Society (Growth and Development)

In this short presentation, Dr Franck Debié, Director of the Library and the Knowledge services in the European Parliament, Associate Professor of Geopolitics at Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris (Paris Sciences et Lettres University), Member of the Steering Committee of the European System for Policy Analysis and Strategy (ESPAS) outlines his view of the key findings of the three ESPAS reports (2012, 2015, 2019) on long-term trends to 2030 for the Ideas Network 2030, an Oxford based network regrouping policy-makers, business actors and researchers. The discussion took place on 14 September 2019. In his conclusions he stressed that: 'the successive ESPAS reports help us to progressively narrow our focus on those issues which will force Europeans to engage in a joint conversation on policy options for the future: the rise of China, climate change, aging and migration, digital disruption, and the growth of nationalism.

This report is based on a study of foresight into the drivers of change and disrupters affecting the future of Europe and the strategic responses that the European Commission should consider in shaping the second strategic programme (2016-2018) of Horizon 2020. Importantly, the study was designed to use available foresight material. It is therefore focused on sense-making, rather than the generation of original intelligence.
Whilst the study cannot claim to be comprehensive, it nevertheless points out that foresight used in strategic planning offers insights, generates ideas and brings to the fore important cross-cutting domains. The use of foresight can help ensure that Horizon 2020 strengthens the competitiveness of Europe and enables it to respond to the significant current and future societal challenges.

Created during the post-war boom years, the French social model is based on the following three types of transfers: collective national insurance funded by contributions based on employment and managed jointly by employee and employer representatives; generally means-tested assistance benefits, funded by taxes and duties and managed by the State and regional authorities; free and universal public services (education and health) funded and organised by the State.

The social model therefore relates not only to social protection but also to other institutions at the heart of economic and social regulation in France. The foundations of this model are being challenged by the emergence of new risks (long-term unemployment, job insecurity, downgrading of jobs, single parenthood, dependency, etc.) and by increasing inequalities (in terms of income, access to the job market and public services, and even, in more general terms, of ‘opportunities’, whether relating to academic success, social mobility or career progression). The difficulties associated with funding social protection and with the welfare state crisis have also had the effect of weakening the model. Indeed, for many, it will have reached its limits and will be faced with a triple crisis of legitimacy, solvency and efficiency. At the same time, the social model is a central component of our social cohesion and of the French identity. The key issue for its future is to reconsider the objectives and the means we intend to allocate to it, taking into account our place within both a European and a global economy. With this in mind, there would appear to be three key questions that need to be answered: to what extent is solidarity
taken into account in the social model? What positions do taxes, transfers and public services occupy in terms of redistribution? And finally what proportion of resources should be transferred from curative action to preventive action when it comes to dealing with modern-day risks?

“Sustainable” development has to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. For several decades French growth has not complied with this definition: the prospect of climate change, the acceleration of species’ extinction and the pollution of our ground water provide three such examples merely within the field of the environment. Similar questions surround the sustainability of our Welfare State while our public debt makes us vulnerable to financial crises. There are serious methodological difficulties in determining the possible nature of sustainable growth for the French economy. It requires anticipating the future development of our model of growth and, therefore, a clear understanding of its interaction with the natural and social environment, as well as with other economies at the European and international levels. Beyond the difficulties in predicting France’s growth model, there may be disagreement with regard to the solutions required to build a sustainable model and ensure that the costs of such a model are equitably distributed. Indeed, the sustainability of a growth model presupposes that the objectives to be met and the reforms to be implemented have been developed, through discussion, while taking budgetary constraints into account. This is the only standard that will enable us to assess the possibility of succeeding in reforming our modes of production and social model, while initiating the necessary ecological and energy transition that will lead us to rethink our models of consumption, production, development and growth. In order to ensure our transition towards a sustainable growth model, our institutions will need to have more effective means of taking long-term considerations into account. The debates and consultations held in the coming weeks should enable us to outline the model (or models) of growth towards which we intend to move.

In comparison with some of its European neighbours, France remains consistent when it comes to access to resources (public services, social benefits, etc.), the availability of infrastructures and the distribution of income. Furthermore, its social model is perceived positively by the majority of its inhabitants, who generally consider it to be egalitarian. Nevertheless, the founding principles of our republican model could do with being adapted to reflect the changes that have transformed our society and social relations, and altered our relationship with politics and institutions. Economic and cultural globalisation, the construction of Europe and profound demographic changes have resulted in a more complex society, generated fears and created new aspirations. Whilst they are certainly coming up against increasing resistance, persistent social and territorial inequalities, as well as discrimination relating to gender, sexual orientation and origin, are fuelling a feeling of injustice and reduced social cohesion. Furthermore, multiple individual and collective affiliations and identities are emerging, representing both a sign of freedom for some and of uncertainty for others. Ultimately, involvement in public life is no longer limited to the vote and to support for representative democracy, since other forms of civic involvement are also now emerging. It is important, then, that such changes be supported in a way that helps combat this loss of trust in institutions (government , local authorities, schools, etc.) and in private stakeholders, such as companies. The aim is to eventually guarantee the support of all citizens for a joint project, drawing on the merits and expertise of each individual. The republican model, without any shadow of a doubt, boasts the resources required to adapt to this society with its multiple components and expectations, an adaptation that should go hand in hand with the improvement of our social model (see note entitled ‘Which social model will France be implementing in 10 years’ time?’).

