This Report, which draws on the main presentations made during the 2016 CSCAP EU Committee meeting devoted to this topic, examines the role of the EU as a preventive diplomacy actor and explores how in pursuing this strategy it can contribute positively to security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Weighing up all the risks, threats and opportunities for France, two main issues underpin the work in this review:
- France clearly cannot address all these challenges on its own. Our national autonomy is real and should be as comprehensive as possible, but it is limited within a growing number of fields. This calls for a clear-sighted approach to priorities based on the geographical proximity of threats and on the interests of our national community. France’s European and American partners are essential for facing these challenges.
- France also has global interests. These relate to its status within multilateral organisations and its presence around the world (in particular in its overseas territories and exclusive economic zone), as well as the fact that the world is shrinking as globalised technologies and flows of goods and people generate more interdependence.
Within this context, its responsibility is based on its unique situation in objective terms. France is the only EU country (post-Brexit) that is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a nuclear power, a founding member of the European Union and NATO, and that retains a full-spectrum and engaged military. As such, its ambition must be twofold: to preserve its strategic autonomy and to build a stronger Europe to face the growing number of common challenges.

Depuis le début du 21ème siècle, de nombreux risques ont mis la sécurité à l’ordre du jour des préoccupations des citoyens et des pouvoirs publics. Depuis le début des années 1980, le besoin de sécurité est ressenti avec de plus en plus de force en France et en Europe, et encore plus aux États-Unis. La filière de la sécurité répond à ce besoin, et elle comprend, outre le coeur des industries de sécurité, des services privés et surtout un important secteur de services publics de sécurité non marchands (police et gendarmerie nationales, douanes, polices municipales, sécurité civile dont certaines unités militaires, pompiers, justice, administration pénitentiaire). La filière de sécurité répond à un besoin fondamental des citoyens, cela ne fait aucun doute, et elle constitue une activité majeure. Elle est cependant mal connue faute d’un instrument adéquat de suivi statistique par exemple. C’est pourquoi les pouvoirs publics ont lancé une étude visant à affiner les premières estimations de l’importance économique du secteur de la Sécurité contenues dans le Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité nationale publié en 2013. En parallèle, la Commission européenne a lancé une étude sur la filière de la sécurité au plan européen. La filière de la sécurité, et plus particulièrement sa composante industrielle, est en plein développement depuis les années 2000. Elle représentait au total en France en 2013 un volume d’affaires de 60 milliards d’euros et près d’un million d’emplois publics et privés. Le secteur marchand et industriel s’appuie pour sa part, sur un tissu d’entreprises comprenant de grands groupes internationaux et des PME innovantes et fortement exportatrices. C’est une filière en forte croissance. Entre 2003 et 2013 le chiffre d’affaires des produits et services de sécurité s’est développé sensiblement davantage que le PIB, au rythme soutenu de 5% par an jusqu’à la crise de 2008 et réduit à 2% par an ensuite. Dans la période à venir (de 2013 à 2020), la croissance devrait repartir et retrouver sensiblement le même niveau qu’avant la crise (à 5,1% par an selon nos estimations). C’est une filière en mutation. Ces chiffres moyens cachent en réalité une mutation de la filière. La partie traditionnelle des activités de sécurité (protection physique, services de gardiennage) stagne, alors que des domaines nouveaux comme les produits et systèmes numériques et robotiques, ou la cybersécurité, sont en très forte croissance. Cela traduit une mutation de la société elle-même qui se "numérise" et se prépare aux évolutions telles que les réseaux intelligents, les villes intelligentes, les automobiles et les objets connectés, et plus généralement, l’utilisation exponentielles de capteurs toujours plus performants et miniaturisés dont les informations nécessitent stockage et traitement. Toutes leurs applications nécessitent d’être fortement sécurisées et d’intégrer des dispositions de protection de la vie privée dès leur conception (ingénierie de type "privacy by design"). Ces évolutions offrent de formidables opportunités pour l’industrie et les entreprises françaises et européennes, qui nécessiteront de la part de tous les acteurs impliqués des visions audacieuses et une grande rapidité de mise oeuvre pour être saisies.

Security challenges in East Asia are becoming acute. North Korea is developing a missile-deliverable nuclear weapon, and the long-term stability of the Pyongyang regime is questionable. Taiwan, which Beijing claims as part of Chinese territory, is about to have a presidential election in which a candidate from a pro-independence party is the front-runner. China has also become increasingly assertive in its territorial disputes with Japan and several Southeast Asian countries. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders are attempting to redefine the role Japan plays in regional security affairs. Indeed, Japan's legislature recently enacted revisions to the country's national security laws that would loosen limitations on the use of Japan's armed forces, and the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pledged to increase defense spending