The National Intelligence Council's (NIC) Global Trends Report engages expertise from outside government on factors of such as globalization, demography and the environment, producing a forward-looking document to aid policymakers in their long term planning on key issues of worldwide importance.Since the first report was released in 1997, the audience for each Global Trends report has expanded, generating more interest and reaching a broader audience that the one that preceded it. A new Global Trends report is published every four years following the U.S. presidential election.
Global Trends 2030 is intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories over the next 15 years. As with the NIC’s previous Global Trends reports, NIC does not seek to predict the future—which would be an impossible feat—but instead provides a framework for thinking about possible futures and their implications.In-depth research, detailed modeling and a variety of analytical tools drawn from public, private and academic sources were employed in the production of Global Trends 2030. NIC leadership engaged with experts in nearly 20 countries—from think tanks, banks, government offices and business groups—to solicit reviews of the report.

The world is transforming at an unprecedented rate: it took Britain 155 years to double GDP per capita, with about 9 million people in 1870 . . . The US and Germany took between 30 and 60 years with a few tens of million people . . . but India and China are doing this at a scale and pace not seen before: 100 times the people than Britain and in one tenth the time. By 2030 Asia will be well on its way to returning to being the world’s powerhouse, just as it was before 1500.
But it is not totally back to the future: the world has been transformed in other ways. By 2030, majorities in most countries will be middle-class, not poor, which has been the condition of most people throughout human history.
Global population in urban areas is expanding quickly:
And the pace of technological change will accelerate: Absorption of new technologies by Americans has become much more rapid. The absorption rate in developing states is also quickening, allowing these states to leapfrog stages of development that advanced economies had to pass through.

This report is intended to stimulate thinking about this rapid, vast array of geopolitical, economic, and technological changes transforming our world today and their potential trajectories over the next 15-20 years. The NIC begins by identifying what it sees as the most important megatrends of our transforming world— individual empowerment, the diffusion of power to multifaceted networks and from West to East and South, demographic patterns highlighted by aging populations and exploding middle classes, and natural resource challenges. These megatrends are knowable. By themselves they point to a transformed world, but the world could transform itself in radically different ways. We are heading into uncharted waters. The NIC contends that the megatrends are interacting with six variables or game-changers that will determine what kind of transformed world we will inhabit in 2030. These game-changers—questions about the global economy, national and global governance, the nature of conflict, regional spillover, advancing technologies, and the United States’ role in the international arena—are the raw elements that could sow the seeds of global disruption or incredible advances. Based on what the NIC knows about the megatrends, and by positing the possible interactions between the megatrends and the game-changers, the NIC envisions four potential worlds. At one end of the spectrum is a Stalled Engines world in which the risks of interstate conflict increase and the US retrenches. At the other extreme is a newly rebalanced and Fused world in which social, economic, technological, and political progress is widespread. In the middle are two other
possibilities: a Gini-Out-of-the-Bottle world in which inequalities dominate or a Nonstate World in which nonstate actors flourish both for good and ill. None of these outcomes is inevitable. The future world order will be shaped by human agency as much as unfolding trends and unanticipated events. In describing potential futures, the NIC identifies inflection points as well as opportunities and risks to help readers think about strategies for influencing the world’s trajectory.

This report summarizes discussions among a group of experts who met on 1 July 2011 to examine the prospects for cooperation in the Atlantic space. Summarizing the tenor of these discussions is a challenge given the wide variety of experts involved – academics and government officials from all parts of the Atlantic participated, drawing on themes across a range of issues – economic, security, energy, environmental, crime and many others. The report therefore stays close to the original discussion, with some small editorializing here in this executive summary and in the conclusion.
The Atlantic space is a region connected by growing linkages and common challenges. One of the aims of this conference was to begin thinking about and elaborating that which distinguishes and unites the region, and indeed whether unifying characteristics are sufficient to overcome the divergences and disparities among these four continents, which together house the world’s richest and its poorest.
It is clear that economic flows and social linkages are growing across the Basin. Investment, trade, migration, social networking, criminal activities, and other indicators are on the rise, though in some cases the same is true for extra-Atlantic interactions, especially with Asia. Yet most agreed that these flows and links alone were sufficient to call for agenda-setting on governance issues, and to begin thinking about how to resolve common problems collectively.
Meanwhile Northern Atlantic basin states are the architects of the post-war economic and security order – a liberal order whose foundational ideas remain more widely accepted today than its institutional architecture, which represents a snapshot of the distribution of power in 1945. In the absence of global agreement on reframing institutions of governance, it seems doubly important to examine the Atlantic space as a region ripe for better mechanisms of cooperation.
In terms of cross-border interactions, conference participants discussed activities between social actors such as private enterprises; they looked at region-wide economic and social activity; they disaggregated activity by state and by sector. Different pictures emerged from these analyses. Taken as a whole, economic activity between South America and Africa is low (by comparison to the EU-US relationship), but in certain areas like mining and energy there is growing investment in Africa, especially from Brazil. A bewildering host of challenges and concerns emerged from these discussions. Promoting security linkages in the South Atlantic – where there is virtually nothing in place – was seen as important both because of Brazil’s rising military strength and also because new discoveries and new technologies make it possible to exploit offshore resources more comprehensively.
Likewise, new security threats – including drug shipments, piracy, and other illicit activities – threaten weak littoral states and call for cooperative security solutions. Energy, climate change, and natural resources are a key theme in the Atlantic. The divergence between the most and least efficient producers (and the most and least prolific consumers) is perhaps greater than anywhere else on the planet. The North Atlantic states have technological solutions that are the most advanced in the world. Yet they cannot translate into control of agendas and solutions, or preservation of historical rights and access to common resources. Governance mechanisms for common resources have been devised in the North
Atlantic. How can these be translated successfully to other parts of the basin? Thus, different parts of the Atlantic basin clearly have diverging objectives and concerns given varying levels of development, democratization, and security challenges. Opening the discussion of these factors raises a host of questions needing attention, among them:
★ How do interactions drive interests and what does that mean for Atlantic basin cooperation? Most (but not all) Atlantic states are market economies and democracies – can norms and values also play a role in driving cooperation, and if so what should they be?
★ What should the emerging powers of the South Atlantic do with their power? Can they serve as anchors (along with North America and the EU) around which all Atlantic states can coalesce in order to promote democracy and development, and to find solutions to common natural resource problems?
★ What is the best way forward for cooperation and policy coordination? A sectoral approach often seems most feasible, drawing together stakeholders in agreements which are limited to interested actors and to narrow sectors. But how does this affect national sovereignty? Is sovereignty still so tightly held by most states that meaningful cooperation is precluded, or can cooperative solutions be forged among Atlantic basin states without EU-style relaxation of sovereignty norms?
★ What role do (and should) civil society groups play in the Atlantic space, and how do we best ensure respect for democratic accountability and the rule of (international) law given the deep power imbalances and the diverse interests at stake?

Since the 1960s the family in the OECD area has undergone significant transformation. In many countries, the extended family has all but disappeared, and the traditional two-parent family has become much less widespread as divorce rates, re-marriages, cohabitation, single parenthood and same-sex partnerships have all increased. With rising migration, cultures and values have become more diverse, with some ethnic minorities evolving as parallel family cultures while others intermingle with mainstream cultures through mixed-race marriages. Families have seen more mothers take up work in the labour market, their adolescents spend longer and longer in education and training, and the elderly members of the family live longer and, increasingly, alone. The repercussions of these changes on housing, pensions, health and long-term care, on labour markets, education and public finances, have been remarkable. Recent demographic projections perfromed by many OECD countries suggest that the next 20 years are likely to see a continuation and even acceleration of changes in household and family structures. In particular, the numbers and shares of single-adult and single-parent households are expected to increase significantly, as is the number of couples without children. This report explores likely future changes in family and household structures in OECD countries; identifies what appear to be the main forces shaping the family landscape between now and 2030; discusses the longer-term challenges for policy arising from those expected changes; and on the basis of the three subsequent thematic chapters, suggests policy options for managing the challenges on a sustainable basis.

Launched in March 2010 by the European Commission, the Europe 2020 strategy aims at achieving “smart, sustainable and inclusive” growth. This growth is intended to be driven by three sets of engines: knowledge and innovation, a greener and more efficient use of resources and higher employment combined with social and territorial cohesion. This CEPS report takes an in-depth look at the Europe 2020 strategy and the goals it sets for the EU, with the aim of shedding light on the question of whether the strategy will succeed in fostering the global competitiveness of the European Union. While finding that the Europe 2020 strategy identifies the right key indicators for its targets, the authors advise that it should be revised in several important respects and conclude with relevant policy steps to foster the future capability of European economies and their prosperity.